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Introduction
Consider these three cases:
Case One: Four police officers arrest a man who led them on a
high-speed car chase after breaking a church window. They place him
in a holding cell and begin to beat him. During the beating, he suffers
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a heart attack. They break his nose, ribs and teeth. When they are
done, he is in a coma, with irreversible brain damage. Convicted of
assault, three officers are sentenced to weekends in jail for between
thirty and forty-five weekends. The fourth officer receives a sus-
pended sentence and 180 hours of community service.' The lenient
sentences cause an outcry from the public, but the judge states they
have "'already been punished and stigmatized enormously by the un-
precedented publicity surrounding this case. ' ''2
Case Two: A police officer arrests the driver of a car and his
passenger after a high-speed chase. The passenger is pinned to the
ground and handcuffed, then the officer stomps on his body, kicks
him, jams a shotgun barrel to his forehead and slams his face against
the patrol car. The passenger's injuries include a laceration requiring
sutures, a broken nose, contusions to the eyes, several chipped teeth
and a contusion on the forehead.3 The officer pleads guilty to a mis-
demeanor civil rights charge of using excessive force and is fined
$500.4 The judge concludes that the officer's act was aberrant, that he
has suffered enough and that he would lose his job if sentenced to
probation.5
Case Three: A police officer orders a group of people to leave a
public street comer notorious for illegal activity. When two people
refuse to leave, the officer repeatedly assaults them with his baton.
He is convicted of felony and misdemeanor use of excessive force and
sentenced to three years probation and 500 hours of community ser-
vice. Although the maximum penalties for these two crimes are three
years and eight months in prison respectively, the judge says that he
does not think prison is appropriate.6
Since the exposure of reprehensible behavior committed by some
police officers in the Los Angeles Police Department through the
Rodney King beating and O.J. Simpson trial, media commentators,
academicians and politicians across the country are discussing police
brutality and other police wrongdoing, bringing to light examples of it
1. Police-Beating Sentences Dismay Montreal Public, SEATrLE TIMES, July 14, 1995,
at A17.
2. Editorial, The Montreal Sentencing, VANCOUVER SUN, July 17, 1995, at A.
3. United States' Sentencing Memorandum at 2-5, United States v. Kachadurian
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 1989) (No. 89-251-Cr-T-10(A)).
4. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 2,23, United States v. Kachadurian (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 13, 1989) (No. 89-251-Cr-T-10(A)).
5. Transcript at 21-23, Kachadurian (No. 89-251-Cr-T-10(A)).
6. Eric Malnic, Judge Gives Ex-Officer Probation for Beating, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1991, at B1.
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in their local jurisdictions. Most of these discussions describe the
problem and propose steps to be taken in the future to reform police
departments and police misconduct.7 Focusing on the prevention of
police brutality should be a priority in these reforms, provided that
prevention efforts address its many-layered causes.8 However, it is
equally important to ensure that justice is done when prevention fails.
This Article addresses a critical part of the criminal justice pro-
cess that bears on police brutality-sentencing. The low sentences in
the three descriptions above may seem shocking, but they are not at
all unusual in police brutality cases.9 In many instances, police officers
manage to avoid prison altogether for criminal acts that, if committed
by civilians, would lead to many years imprisonment. 10 When police
do go to prison, it is often for a fraction of the sentence that normally
results from a particular crime. This is so even when their brutality
causes permanent disability or death.1'
Now consider this case: Four police officers arrest a man for bur-
glarizing a pizzeria. On the spot, they begin to beat him, continuing
even after the man is subdued, handcuffed and knocked unconscious.
Three of the officers are convicted of misdemeanor battery and mis-
conduct and sentenced to sixty days in jail. It is considered "unprece-
dented" for police to receive a jail sentence for brutality in that
7. Examples abound of the burgeoning media pursuit of this issue. See e.g., Pierre
Thomas, Police Brutality: An Issue Rekindled, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1995, at Al (reviewing
the scope of, and reactions to, police brutality nationally); Sam V. Meddis, Case Forcing
Police to Take a Closer Look, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 13, 1995, at 4A (discussing changes in
police procedure as a result of the criticism of the Los Angeles Police Department in the
O.J. Simpson case); Many Police Chiefs Re-examine Reform after O.J. Trial, NPR Radio
Broadcast, Oct. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, NPR file (exploring possible
agency reforms to address racist behavior within law enforcement departments) [hereinaf-
ter NPR Radio Broadcast].
8. See discussion infra Part I.C on causes of police brutality.
9. I discussed in the first case an example of police brutality in Canada to illustrate
that the problem of unjust sentencing for police brutality is not limited to the United
States. This Article, however, is concerned with sentencing in the United States.
10. See infra note 104 for discussion.
11. In United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975), the court affirmed
the conviction of a police officer who was sentenced to six months imprisonment and five
years probation after leaving a man in a permanent coma from a fractured skull when he
beat him following his arrest. Similarly, in United States v. Nieves-Rivera, 961 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1992), the court initially placed a police officer on probation for his role in beating a
person who died as a result. Id. at 16. After learning that it lacked authority under 18
U.S.C. § 3651 to suspend the sentence, the court resentenced him to a year and a day in
prison. Id. This crime was punishable by life imprisonment, and the government had
asked for 30 years. Brief for the United States at 4, United States v. Nieves-Rivera, 961
F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1846).
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jurisdiction.' 2 But the judge reasons that, "'[o]nce a police officer
steps across that line . . . he is placing himself in the same kind of
posture as the thugs who he is seeking to arrest.""' 3
The sentence in this fourth case was quite mild, not much harsher
than the sentences given in the first three cases. What distinguishes
this case from the others is the attitude conveyed by the judge. The
judge insisted that we not be blinded by the badge, but rather, that we
see such police behavior through the same lens that we view other
violent crimes.
When the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated
sentencing guidelines for police brutality, it did just what the judge in
this fourth case said had to be done.14 The Commission created a sen-
tencing structure for civil rights offenses that punishes police for their
crimes under the same criteria and according to the same calculations
used in sentencing civilian criminals.'5 A police officer who assaults
someone is subject to the same guidelines as anyone else.' 6 In fact,
the sentences given to police, as well as to others acting under color of
law in civil rights crimes, are enhanced because they have not only
violated the law, but have violated the public trust as well.
17
In theory then, and often in practice, the federal civil rights sen-
tencing guidelines eliminate the sort of gross disparities exemplified in
the cases above. Common to these cases is the fact that these
sentences were determined in jurisdictions without sentencing guide-
lines governing police brutality.'8 Without guidelines, judges are
often constrained by community attitudes and norms, even when they
12. Jon Jeter, 3 P. G. Officers Sentenced to Jail for Beating Suspect; Judge's Decision
Unprecedented in County, WASH. POST, June 14, 1995, at B1.
13. Id.
14. The federal sentencing guidelines first went into effect on November 1, 1987.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATE-
mENTs 1.1 (1987). Although police brutality is not specifically discussed, it is one of the
civil rights crimes for which sentencing guidelines were promulgated. Parts III and IV of
this Article discuss their history, operation and impact. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FED.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 143-44 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 GUIDELINES
MANUAL].
15. See discussion infra Part III.A detailing how the federal sentencing guidelines
work.
16. Note that the two crimes are different. Police officers legally may use force under
a variety of circumstances and thus have defenses that are not available to civilians. But
once they are convicted of using excessive force, the guidelines apply equally to their
conduct.
17. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note.14, at 137-39.
18. Case One is from Canada, which does not have sentencing guidelines. Case Two
is a United States civil rights case decided prior to the enactment of the federal sentencing
guidelines. Case Three is from California which has enacted detailed statutory sentencing
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recognize the problem and want to use prison as punishment, as in the
fourth case described above. Sentencing guidelines in police brutality
cases state a presumption and set a standard against which judges
must justify divergences. 19
In the federal system, which is the focus of this Article, two fac-
tors have contributed to an increase in police sentences: the elimina-
tion of sentencing disparities between police and civilian crimes, and
the assignment of additional penalties for the civil rights dimension of
the crime.20 Federal prosecutors generally support this result, con-
tending that the minimal sentences imposed prior to the enactment of
guidelines diminished the seriousness of these crimes.21 This argu-
ment is particularly potent in light of the extraordinary legal and prac-
tical difficulties involved in prosecuting police brutality, particularly as
a civil rights crime, 22 in which a racial dimension is commonly present.
Although race is not an element of the crime, and no racial or ethnic
group has a corner on being either perpetrators or victims of it, police
brutality, like lynchings in the past, symbolizes racism to many people.
Under these circumstances, it is important not to dilute the message
that police are not above the law with a trivial sentence.
The policy of fair punishment for police brutality achieved by the
use of civil rights sentencing guidelines may be shortlived, however.
In the past year, these guidelines have faced challenges on two fronts.
First, in January 1995, the Sentencing Commission staff proposed that
the Commission reduce the offense level for civil rights crimes com-
mitted under color of law, and correspondingly reduce the sentence to
but leaves police brutality untouched. Case Four is from Maryland which has indetermi-
nate sentencing.
19. This is not to say that sentencing guidelines are always sound. Removing judicial
discretion from sentencing raises serious questions, and the federal system, in particular,
imposes very harsh sentences. These and other issues have been the subject of much schol-
arship but are beyond the scope of this Article. See infra notes 193 & 279 and accompany-
ing text. The claim this Article asserts is that sentencing guidelines are necessary in police
brutality cases. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
20. This is sometimes referred to as "the civil rights enhancement." See infra Part
III.A.2 for a description of how the civil rights guidelines operate. See discussion infra
Parts III and IV. Equivalent sentences between police and civilians could have been
achieved by lowering the sentences for civilian crimes to the penalties police used to re-
ceive. Partly because of mandatory minimum sentences set by Congress and partly be-
cause of its own punishment philosophy, the Sentencing Commission generally increased
sentences across the board.
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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be applied.23 Ultimately, however, the Commission overrode the pro-
posal and slightly increased the guideline levels.24
Secondly, and more ominously, on June 13, 1996, the Supreme
Court upheld most of the departure grounds applied by the trial court
in sentencing the two police officers convicted in the Rodney King
beating- 5 The two officers challenged the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the sentencing guidelines applicable to their crime, reversing
the trial court's downward departure from the guidelines. The down-
ward departure adopted by the trial court drastically reduced the of-
ficers' sentences. The trial court's justification for departure cut to the
quick of the crime. By singling out factors that are inherent in police
brutality to support downward departure, the court was, in essence,
disparaging the crime itself.26 In so doing, the trial court essentially
excused the officers' behavior.27 The Supreme Court's reversal of the
Ninth Circuit is troubling not only because of the symbolic weight that
the "Rodney King case" carries, but also because the decision paves
the way for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines in
future police brutality cases. The effect of this action is to send a
message to police, and the nation, that police are above the law.28
Now the Sentencing Commission must act again, this time to ensure
that just sentencing for police brutality is not circumvented by the
Supreme Court's ruling. It must promptly amend the guidelines to
make clear that the departure grounds approved in Koon are not nor-
mally applicable in police brutality cases.
29
This Article argues that police brutality is an egregious crime, the
harm of which extends beyond the physical and psychological injuries
to victims. Situated in a social reality of acute racial divisions and
radically different perceptions of, and experiences in, the criminal jus-
tice system, police brutality serves as a lightning rod for widespread
23. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 2430,2435-37 (1995)
(amendments to federal sentencing guidelines).
24. Proposed Guideline Amendments for Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 2430 (1995).
25. Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996).
26. For the trial court's justification of the sentences, see Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 785-
88.
27. Koon is not the first police brutality case to have raised these issues. Two other
cases, United States v. Rorke, No. 90-485, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11932, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 22, 1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1994), and United States v. Couch, No. 94-
3292, 1995 WL 369318 (6th Cir. June 20, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996),
presented appeals courts with downward departure claims. See infra Part IV.B.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 415-18.
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public fear and anger. How we deal with it, and particularly how we
sentence those who perpetuate it, speak volumes about our commit-
ment to overcoming these deep societal chasms.
Part I of this Article describes police brutality and its causes,
placing the conduct in the larger context of race and ethnicity in the
United States, especially the African-American relationship to the
criminal justice system. Part I then examines the harms of police bru-
tality and argues that the failure to control the police brings with it
terrible social consequences and undermines the rule of law. Part II
contends that police brutality needs to be treated like the serious
crime that it is and sentenced accordingly, but that all too often it is
ignored. The states and even the federal government have long ne-
glected the reality of police brutality. Civil rights laws have inade-
quately enhanced sentences punishing police brutality. Part III
examines the federal sentencing guidelines, describing their operation
and their effect in strengthening sentencing. Part IV recounts the en-
actment history of the civil rights guidelines, arguing that after a weak
start, the Sentencing Commission intended to send a strong message
condemning police brutality. Part IV then analyzes several key con-
flicting cases that address downward departures from the guidelines in
police brutality cases. I examine in detail Koon v. United States, the
case that arguably reverses the beneficial effects of the guidelines and
reinstates a double standard for police. In failing to reject the use of
pretextual grounds for departure, the Supreme Court's decision allows
police officers to escape just sentencing for brutality convictions. Ac-
cordingly, the Article argues that Koon is not a case presenting nar-
row questions of technical application and standard of review, but was
one raising an enormously important social problem that has far-
reaching consequences for the nation's well-being. The Article con-
cludes that it is incumbent upon the Sentencing Commission to reaf-
firm its intent to maintain strong police brutality sentences by
amending the guidelines to reject the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the departure rules in these cases.
1. Why Police Brutality is a Problem
A. Definitions
Effective police work often requires, and therefore justifies, the
use of reasonable force. However, distinguishing between a legitimate
and an excessive use of force is sometimes difficult. Even the "obvi-
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ous" cases are not obvious to everyone, as evidenced by the acquittals
in the state prosecution of Rodney King's batterers.30
Many criminologists and other academic researchers distinguish
between the force that is necessary to get the job done and therefore
authorized, and unauthorized force.31 This distinction reflects police
policy, but is not helpful in understanding what police brutality is.
Also, as a policy matter, much police behavior should be deemed un-
acceptable and thus censorable even though it might not be
actionable.
A useful way of understanding this gradation is to focus on "po-
lice abuse of authority," defined as "any action by a police officer
without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult,
trespass upon human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or
violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency
in the course of performing 'police work'. '32 Police abuse of authority
can be physical, psychological or legal. "Physical abuse occurs when a
police officer uses more force than is necessary to effect a lawful arrest
or search, and/or the wanton use of any degrees [sic] of physical force
against another by a police officer under the color of the officer's au-
thority. ' 33 In this circumstance, police abuse of authority and police
brutality become synonymous. Psychological abuse occurs when: "a
30. Despite carefully wrought definitions in the caselaw and academic literature de-
lineating the distinction, in the end most juries simply refuse to convict police. CATHERINE
H. MILTON ET AL., POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 85 (1977). See discussion infra Part
II.B.3. The lack of agreement on what constitutes a reasonable use of force reflects a
experiential gap, because some communities that see police brutality all the time know
perfectly well what it is. See Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the
Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1533, 1565-66 (1993) (describing how people from differ-
ent demographic backgrounds have different perceptions of reality; those who have wit-
nessed or frequently heard about police brutality against minorities will evaluate what
excessive force is differently than those who have not). This dichotomy may begin to
change due to the crash course provided by the O.J. Simpson trial that has made many
people previously untouched by, or unaware of, police misconduct more aware of such
problems.
31. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Causes of Police Behavior: The Current State of Quan-
titative Research, 17 J. RES. CRIME & DELINO. 69 (1980) (defining police violence as the
justified and unjustified use of any physical force against citizens); Robert J. Friedrich,
Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organizations, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sa. 82 (1980) (describing police use of force as any legitimate or illegitimate
forceful activity which produces physical or emotional injury); Richard E. Kania & Wade
C. Mackey, Police Violence as a Function of Community Characteristics, 15 CRIMINOLOGY
27, 29 (1977) (defining excessive force by police as more violence than is "justified to effect
a legitimate police function").
32. Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, A Typology of Police Deviance, in POLICE
DEVIANCE 4, 7 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter eds., 1991).
33. Id.
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police officer verbally assails, ridicules, discriminates, or harasses indi-
viduals and/or places a person who is under the actual or constructive
dominion of the officer in a situation where the individual's esteem or
self-image [sic] are threatened or diminished. ' 34 Under this defini-
tion, an officer who threatens physical harm or an unjustified arrest to
an individual is engaging in psychological abuse.35 Legal abuse may
occur even without physical or psychological abuse. It is the "viola-
tion of a person's constitutional, federally protected, or state-pro-
tected rights by a police officer. '36
The justification for expanding the concept of police brutality to
encompass physical, psychological and legal abuse is that the broader
concept more accurately captures the wrenching experiences many
people have with the police. 37 Police departments will benefit from
thinking in these terms while trying to improve police/community re-
lations. Also, the term "police brutality" connotes physical injury,
which may not always result from excessive use of force or other po-
lice abuse.38
Legal definitions correspond imperfectly to the definitions pro-
posed above. There is no statute outlawing "police brutality" per se.39
Under state law, the crimes with which police are typically charged
include assault, battery, manslaughter and murder. Under federal
law, police are charged with the willful deprivation of a federal or con-
34. Id. at 7-8.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Barker & Carter, supra note 32, at 198. Carter notes that others have run into the
same difficulty defining police brutality. For instance, he observes that the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice called brutality exces-
sive force, name-calling, sarcasm, ridicule and disrespect, while the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights called it the "violation of due process" as well as "the unnecessary use of
violence to enforce mores of segregation, to punish, and to coerce confessions." Id. at 198.
38. United States v. Calhoun emphasized that "the law establishes.., that a prosecu-
tion for deprivation of rights does not depend upon death or serious physical injury to the
victim .... [E]ven if... [the victim] had suffered no apparent physical injury, nevertheless,
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 might have occurred if the striking were unwarranted and
with the intent to deprive ... [the victim] of a constitutional right ...." 726 F.2d 162, 163
(4th Cir. 1984). Thus, a defendant is not entitled to instruct the jury to consider the severity
of the victim's injuries because it is the use of excessive force, rather than the degree of the
victim's injury, that determines the crime. United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 948 (5th
Cir. 1987).
39. Nevertheless, this Article often uses the shorthand "police brutality" in lieu of the
unwieldy "law enforcement use of excessive force."
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stitutional right under color of law.40 Nevertheless, in excessive force
cases brought under either state or federal law, the initial question is
whether the physical force employed by the police was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. 41 Under a broader definition of
police brutality that encompasses both psychological and legal abuse,
the challenged conduct of the police might be weighed against some
other norm. 42 But irrespective of whether the injury results from
40. The federal statutes under which police excessive force crimes are normally prose-
cuted are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 (1994). See infra note 144 and accompanying text of
statutes.
41. The Supreme Court has said that reasonableness is measured by an objective stan-
dard in which intent or motivation is irrelevant. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989). See infra note 298. The confusion between academic and legal definitions of police
brutality is exemplified by the work of two prominent scholars, Jerome Skolnick and James
Fyfe, who have written extensively and testified as experts on police matters. Skolnick and
Fyfe call brutality a "conscious and venal act committed by officers who usually take great
pains to conceal their misconduct." JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE
LAW 19 (1993). In contrast, unnecessary force "is usually a training problem, the result of
ineptitude or insensitivity." Id. at 20. Accordingly, under Skolnick and Fyfe's scheme,
brutality is intentional, whereas unnecessary force is a mistake made in good faith. Id.
Looking at police brutality this way may be helpful for police departments because it sug-
gests a scheme through which they can evaluate and respond to the problem. Skolnick and
Fyfe recommend that police departments deal with intentional brutality by firing guilty
officers and reforming the particular department's deviant culture. In contrast, when of-
ficers use unnecessary force, a new training program is recommended. Id at 19-20. But in
analyzing police behavior for possible civil or criminal prosecution, Skolnick and Fyfe's
approach is too limited. It would allow a large category of inappropriate or abusive police
behavior to go untouched by the law.
In one area of the law, Skolnick and Fyfe's distinction does apply. Intent is relevant in
prisons where the Eighth Amendment is most often invoked. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Prison officials must exhibit "deliberate indifference" to prisoners, Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294,303 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); or in riot situations, the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986),
in order to be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation. Both of these standards encom-
pass a subjective component involving intent.
42. It is easier to conceptualize excessive physical force than, for example, excessive
psychological abuse. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Force of Law, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 76,
77 (interviewing experts who believe that the Graham standard is easy to understand, com-
mon-sensical and "well within the grasp of most jurors.") If psychological abuse were to be
actionable, a more appropriate norm might be drawn from tort law: did the police officer
intentionally inflict emotional distress? In the case of legal abuse unaccompanied by physi-
cal or psychological abuse, the test might be whether the officer knowingly deprived the
victim of a protected right. The point is that the current law treats police brutality as a
physical phenomenon and tests its legality against a physical norm.
Some states have enacted laws to reach non-physical police abuse of authority. Most
are modeled after the Model Penal Code. Section 243.1, entitled "Official Oppression,"
provides:
A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advan-
tage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor if, knowing
that his conduct is illegal, he
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
physical, psychological, or legal abuse, inappropriate conduct within
any of the three categories is always wrong and should be condemned.
B. Incidence
At the outset, two observations concerning the incidence of po-
lice brutality are important: First, while police brutality is aberrant in
the sense of deviating from acceptable behavior, it is not aberrant in
the sense of being unusual.43 Second, no truly reliable statistics on the
occurrence of police brutality exist.44
A survey of law enforcement agencies conducted by the Police
Foundation and funded by the National Institute of Justice, attempted
to compile the number of incidents of excessive use of force commit-
ted by police during 1991.45 The survey used a representative sample
of four types of law enforcement agencies: county sheriffs, county po-
lice, municipal police and state police.46 Citizens lodged a total of
15,608 complaints of excessive force in 1991 to agencies in the sample,
with the greatest number by far (13,886) attributable to city police
departments. 47 In order to standardize the absolute number of com-
plaints, the Foundation calculated the number of complaints of exces-
sive force for every one thousand law enforcement officers within
each category of agency. The weighted averages48 were 15.7 per thou-
sand for state agencies, 20.7 for sheriffs' departments, 33.8 for county
(A) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dis-
possession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal or property rights;
or
(B) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right,
privilege, power or immunity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 243.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
43. See discussion infra Part I.C.
44. There is no national reporting requirement. Police Brutality: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1991) (remarks of Don Edwards, Chairman) [hereinafter Police Bru-
tality Hearings]. Local agency records are often incomplete, biased and inaccessible to
researchers. Moreover, they are not necessarily comparable because they measure differ-
ent things. ANTHONY M. PATE & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICIAL
REPORTS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 24 (1993).
45. PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 44, at 8.
46. Id. at 49. For a description of the survey methods see id. at 48-62.
47. Id. at 90. This figure underestimates the actual number of incidents. Not all agen-
cies in the survey provided complaint data; approximately 25 percent did not respond to
questions about excessive force. Moreover, the reliability and validity of the data were
affected by the different ways agencies counted and categorized misconduct complaints.
Id. at 89.
48. Weighted averages are used to standardize the absolute number of complaints,
allowing comparison between large and small law enforcement agencies. Weighted aver-
ages are calculated by dividing the total number of complaints received from each respond-
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police departments and 47.5 for city police departments.49 With the
exception of the state agencies, males and African Americans submit-
ted the most complaints.50
A Gallup Poll taken in March 1991 asked a sample of citizens,
"Have you ever been physically mistreated or abused by the po-
lice?" 51 Five percent of all respondents and nine percent of all non-
white respondents answered in the affirmative. Twenty percent of all
respondents said they knew of someone who had been a victim.52
These statistics are more startling in light of the ambiguity of the ques-
tion posed. Respondents could have easily understood the inter-
viewer to be asking about only incidents of violent attack resulting in
serious injury.
Other studies report excessive use of force in police-civilian en-
counters ranging from one-third of a percent 53 to 13.6 percent.54 A
survey of police officers in a small southern city found incredibly that
forty percent thought their fellow officers had at some point used ex-
cessive force on a prisoner.55 These widely varying statistics are not
surprising given the lack of uniform definitions and reporting require-
ments. Nevertheless, taken together, a very serious account of police
brutality emerges.
ing agency by the number of sworn officers in that agency. The result is multiplied by one
thousand. Id. at 106.
49. PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 44, at 106-07.
50. Id. at 155, 159-62. Other studies also report that people of color file more com-
plaints of police brutality than whites do. In one population that was studied, 67 percent of
complaints were filed by African Americans (who made up 41 percent of the population).
TWenty-five percent of the complainants were unemployed. DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COM-
MON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REvIEW 24-25 (1994). Another study based in New York found
that African Americans represented only 24 percent of population yet file 44.8 percent of
complaints. Similarly, Hispanics represented 19.9 percent of the population and filed 25.1
percent of complaints. Id. at 28 (citing NEw YORK CIVILIAN COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIVE
BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT 1989). In a survey of people in the Bronx, a largely minority
community, a cross section of people said they had seen police harassment or brutality in
an arrest. Id. at 24 (citing James R. Davis, A Comparison of Attitudes Toward the New
York City Police, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 238 (1990)).
51. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL (Mar. 20, 1991).
52. Id. at 2-3.
53. Robert Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police
Use of Force, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE
ABUSE OF FORCE (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995).
54. GORDON P. WHITAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BASIC ISSUES IN POLICE PER-
FORMANCE (1982).
55. Thomas Barker, An Empirical Study of Police Deviance Other Than Corruption,
in POLICE DEVIANCE, supra note 32.
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C. Causes
(1) Police Brutality is a Societal Problem
Competing claims about the causes of police brutality create a
false dichotomy of police behavior. Some commentators speculate
that police who use excessive force are "rotten apples," while the ma-
jority of police officers are honest, forthright and refrain from vio-
lence.56 Others reject the "rotten apple" theory, arguing instead that
police brutality is an occupational hazard, endemic to police work.57
Although psychological profiling is unable to identify violence-prone
officers,58 the "rotten apple" theory clearly has some validity, even if
limited. As widespread and culture bound as the problem of police
brutality is, it is apparent that most police officers do not beat people
up.59 At the same time, the causes of police brutality, including, inter
alia, police culture, job stress and racism, are social problems that can-
not be eliminated merely by firing or incarcerating a few bad cops. 60
A complete account of police brutality must reject the false dichotomy
and recognize that some, perhaps many but certainly not all, police
are violent, and that the causes of police violence are not only individ-
ually-based, but also stem from our society and culture.
Police brutality is not a new phenomenon-rather, its setting has
shifted. Many scholars analogize police brutality today to lynchings in
56. MILTON, supra note 30, at 140; PEREZ, supra note 50, at 29; William 0. Dwyer et
al., Psychological Screening of Law Enforcement Officers: A Case for Job Relatedness, 17 J.
POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 176, 180 (1990) (discussing the "rotten apple theory's" validity);
Michelle A. Travis, Psychological Health Tests for Violence-Prone Police Officers: Objec-
tives, Shortcomings, and Alternatives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1717, 1765 (1994) (describing the
"rotten apple theory" as a belief that violent officer behavior stems from personality flaws
rather than the law enforcement "subculture"). See also A. Ray McCoy, Panel Discussion
II, Duties Associated with the Right to Self-Determination, Proceedings of the Conference on
African-Americans and the Right to Self-Determination, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 71 (1993)
(stating that the U.S. government's response to a United Nations' petition alleging human
rights violations by police against African Americans was that these were "isolated
incidents").
57. PEREZ, supra note 50, at 47.
58. Travis. supra note 56, at 1765.
59. Barker & Carter, supra note 32, at v ("[P]roblems of police deviance ... reflect
the exception rather than the rule .... police misconduct represent[s] the minority of of-
ficers whose behavior taints their peers."). But see PEREZ, supra note 50, at 29-30 (observ-
ing that complaints are distributed among the majority of officers rather than certain
officers receiving large numbers).
60. See Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Fed-
eral Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1481-82
(1993) (emphasizing that indifference to police brutality was widespread throughout the
Los Angeles Police Department and most likely contributed to the development of abusive
police officers).
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the past.61 The analogy is apt. For nearly a century following the
Emancipation of slaves in the United States, law enforcement officials
not only condoned lynchings, 62 but in many instances participated in
them.63 Judge Higginbotham describes Rodney King's beating as "a
61. See, e.g., Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Terror Austerity Race Gender Excess Theater, in
READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 23 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed.
1993) [hereinafter READING RODNEY KING]; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 24;
Abraham L. Davis, The Rodney King Incident: Isolated Occurrence or a Continuation of a
Brutal Past?, 10 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 67 (1993).
62. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 204, 434 (1988) (stating that law enforcement officials were afraid to prosecute
whites); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950
8 (1980) (stating that "public officials ... either cooperated with the mob or sought refuge
in silence and inaction."); REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1866) (reporting that local officials refused to "prevent or punish" crimes perpe-
trated against African Americans during Reconstruction). The Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Enforcement Act of 1871 were passed to protect African Americans from vigilante
violence. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. Government complicity in lynch-
ing continued well into the 20th century. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To
SECURE THESE RIGHTS 23 (1947) ("Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsi-
bility of state or local governments .... Frequently, state officials participate in the crime,
actively or passively.").
63. FONER, supra note 62, at 203 (Confederate soldiers often became policemen after
the Civil War and regularly terrorized the African American community). It is clear from
the debates on the Enforcement Act of 1871 that Congress knew that law enforcement
officials participated in lynchings and mob violence. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1871). One member described an incident in his district: "[S]uddenly,
without provocation or warning, a policeman, or at least a man in the uniform of a police-
man, drew a pistol and deliberately put a bullet through the body of a quiet and inoffensive
colored man standing near him. Immediately, an indiscriminate and rapid firing com-
menced . . . . For at least five minutes a steady fire was poured into the retreating
crowd .... [T]he panic was increased by the discovery that the police force was in full
sympathy with the murderers, and were themselves emptying their revolvers into the terri-
fied and struggling mass of human beings who were frantically striving to get beyond their
range." ld. at 184 (statement of Rep. James Platt). See also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note
41, at 24 (police participated in at least half of the lynchings in the 1930s); WE CHARGE
GENOCIDE 10-12, 58, 59, 81, 82, 120, 225 (William L. Patterson ed., 1951) (describing nu-
merous cases of police participation in, and even instigation of, mob attacks on African
Americans up to the 1950s); see also Howard N. Rabinowitz, The Conflict between Blacks
and the Police in the Urban South, 1865-1900, HISTORIAN, Nov. 1976, at 62, reprinted in
RACE AND CRIMINAL JuSTIcE 318,324-26 (Paul Finkelman ed. 1992) (recounting instances
of police brutality against African Americans in post-Civil War urban communities that
were rarely punished).
See also Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1943) (holding that a
sheriff who refused to protect several Jehovah's Witnesses who were victims of mob vio-
lence and who also participated in the violence violated federal law); Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (declaring that persons in the custody of a United States Mar-
shall have a constitutional right to be protected from lawless violence); Downie v. Powers,
193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951) (finding that a law enforcement officer's failure to protect
Jehovah's Witnesses was actionable under §1983); Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476,
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haunting sequel to the widespread lynching of blacks in the
south."64
Brutality during police interrogations, known as the "third de-
gree," also has a sordid history.65 In 1931, the National Commission
of Law Enforcement and Observance, appointed by President Her-
bert Hoover and headed by George Wickersham,66 investigated the
use of the "third degree," and concluded that it was "widespread
throughout the country. ' 67 In 1930, close to one-quarter of the crimi-
nal defendants in New York City alleged that they were beaten by the
police.68 Third degree victims were disproportionately African-Amer-
ican and the severity of treatment was reportedly greater when the
victim was African American.
69
Although lynchings and third degree interrogations are no longer
part of police routine, police brutality falls on the same continuum of
behavior. First, although it is not always motivated by racism, police
brutality cannot be understood apart from race. Throughout the his-
479 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (concluding that African-American prisoners
have a right to be protected by officers against injuries by third parties under federal law).
64. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Aderson B. Francois, Looking for God and Racism
in all the Wrong Places, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (1993). According to the Tuskegee
Institute archives, between 1882 and 1968 there were 4,743 recorded lynching deaths, of
which 3,446 (72.7 percent) were African-American. It is doubtful that these recorded sta-
tistics fully capture the true scale and strength of this terrorism. ZANGRANDO, supra note
62, at 4. Although civil rights groups have been collecting and publicizing reports since
1898, no formal reporting mechanisms existed until Congress Passed the Hate Crimes Sta-
tistics Act in 1990. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
See also MICHAEL NEWTON & JUDY ANN NEWTON, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA: A CHRONOLOGY Xi (1991) (listing over 8000 accounts of "atrocity, acts of may-
hem, murder, and intimidation" motivated by racial or religious animus but speculating
that there were many more victims or their families who were too terrified to report these
crimes out of fear of retaliation).
65. The "third degree" is "the employment of methods which inflict suffering, physical
or mental, upon a person in order to obtain information about a crime . . . . Those who
inflict the third degree are ordinarily law-enforcing officials-police, detectives, sheriffs, or
prosecutors." ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. ET AL., THE THIRD DEGREE: REPORT TO THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 19 (Arno Press 1969)
(1931).
66. The Commission was known as the "Wickersham Commission."
67. CHAFEE ET AL., supra note 65, at 153. Techniques included solitary confinement
in dark, cold cells; near-suffocations in "sweat boxes;" whippings; beatings with rubber
hoses, clubs or fists; kickings; threats at gunpoint; intimidation and promises; sleep depriva-
tion; withholding food; and visits to the morgue. ld. at 47-48, 153.
68. Id. at 225. One former district attorney admitted to the Commission that: "'The
third degree has now become established and recognized practice in the police department
of the city of New York[, and] .. .every police station in the city is equipped with the
instruments to administer the torture incident to that process."' Id. at 90-91.
69. Id. at 101, 158-59.
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tory of the United States, police violence against people of color has
reinforced white supremacy by discipline and repression.70 Second,
the police mentality in the two behaviors is the same: they believe
that ordinary legal processes are inadequate to maintain order and




Racist beliefs that people of color, especially African Americans,
are more dangerous and prone to criminality than whites, have long
fueled white fears and have spurred mob savagery in the past. Today,
one way these beliefs destroy African-American lives is by sending
disproportionate numbers of African Americans into the criminal jus-
tice system. African-American men are arrested, incarcerated and ex-
ecuted at a rate out of proportion to their numbers in the
population.72 Even taking into account the higher crime rates among
African Americans (itself not a neutral fact), the statistics make it
clear that the criminal justice system is not color-blind.73
70. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
71. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
72. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (1995) (finding that 45 percent of those
arrested for violent crime are African Americans and 32.2 percent of African-American
men aged 20-29 are under criminal justice supervision on any given day); Marc Mauer,
Lock 'Em Up and Throw Away the Key: African-American Males and the Criminal Justice
System, in THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE: A SECOND EMANCIPATION 57,64 (1992) (not-
ing that African-American men constitute 48 percent of drug arrestees); NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. REPORTER 773 (1995) (indicating that
in 1994 nearly 40 percent of those on death row were African-American); Robert Tillman,
The Size of the "Criminal Population". The Prevalence and Incidence of Adult Arrest, 25
CRIMINOLOGY 561, 567-69 (1987) (observing that, even before the war on drugs, two-fifths
of African-American men in California between 18 and 29 had been arrested, twice the
rate for white men).
Hispanics, too, are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. But because they
are harder to identify, data are often inconclusive. MAUER & HULING, supra, at 6. From
1980 to 1993, the number of Hispanic prisoners doubled. Ld. Hispanics are frequent vic-
tims in drug war sweeps. See infra note 76. In 1992, nearly 90 percent of those sentenced
to state prisons for drug possession were African Americans and Hispanics. MAUER &
HULING, supra, at 13.
73. Unless one subscribes to the myth that African-American men are inherently
predisposed to commit more crime than anyone else, the explanation for such asymmetric
involvement in the criminal justice system lies within the complex intersection of racism
and poverty. Granted, the overrepresentation of African-American men in the criminal
justice system is not necessarily solely the result of racial bias. Current research concludes
that in certain areas, such as sentencing and incarceration, racial patterns in crime, rather
than bias, are more often the cause of the disparities. MAUER & HULING, supra note 72, at
7. Clearly, conditions such as high unemployment, poor education, the growth of gangs
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and the lack of drug treatment programs, as well as alienation, hopelessness and a sense of
futility, can push people into criminal acts, and the inability to buy a good defense sends
them to prison. These conditions are dominant in the lives of many poor African Ameri-
cans and other people of color.
But even though it is hard to measure, racial bias must be acknowledged. For exam-
ple, scholars have tried to compare the influence of discrimination and crime rates on the
disparate number of shootings of African Americans by police. See infra note 76. One
school argues that "the police have one trigger-finger for whites and another for blacks."
Mark Blumberg, Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring Some Key Issues, in POLICE DEVI-
ANCE, supra note 32, at 230 (quoting P. Takagi, A Garrison State in a 'Democratic' Society,
in CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A JOURNAL OF RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY, Spring-Summer
1974). Another school reasons that African Americans are shot more because they are
disproportionately involved in violent criminal activity. Id. While research does not con-
clusively validate either explanation, available methodologies are not capable of capturing
the full extent of bias. Blumberg concludes that, even though the evidence is mixed, "we
must recognize that race discrimination at the societal level is clearly responsible for much
of the disproportionate representation of blacks as shooting victims .... ." Id. at 232-33.
See also Kevin P. Jenkins, Police Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities: Ways to Stop the
Killings, 9 HARV. BLACKLE-I-rER J. 1, 8-12 (1992) (examining studies concerning whether
racial prejudice is a factor in police shootings of African Americans and concluding that
racism, even if disguised, often plays a role).
Furthermore, we know that racial bias exists. As long as racist ideologies are vigor-
ously propagated, such as those by Detective Mark Fuhrman of the O.J. Simpson trial,
there will be adherents among all sectors of society, including people who work in the
criminal justice system. People have a great deal of discretion in the criminal justice sys-
tem, particularly at the front end. Police do not arrest everyone believed to have commit-
ted a crime, nor do prosecutors bring every possible case to trial. Under these
circumstances, it is impossible to completely protect against the subtle (or not so subtle)
influences of racist beliefs. This reality underscores a main premise of this Article-that
limits on judicial discretion in sentencing police brutality are a good idea because pro-
police and anti-victim biases bring about unjust results.
Besides the direct influence of racial animus, the criminal justice system itself is in-
fected by racial inequities causing disparate treatment of African Americans and other
racial minorities. For instance, few people of color serve as judges. In 1991, only 465 out
of 12,000 full-time state judges were African Americans and 150 were Latino. NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, The Color of Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 62, 62.
In 1992, of 837 federal judges, only 4.3 percent were African-American and in the preced-
ing eleven years, only sixteen African-American and seventeen Hispanic judges were ap-
pointed to the federal bench. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Racial Injustice and American
Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 60. Relatively few people of color become lawyers. In
1990, 3.2 percent of United States lawyers were African-American and 2.7 percent were
Hispanic. Id. at 59. People of color are frequently struck from juries by prosecutors who
are able to find "race-neutral" grounds for circumventing the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (determining that state's use
of peremptory challenge to exclude all African-American potential jurors because of their
race violated defendant's right to equal protection); NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, supra, at 62-63. Similarly, changes of venue often have the effect of excluding peo-
ple of color from juries. Id. at 63. Several scholars have written persuasively that venue
decisions should consider race, ethnicity and other demographics in the interest of justice.
See, e.g., M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for
Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1855, 1861-62 (1993)
(supporting proposed legislation that would require consideration of demographic similari-
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But instead of prompting calls for reform, the overrepresentation
of African-American men in the criminal justice system has simply,
and wrongly, confirmed, for many, that African-American men are a
menace. The dominant culture that has long dehumanized and imper-
iled African Americans by racist stereotyping continues to scapegoat
them.74 A principal way this scapegoating takes form is in the adop-
tion of increasingly harsh criminal justice policies peddled to the pub-
lic by politicians who exploit the fear of crime.75
ties between the community in which the crime occurred and the new, proposed trial loca-
tion); Levenson, supra note 30, at 1568 (asserting that courts should weigh demographic
evidence during change of venue decisions); Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking
Venue in Light of the "Rodney King" Case: An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 215,
220-21 (1993) (arguing that local community values should be respected by having impor-
tant trial decisions made according to that community's "norms and values"). Bail deci-
sions disproportionately favor whites; many people of color are detained in jail before
judgment because they are unable to make bail. In New Jersey, over 90 percent of those
unable to pay bail of 500 dollars or less and kept in jail were people of color.
D'Alemberte, supra, at 73.
74. Recall former President Bush's 1988 campaign which so effectively exploited ra-
cist beliefs about African-American criminality with its Willie Horton ads. Thomas B. Ro-
senstiel, Regional Advertising Proves Tough on Dukakis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1988, at 16.
See Susan Estrich, The Politics of Race, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1989, at W20 (campaign
manager for Michael Dukakis criticizes herself and the campaign for not speaking out
against racism and the Bush campaign for using the Willie Horton ads to exploit the crime
issue and to "fan the flames of racism for political advantage").
75. One popular measure is the repeat offender law, commonly known as "three
strikes" or "three-time loser" laws, in which persons convicted of a third felony are sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole. Fourteen states have passed a version of the
"three strikes" law by the end of 1994. WILLIAM M. DIMAscIO, SEEKING JUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 20 (Edna McConnell Clark Found. 1995). Many states en-
acted these laws in the wake of the murder of a young girl, Polly Klaas, in California by a
man (ironically Caucasian) with a long criminal record who had been released on parole
three months earlier. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Who Kept Going Free, THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 7, 1994, at 38. The federal government now has its own "three strikes" law
for serious violent crimes. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982 (1994). Another response has been the federalization
of certain state crimes. Congress now allows the federal government to prosecute drug and
gun offenses, an area formerly handled primarily by the states. The federal government
favors law enforcement and interdiction over drug prevention and treatment, although the
latter were increased as well. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 113 (1995) (representing budgetary spending on enforcement,
drug prevention, and treatment). See also Stephen Chippendale, More Harm Than Good:
Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994). A third common
strategy in the war on crime is mandatory minimum sentences and the abolition of parole.
All 50 states have adopted mandatory sentencing laws for various crimes and 34 states now
have "habitual offender" laws, which give enhanced sentences to repeat felony offenders.
DIMAscIo, supra, at 19. These "get tough on crime" measures do not work to reduce
crime. For a scathing critique of the war on crime, see Anthony M. Platt, Crime Rave;
Politics of Crime in the U.S., MONTHLY REv., June, 1995, at 35. Moreover, they are unaf-
fordable. States are struggling to bear the costs of the war on crime, particularly the im-
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Police are the enforcers of these policies, carrying out the wishes
of those in power in society. African Americans, and other people of
color, are certainly not the only victims of police, but in large cities
they bear the brunt of the war on crime. They are disproportion-
ately harassed, beaten and killed by police. 76 Scholars of police
mense burden of building and running prisons. California is already spending more on its
prison system than on its higher education system. Fox Butterfield, New Prisons Cast
Shadow Over Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at A21. Some states reporting
a shift in resources from education to prisons are Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts,
Michigan and Minnesota. Id. Other states are unable to open new prisons recently built
because the operating costs are too high. DIMAscIO, supra, at 9. Mandatory minimums
also have led to a dramatic growth in the federal prison population. Id. at 19-20.
The war on crime does not expressly single out people of color, but it has a great
impact on them nonetheless. See supra notes 72-74. A vicious cycle has evolved. As more
and more people of color are swept into prison as a result of the war on crime (principally
the war on drugs), the more the public learns to fear them and is willing to support draco-
nian measures which in turn send even more to prison and keep them there for longer
periods of time.
76. Mark Blumberg, Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring Some Key Issues, in Po-
LICE DEVIANCE, supra note 32, at 229 (finding that African Americans are disproportion-
ately victims of police deadly force); William A. Geller, Deadly Force: What We Know, 10
J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 151, 163 (1982) (observing that African- American citizens are
"disproportionately shot by police"). Completely accurate statistics on harassment are im-
possible to obtain because incidents are underreported. However, few African-American
men progress through life without being stopped at least once by the police. African-
American men "understand[ ] what it means to be a black male in the eyes of law enforce-
ment officers and agencies: that one is an automatic suspect, and that one's encounter with
law enforcement officers is likely to be accompanied with unwarranted physical attack."
Adeno Addis, In Defense of Crookedness, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 957. See also Jerome
M. Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENY. U. L.
REV. 199, 200-04 (1993) (discussing the author's own experiences of police harassment
based on his race); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young
+ Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 624-28 (1993) (listing statis-
tics and studies that reveal a pattern of routine discriminatory treatment of African-Ameri-
can youth by police officers); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the
Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP.
U. L. REV. 23, 31-33 (1994) (documenting how law enforcement officers harass African-
American males); Joseph C. Kennedy, Presumed Guilty: To Racist Police, Innocence is no
Defense, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1996, at 19 (presenting African-American father's de-
scription of how his sons were falsely arrested and brutalized by the police in separate
incidents, despite their education, innocence, good citizenship and occupations). The pos-
sibility of danger is such that Culp refers to "rules of engagement" learned by African
Americans to avoid giving offense to law enforcement officers. Culp, supra, at 200-01. A
mother of an African-American boy writes eloquently of her fear for her son's survival
because prevailing presumptions label him dangerous. Deborah W. Post, Race, Riots and
the Rule of Law, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 237 (1993).
The war on drugs has triggered intense police harassment of minorities. African
Americans and Hispanics are ready targets for police in this war. They are stopped and
searched solely on the basis of "profiles" rather than for suspicious conduct. Paul
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1389, 1421 (1993); see also john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
UNSCHEDULED DEPARTURES
brutality cite racism as a major cause of police violence in many
cases.77
The demonization of people of color makes police violence
against them politically defensible. Many people do not even see po-
Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 557, 609-12 (1991) (stressing that the African-American community has been the
target of most drug-related arrests despite the fact that African-American men make up
only twelve percent of drug users). Arrests, prosecutions and sentences also reflect the
racial disparities of this war. MAUER & HULING, supra note 72, at 9-10. See generally
supra notes 72-75.
Accurate statistics on the race of police brutality victims are also unavailable. One
scholar argues that the failure of police review systems to keep statistics on the race and
sex of complainants stems from political reasons. PEREZ, supra note 50, at 28. But, as
noted previously, available research shows that African Americans are disproportionately
victimized by the police. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
77. See generally supra notes 72-75. See also PEREZ, supra note 50, at 24 (citing Jo-
seph Betz, Police Violence, in MORAL ISSUES IN POLICE WORK (Fredrick Ellison & Michael
Feldberg eds., 1985); STEVEN Box, POWER, CRIME, AND MYSTIFICATION (1983); Ruth
Chigwada, The Policing of Black Women, in OUT OF ORDER: POLICING BLACK PEOPLE
(Ellis Cashmore & Eugene McLaughlin eds., 1991); Allen E. Wagner, Citizen Complaints
Against the Police: The Complainant, 8 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 247,247-52 (1980) (docu-
menting that the majority of complainants filing charges of police brutality were young,
African-American men). William Geller explains that:
The most common type of incident in which police and civilians shoot one an-
other in urban America is one involving an on-duty, uniformed, white, male of-
ficer and an armed, black, male civilian between the ages of 17 and 30 and occurs
at night, in a 'public' location within a 'high-crime' precinct, in connection with a
suspected armed robbery or a 'man with gun' call.
Geller, supra note 76, at 158. See also Josephine Chow, Sticks and Stones Will Break My
Bones, but Will Racist Humor?: A Look Around the World at Whether Police Officers
Have a Free Speech Right to Engage in Racist Humor, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
851, 851-66 (1992); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 465, 488-90 (1992) [hereinafter Rudovsky, Police Abuse].
We are all socialized in a racist culture. There is no reason to believe that police are
immune from racial stereotyping. For example, although juries are solemnly instructed to
set aside their personal feelings and prejudices, they nonetheless view African Americans
less favorably than white defendants. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1616-24 (1985) (finding social science research con-
cludes that race is a factor in jury determinations of guilt or innocence in criminal trials and
that African-American defendants are more likely to be convicted than whites).
The reaction of Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit to the Rodney King beating is revealing. He acknowledges that the case forced him to
recognize how beliefs and interests can influence police behavior:
By and large the courts are just normal people. They have a tendency to be skep-
tical of people who say they were abused by the police.... But for a lot of naive
people, including me, [the King case] puts a real doubt on the posture of prosecu-
tors that police are disinterested civil servants just 'telling it as it is.'
We should have known all along what this incident points out: that people
get involved in what they do and that they are participants in the process just like
anyone else. They are subject to bias and they do have a stake in the outcome.
Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, A.B.A.J., July 1991, at 45,48 (quoting Judge Kozinski).
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lice beatings as violence; rather, they see it as legitimate protection of
self and community. Moreover, they interpret the violence as coming
from the victim. 78 This twisted logic explains how the police and later
the state jury that acquitted them, the federal judge that sentenced
them and the Supreme Court were able to perceive the prostrate Rod-
ney King as a threat.
(3) Above the Law
Police antagonism toward the law is driven by several related
conditions. Police are concerned with actual guilt rather than legal
guilt, and consequently find the "technicalities" of the legal system
irrelevant at best, and more often obstacles.79 Police culture encour-
ages a "siege mentality" of "us against them," in which "they" are not
only criminals but also anyone who seeks to criticize or control the
police.80 Police culture also impresses a vision that police are the
78. Drawing from Franz Fanon, Judith Butler writes of how the black male body is
constituted by fear:
In Fanon's recitation of the racist interpellation, the black body is circumscribed
as dangerous, prior to any gesture, any raising of the hand, and the infantilized
white reader is positioned in the scene as one who is helpless in relation to that
black body, as one definitionally in need of protection by his/her mother or, per-
haps, the police. The fear is that some physical distance will be crossed, and the
virgin sanctity of whiteness will be endangered by that proximity. The police are
thus structurally placed to protect whiteness against violence, where violence is
the imminent action of that black male body. And because within this imaginary
schema, the police protect whiteness, their own violence cannot be read as vio-
lence; because the black male body ... is the site and source of danger, a threat,
the police effort to subdue this body ... is justified regardless of the circum-
stances. Or rather, the conviction of that justification rearranges and orders the
circumstances to fit that conclusion.
Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in READ-
ING RODNEY KING, supra note 61, at 15, 18.
79. The courts obviously agree. The steady chipping away of Fourth Amendment
protections is justified on grounds that police should not be hamstrung in their search for
the truth. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (allowing introduction
of physical evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that was subsequently found to
be invalid); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (permitting police officers to search the
outer clothing of those who are believed to be "armed and presently dangerous"); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that police officers' search comported
with the Fourth Amendment because they possessed "reasonably trustworthy information"
to warrant suspicion of the suspect).
80. See generally SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 92, 106 (observing that police
departments often display an "organizational culture" of "internal solidarity" that distrusts
civilian-outsiders). See also Herman Goldstein, Controlling and Reviewing Police-Citizen
Contacts, in POLICE DEVIANCE, supra note 32, at 327; PEREZ, supra note 50, at 36-38. This
siege mentality is inculcated in rookies as soon as they join the force, thereby self-repli-
cating and sustaining a police culture that is hostile to external restraints. PEREZ, supra
note 50, at 36-38.
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"thin blue line" between civilization and chaos. 81 All of these dynam-
ics support the creed that the job must be done no matter what. Such
dynamics teach that the end justifies the means.82
The war against crime further fuels police who feel entitled to
dispense street justice.83 Afraid of street crime,84 much of the public
appears to accept police brutality as a necessary tradeoff for its own
safety.85 A commentator in the Los Angeles Times wrote matter-of-
factly after the Rodney King beating that "the tape of some Los An-
geles-area cops giving the what-for to an ex-con... is not a pleasant
sight, of course; neither is cancer surgery. Did they hit him too many
times? Sure, but that's not the issue: [i]t's safe streets versus urban
terror. ' 86 Skolnick and Fyfe put it more bluntly: "[T]here is consider-
able support among the public for an aggressive, kick-ass style of
policing. '8
7
Another characteristic of police culture that breeds antagonism
to the law and is a predictable cause of police brutality is intolerance
81. The "thin blue line" is an established concept in the academic literature on the
police. It is a "sense of mission" by the police who are "pitted against forces of anarchy
and disorder, against an unruly and dangerous underclass." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note
41, at 93; see infra note 177. In a column after the Rodney King beating, Pat Buchanan
wrote:
In our polarized and violent society, most Americans have come to look upon the
cops as "us," and upon King, a convicted felon, as "them." He is the enemy in a
war we are losing, badly; and we have come to believe the cops are our last line of
defense.
Patrick Buchanan, The Police Are the Last Line of Defense, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at
M5.
82. PEREZ, supra note 50, at 39.
83. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 76, at 614 (documenting complaints alleging
that the police routinely physically abused people rounded up in drug sweeps); Rudovsky,
Police Abuse, supra note 77, at 468-72 (describing the expansion of police power that ac-
companied the war on drugs and presenting a hypothetical case of police brutality based on
an actual case).
84. See, e.g,. Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation with Peril on its Mind, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al (documenting Americans' preoccupation with violent crime).
85. See David Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 242, 245 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed., 1982) (stating that citizens "re-
main silent about police abuse" because of their fear of weakening law enforcement's
power to deal with crime); Lance Morrow, Rough Justice, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991, at 16 (citing
George Kelling, Professor of Criminal Justice at Northwestern University, for the proposi-
tion that the war on crime and drugs encourages a no-holds barred attack by the police
upon criminals); NPR Radio Broadcast, supra note 7 (presenting interview with Barbara
R. Price, Dean of Graduate Studies, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, stating that civil-
ians accept the police use of "tough methods" against the "bad guys" in the war on crime).
86. Llewellyn H. Rockwell, It's Safe Streets Versus Urban Terror, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1991, at M5.
87. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 189.
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of any resistance-real or perceived-to police authority.88 "Rambo-
style" crime fighting tends to confuse the boundaries between the in-
dividual and the job. Many police believe they are the law. They take
citizen defiance personally and then retaliate.89 The Rodney King
beating was a classic example of a situation in which a victim's refusal
to comply promptly with police orders ended in excessive force.90
The environment in which many police work may also give rise to
police brutality. The work is dangerous 91 and requires decision mak-
ing under intense pressure. 92 Research shows that job-related stress is
high among police officers.93 One way that some police cope with job
stress is by distancing and dehumanizing the people who they con-
88. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 51-83,
88-98 (1969) (documenting that verbal defiance and antagonizing attitudes toward police
officers often trigger police brutality). Chevigny describes three escalating stages in police-
citizen encounters that lead to police brutality. They begin with what police perceive to be
citizen insolence. If the citizen is identified as a "wiseguy" and continues to disdain the
officer's authority, an arrest follows. Id. at 60. The citizen who persists in defying the
officer will be taught a lesson, usually receiving a beating and then charged with resisting
arrest. Id. "The one truly iron and inflexible rule" to be derived from a study of police
brutality cases is that "any person who defies the police risks the imposition of legal sanc-
tions, commencing with a summons, on up to the use of firearms." Id. at 136.
89. Whether the citizen has done anything wrong or not is beside the point. Police are
not supposed to punish people. See discussion infra text following note 102.
90. High-speed chases, such as in the King case, are notorious for causing police over-
reaction once the suspect is captured. See infra note 317 and accompanying text. For this
reason, most police department regulations require a supervisory officer to personally
oversee the arrest at the end of a chase. Ricker, supra note 77, at 47. In a police culture
that sees itself as a superior moral force, merely questioning or talking back may threaten
many police officers and provoke an overreaction. One study found that in nearly half of
the occasions where excessive force was used, the "victim verbally defied" the officer's
authority. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 102. Another perceived affront to police
authority is that of repeat offenders whose very return to the street can be experienced as
belittling to the officer whose beat the offender returns to. One judge alluded to this char-
acteristic trigger while sentencing an officer for using excessive force during an arrest. The
court noted that even "the lowliest of citizens, including recidivistic felons" have constitu-
tional rights. Transcript of Sentencing at 19, United States v. Kachadurian, No. 89-251-Cr-
T-10A (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 1989).
91. "'You never know what's going to happen .... The whole world can come to an
end in your last few minutes of duty, right before you leave your watch. Or-right before
you retire from the force."' SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 94 (quoting from an
interview of one police officer). Between 1978 and 1992, 1199 law enforcement officers
were killed in the line of duty. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993 401, Table 3.154 (1993) [hereinafter
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS]. In one year alone, 81,252 officers were assaulted on the
job, 36.5% of them receiving injuries. Id. at 406, Table 3.161 (describing 1992); see infra
note 415.
92. ROBERT COULSON, POLICE UNDER PRESSURE 15 (1993).
93. For a summary of research on police stress, see SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN
AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 344-47 (1992). Police experience higher rates of stress-re-
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tact,94 which makes it easier to use violence against them. Stress-man-
agement programs have been proven to help change violent behavior
among some individuals in some police departments. 95 One expert
goes so far as to argue that control of stress is synonymous with con-
trol of abuse.96 Unfortunately, given the many structural causes of
police brutality, it is unlikely that control of stress can control abuse
entirely, but certainly officers' stress helps explain the individual di-
mension of the problem.
D. The Harms of Police Brutality
(1) Rule of Law is Violated
Police brutality violates the bedrock principle that we are a gov-
ernment of laws. Justice Douglas wrote that "one measure of liberty
is the extent to which the individual can insist that his government live
under a Rule of Law."' 97 Our society cannot claim to hold police to
this standard as long as police act above the law and we tolerate it.
Police brutality offends the rule of law in the following three ways:
(a) Police brutality exceeds positive law
Even if one does not subscribe to a formalist approach rendering
the rule of law coextensive with positive law,98 most people would
agree that when police break positive law such as police department
regulations and state and federal law forbidding unreasonable force
against civilians, they violate the rule of law. Moreover, while cases
may raise a variety of defenses, there is no principled basis for chal-
lenging the laws themselves. Regulations and laws governing police
misconduct cannot be said to offend the core characteristics compris-
lated physiological and psychological disorders than the general population, including sui-
cide. Travis, supra note 56, at 1765-66.
94. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 94 (commenting upon the ways in which
police officers dehumanize citizens); Travis, supra note 56, at 1766.
95. Travis, supra note 56, at 1766-67.
96. Barker & Carter, supra note 32, at 208.
97. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITH-
OUT FORCE 1 (1963).
98. Since Aristotle, philosophers have grappled with different conceptions of the rule
of law. A.V. Dicey's attempted comprehensive reformulation of the ancient doctrine has
been attacked as positivistic-a "rule book" approach that limits the rule of law to a set of
legal rules enacted according to proper procedure. ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1885, 10th ed. London 1960). Ronald
Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in 64 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACAD-
EMY 259, 261-62 (1978).
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ing the rule of law: generality, equality, impartiality, certainty, consti-
tutionality and morality. 99
(b) Police brutality perverts the law
It is axiomatic that police brutality is an illegitimate exercise of
the power which society gives to police. As such, it is a perversion of
the rule of law. Geoffrey Walker proposes twelve principles that de-
fine the rule of law, many of which he borrows from Joseph Raz.100
Raz's eighth principle states that the "discretion of crime-preventing
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law." 101 Walker restates
this principle in more general terms in his eleventh principle, which
requires "impartial and honest enforcement" of the law.102
Police brutality infringes on these principles in many ways. First,
police who employ excessive force against civilians exceed the power
given to them. They are employed to enforce the law, not to take it
into their own hands. Second, the administration of summary punish-
ment denies victims due process. Victims are determined to be guilty,
and punishment is imposed, entirely outside of the normal adjudica-
tive process. Third, police brutality is an arbitrary form of punish-
ment. Even though its causes are largely understood and follow
predictable patterns, police violence is random and unpredictable to
most individuals who experience it. Fourth, given the extent to which
99. Police brutality laws are general in the sense that they are not intended to target
or protect a particular person, and equal in the sense that they are intended to apply the
same to all people who are in the same position relative to them. Enforcement by an
independent, third branch of government, the judiciary, evidences intent of impartiality.
The existence and meaning of police brutality laws are stable and public enough for people
to have knowledge of them, producing certainty. The constitutionality of these laws is no
longer at issue. Finally, police brutality laws have not been enacted for a bad purpose; they
may be over- or underreaching, depending on one's views, but they were intended for a
good or moral purpose. See generally DICEY, supra note 98, at 202-03; F. A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 205-15 (1960); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 7-11 (Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979) (asserting that
laws are valid when they conform to the following principles: they are "prospective, open,
and clear," "relatively stable," general, applied by an independent judiciary that is easily
accessible, and not "perverted" by too much prosecutorial or law enforcement discretion).
100. According to Geoffrey Walker, in a society founded on the rule of law, there must
be: '1. laws against private coercion," "government under law," "certainty, generality,
equality," "general congruence of law with social values," "enforcement of laws against
private coercion," "enforcement of government under law," "independence of the judici-
ary," an "independent legal profession," "natural justice," "impartial tribunals," "accessi-
bility of courts," "impartial and honest enforcement," and "an attitude of legality."
GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW 23-42 (1988) (exploring the philosophical
underpinnings of the validity of legal rules and regulations).
101. Raz, supra note 99, at 11.
102. WALKER, supra note 100, at 40-41.
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poor and minority people are disproportionately victimized, police
brutality violates the principle of impartiality. Finally, police brutality
is cruel, both physically and psychologically, transgressing the norms
of punishment embraced by civilized societies.
(c) Police brutality is treated differently from other crimes
The first two ways in which police brutality offends the rule of law
derive from the police officers' behavior. The rule of law is also af-
fronted by the legal treatment of police brutality. Police crimes are
underreported, underinvestigated, underprosecuted and undercon-
victed.103 If a case clears these hurdles and is successfully prosecuted,
the chances are that it will be undersentenced relative to crimes not
involving police brutality.1°4
103. Police crimes are notoriously underreported because victims are often afraid of
complaining. See infra Part II.B.3. Also, police departments make reporting difficult by
failing to establish and publicize citizen complaint procedures. PATE & FRIDELL, supra
note 44, at 35-36, 38-40. Investigations and prosecutions at the state level are infrequent
because they present a conflict of interest for local prosecutors who must work regularly
with the police on other cases. Ricker, supra note 77, at 48. See infra Part II.B.1. For this
reason, the federal government's role in prosecuting these cases as civil rights violations is
crucial. See infra Parts II-Ill. But there are many obstacles to the effective resolution of
these cases, including absence of witnesses, lack of victim credibility, the police "code of
silence," police perjury and jury nullification, resulting in a low conviction rate. See gener-
ally infra Part II.B.3.
104. "Underpunishment" is intended as a relative concept. This Article does not at-
tempt to present an argument on what fair punishment would be in an absolute sense, but
rather looks at the sentencing of police brutality in relation to sentences unrelated crimes
receive.
Those convicted of police brutality receive less time in prison than those convicted of
any other violent crime and many property crimes. BUREAU OF JUsTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 91, at 495, 537. The civilian crime that corresponds most closely to police brutality is
assault. In the federal system before sentencing guidelines were enacted, the average
prison sentence for assault was 44.6 months in 1986 and 48.4 months in 1987. Id. at 495.
The average sentence for police brutality during this time was 18.7 months. See infra Part
III.B.1. After the enactment of the guidelines, assault sentencing averages ranged from
34.4 to 39.7 months (1988 to 1992) and police brutality sentencing averaged 28.2 months
(November 1, 1987 to September 30, 1994). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note
91, at 495; see infra Part III.B.1. The similar state crime of aggravated assault received an
average prison sentence of 78 months (1990). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note
91, at 537. In each instance, assault by civilians received far more prison time than police
brutality (although the gap was substantially narrowed in the federal system after the
guidelines were enacted).
To put these statistics in perspective, a property offense such as burglary before the
federal guidelines averaged 58.5 months. Id. at 495. After the guidelines, burglary still
averages approximately 49 months, approaching double the average for police brutality.
Id. at 495. State burglary averages 80 months. Id. at 537. Even federal motor vehicle theft
is punished more severely than police brutality, receiving a pre-guideline average of ap-
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Few judges issue written opinions explaining the reasons for their
sentences. A sampling of cases in which sentencing opinions were is-
sued indicates that judges are extremely sympathetic to police officers
and the demands of their work.10 5 Judges are subject to the same so-
cial influences as the rest of society. Those influences, such as racism
and acceptance of the implicit pact that police have made with much
of the public in which brutality is tolerated in exchange for safe
streets, enable police brutality to occur in the first place. Sentencing
practices perpetuate this double standard when incarceration is im-
posed unevenly, depending on who the criminals and the victims are.
In police brutality cases, police are forgiven and the victims are
blamed. Examples of light sentences despite the severity of the harm
inflicted and sentencing statistics demonstrate a disregard for the seri-
ousness of this crime. 10 6
proximately 43 months and a post-guideline average of 28.9. Id. at 495. (No comparable
figures are available for state motor vehicle theft.)
As these statistics demonstrate, sentencing guidelines alone do not ensure fair sen-
tencing of police brutality. Downward departures from guidelines are one way in which
police brutality may be trivialized. While sentencing guidelines are often just that-guide-
lines-they are supposed to direct the sentence unless an exception applies. Police are not
exempt from sentencing guidelines in any system; indeed, in the federal system specific
guidelines were enacted to cover crimes by police and other public officials. When they are
not applied as intended and there is no appropriate basis for departure, the legal system is
not adhering to the values of the rule of law. See discussion infra Parts III-IV. If the
Sentencing Commission allows the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States, 64
U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996), to stand, downward departures in police brutality
cases are likely to accelerate, contributing to a further unraveling of the rule of law.
Also, sentencing levels under guideline systems entail value judgments about how
crimes are to be treated. The federal sentencing guidelines were a major accomplishment
in recognizing the seriousness of police brutality. Even so, police brutality is not consid-
ered nearly as serious as drug trafficking, for example. Compare 1995 GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL, supra note 14, at § 2 D.1 (revealing much higher sentences for drug offenses than civil
rights violations) with id. at § 2 H 1.1 (showing lower sentences). The point here is not to
diminish the harms of drug trafficking, but to show how police brutality rates in
comparison.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. Other examples abound. A Los
Angeles police officer was sentenced to community service (30 days on a state highway
cleanup crew) probation and restitution for battering a suspect during an arrest. Officer
Sentenced for Battery in Drug Arrest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at B8. A former vice-
squad leader convicted of using excessive force and for using interstate commerce to pro-
mote prostitution received sixteen months in prison instead of the 70-87 month term rec-
ommended by prosecutors. Ex-Vice Officer Gets Lighter Sentence, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 15, 1992, at 2. An officer who shot and fatally killed an unarmed woman was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment and sentenced to one year
in prison. The trial judge said that he wanted to hold the officer accountable, but that
"[t]here is such a thing as too much deterrence. An officer who fears his own criminal
prosecution every time he draws a weapon in the line of duty ... could very well put the
In this era of the war on crime, judicial failure to punish police
brutality in a manner proportionate to similar civilian crimes and citi-
zens' failure to object to this disparity are especially hypocritical.
They constitute societal acquiescence to the violent treatment of cer-
tain numbers of our citizens by public officials. They suggest that our
culture's celebrated values of fairness and equality are not so sturdy.
Like all principles, these are given life by our actions, and are mean-
ingless if we do not act in harmony with them.
0 7
(2) Police Brutality Intensifies the Racial Divide
Racism is not only a cause, but also a result of police brutality.
Its damage is far-reaching. At the core of this problem lies different
belief systems born of different experiences.
In our culture, individualism is the dominant narrative.' 08 This
narrative speaks in terms of individual rather than group rights,
entire community in harm's way." Kevin Sullivan & Veronica T. Jennings, Md Officer
Gets 1 Year in Fatal Shooting; Judge Wants Police 'Held Accountable', WASH. POST, July 18,
1992, at Al.
107. Walker's twelfth principle requires an "attitude of legality," in a society organized
according to the rule of law. WALKER, supra note 100, at 41. One scholar describes the
"attitude of legality" as
both substantive-the content of the legal system must somehow "feel" right-
and procedural-the legal system's administration is subject to the public's per-
ceptions of its ability to produce justice. The attitude of legality is simultaneously
outside the institutional system because it originates and resides in the people
subject to the system, and inside the institutional system because it evaluates and
guides the system itself. Exercise of the attitude of legality is both cause-shap-
ing the substance and procedure of the legal order-and effect-being shaped by
the legal order's substance and procedure.
Thomas M. Riordan, Copping an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney King
Incident, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 675, 694 (1994).
Police brutality represents a failure of this attitude inside the legal system not only by
the police who engage in it, but also by police departments and government officials who
tolerate it and in some cases even encourage it, as well as by the criminal justice system
that inadequately punishes it. Outside the legal system, the public at best ignores police
brutality ("not my problem") and at worst tacitly or even overtly approves of it. Public
attitudes both cause institutional neglect and are shaped by this neglect. In turn, victims of
police brutality and communities which are commonly plagued by it learn not reverence,
faith, trust, ownership and respect for the legal system, but scorn, skepticism, distrust, re-
jection and disrespect for it.
108. This discussion draws heavily on Addis, supra note 76, at 949-53. Addis also in-
cludes communitarianism, which recognizes the existence and force of social groups but
ultimately seeks to transcend group differences, as part of the dominant narrative. Id at
951-53. He argues that communitarianism is an assimilationist philosophy. Individualism
fails to recognize group differences and communitarianism seeks to eliminate them. Id. at
952. While communitarianism should be categorized as a strain of the dominant narrative,
it is not emphasized here because it is a negligible voice in the discourse on police brutality.
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agency and responsibility, and individual rather than group injustices.
Wrongdoing is the act of an identifiable person against another. Ac-
cordingly, as we have seen, the dominant story of police brutality is of
individual officers, "bad apples" hurting other individuals who are sin-
gled out not because of their race' 09 but because they are caught
breaking the law or are resisting the officer, i.e., they are victims who
put themselves at risk.110
The story of the marginalized person is different. For people of
color, the reality of racism makes it impossible to consider any aspect
of life free from racism's effects: "[I]n this country, for all minorities,
especially African-Americans, the almost daily encounter with racism
provides the orientation as to how they see and respond to the institu-
tions of this country, even though the encounter might not compel the
specific content of that response.""' In other words, while many acts
of police brutality entail police who are not white or victims who are,
police brutality cannot be thought about in a way that avoids or moves
beyond race.
In a culture such as ours in which the dominant viewpoint denies
racism and the marginalized viewpoint finds it inescapable, all acts of
police brutality, and official responses to it, heighten the divide. To
take the most famous case, when President Bush said that he was sick-
ened watching the King beating videotape," 2 it is likely that he was
referring to the individual police officers wielding their clubs against a
helpless victim, not that the racism represented in the beating was
sickening. When he said that the Justice Department was investigat-
ing the case, it is unlikely that he meant that it was targeting institu-
tionalized racism. Yet, for many, the trial against the four officers was
a trial against racism and their acquittals in the state case affirmed that
the white criminal justice system was not about to dismantle racism.
Of the many manifestations of the contribution of police brutality
to a deepening racial divide, including African-American alienation
from the criminal justice system, none is so pernicious as the conse-
quent racial stereotyping. Whites internalize the message that racial
minorities, and particularly African Americans, are criminals whose
own violence has triggered the police reaction. In turn, many of those
109. Because this discussion is about the racial effects of police brutality and because
race is probably the greatest predictor of victimization, I have singled it out here. I am not
saying that only racial minorities are victims of police brutality.
110. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. See also infra Part IV.B.
111. Addis, supra note 76, at 957 (emphasis in original).
112. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Police Beating Sickening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1991, at A16.
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who are tagged with the badge of criminality, particularly youths, take
it on as part of their self-definition and identity.113 Identification with
the outlaw is a key element of "urban cool" which entails maintaining
a detached and disdainful posture from the mainstream. It is a sur-
vival mechanism for validating a self which is rejected under the domi-
nant culture's rules.114 But clever as this image-flipping is,115 the
strategy is risky in a society that shows no sign of abating its practice
of scapegoating people of color. Society fails to realize that "gang-
ster" is merely a role because that role is too often assigned.
(3) Social Costs
Police brutality imposes enormous social costs. In the United
States, many of the worst riots were precipitated by a police shooting
or other incident between officers and civilians. 1 6 Often, these
flashpoints were imbued with a racial dimension. In the last three de-
cades, at least eight deadly riots have been ignited by the volatile mix
of race and police brutality. In 1964, in Harlem, New York City, one
person was killed and 140 injured after the shooting of an African-
American youth by an off-duty police officer.117 In 1965, in Watts,
Los Angeles, thirty-four people were killed and 864 injured after
white police officers mistreated crowd members after an African-
American youth was arrested for drunk driving." 8 In 1967, in New-
ark, New Jersey, twenty-three persons were killed and more than one
thousand injured after police officers beat an African-American cab
driver who was arrested for tailgating a slow-moving patrol car.1" 9 In
1967, in Tampa, Florida, rioting followed the fatal shooting in the back
of an African-American youth by a white police officer. 20 In 1970, in
Atlanta, Georgia, six people were killed and twenty wounded after
113. Obviously, police brutality alone is not the cause of these ideas, but it operates
within and reinforces this system of beliefs.
114. Michael Marriott, The 4-1-1 On Urban Cook Hype or Hope?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1995, at 53.
115. Such image-flipping is similar to the appropriation of the word "queer" by gay
men and lesbians as a description of selfhood and community. 'Queer Village' Gay-Rights
Movement Unveiled, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at J8. Lisa Duggan, Making it Perfectly
Queer, 22 SociALisT REV. 11 (1992), reprinted in SEX WARS 155 (Lisa Duggan & Nan
Hunter eds., 1995).
116. Geller, supra note 76, at 1-14 (listing riots that were reactions to police brutality).
117. Liz Donovan, Racially Motivated Violence in the U.S. Since the '60s, MIAMI HER-
ALD, May 1, 1992, at 11A.
118. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968) [here-
inafter KERNER COMM'N]; Andrea Stone, After the Riots, USA TODAY, May 5, 1992, at 4A.
119. KERNER COMM'N, supra note 118, at 32-33, 38.
120. KERNER COMM'N, supra note 118.
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protesting the killing of an African-American youth in a county jail.
In 1980, in Miami, Florida, eighteen persons were killed following the
acquittal of white police officers in the beating death of an African-
American man; in 1982, one person was killed and twenty-five injured
following the shooting of an African-American man by officers; and in
1989, one person was killed and eleven wounded after an African-
American motorcyclist was killed by a police officer.121 Finally, in
1992, in Los Angeles, California, at least fifty-five persons were killed
and 2,283 injured following the acquittal of the four police officers-
three white and one Hispanic-for the beating of African-American
motorist Rodney King.
122
While other high-profile crimes that affect low-income minority
communities often occur and are sometimes prosecuted (i.e., financial
fraud, environmental pollution and official corruption), police brutal-
ity is like no other crime in its ability to trigger riots and the devasta-
tion of deaths, injuries, and ruined lives, homes and businesses which
follow. 123
Besides riots, police brutality costs local governments huge sums
in settlements and judgments from lawsuits. Courts are increasingly
holding police departments, city officials and municipalities liable for
damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1967.124 De-
121. Donovan, supra note 117, at 11A.
122. Louis Sahagun & Carla Rivera, Jittery L.A. Sees Rays of Hope, L.A. TIMES, May
3, 1992, at Al; Toll from the Riot, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1992, at 9A.
123. KERNER COMM'N, supra note 118, at 68-69. The Kerner Commission selected
twenty-four disturbances to study and found that in half of them, the final precipitating
incident involved an action by the police. In 40 percent of these, there were alleged inci-
dents prior to the precipitating event involving police abuse or discrimination. KERNER
COMM'N, supra note 118, at 69.
In addition to human injury and loss of life, the economic consequences of riots are
devastating. In 1965 dollars, the Watts riot was estimated to have caused $35 million in
damages. Id. at 38. Losses from the Newark riot were estimated at over $10 million and
from the Detroit riot at $22 million (1967 dollars). Id. at 69, 107. The cost of the riot to
Los Angeles following the state trial acquittals of the officers in the Rodney King beating
was over a billion dollars. Tom Redburn, The Earthquake: The Economy, Storms, Floods,
Fires, a Deep Recession, and Now Comes This, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 18, 1994, at A21.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Under the test established in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,
municipalities can be liable for hiring, retaining, training, supervising and failing to disci-
pline police officers who violate a citizen's constitutional rights when "the ac-
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spite legal and cultural obstacles to winning these cases, 125 costs asso-
ciated with political brutality claims have soared, ultimately coming
out of taxpayers' pockets. For example, the Police Foundation
learned that in 1991, $50 million in awards in civil suits were granted
to victims of police brutality occurring in a small number of agen-
cies. 126 Police brutality cost New York City $87 million over a recent
five-year period. 27 The costs to cities have skyrocketed in the past
couple of decades. In Los Angeles, plaintiffs were paid only $7000 in
1965 but 10 years later the city paid out approximately $10.5 million
for police brutality suits. 28 That 1975 figure appears modest com-
pared to the liability that the city is now facing, since the Los Angeles
Police Department's recent exposure for its brutality and racism. Un-
fortunately, Los Angeles is not alone in this problem and ultimately it
is the taxpayers who pay for police liability. 129
Finally, police brutality undermines public confidence in the po-
lice. Without the public's trust, effective police work is impossible.
People may be less willing to cooperate with police in reporting crimes
and giving information as a result of police brutality. Also, citizens
might fairly ask themselves why they should follow the law when
those who are supposed to enforce it do not. Police brutality can, and
already has for many communities, set into motion an unraveling of
tion ... implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that [local governing] body's officers." 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). They may also be sued "for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decision-making channels." Id. at 690-91.
125. Section 1983 cases are not easy to win, contrary to the myth that municipal gov-
ernments in general, and police departments in particular, are easy targets. See, e.g., The
Cost of Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1995, at 22 (reporting that brutality settle-
ments and judgments have cost New York $87 million over five years). The qualified im-
munity and collateral estoppel defenses present considerable impediments to prevailing in
these cases. See MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND
LITIGATON §§ 7.2, 8.1 (1992) (providing information for lawyers litigating section 1983
cases); SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIrHTs LmGATION AND A-rORNEYS' FEES 1993 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 484, 1993) (same). In addition to legal chal-
lenges, there are substantial cultural barriers that need to be overcome, the same ones that
make winning a criminal conviction against a police officer difficult. They are discussed in
the next section. See discussion infra Part II.
126. PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 44, at 157.
127. The Cost of Police Brutality, supra note 125, at 22.
128. WALKER, supra note 93, at 287.
129. A Gannett News Service study found that between 1985 and 1992, there were one
hundred police brutality civil cases from 22 states in which police agencies were ordered to
pay $100,000 or more. Total damages in the cases came to nearly $92 million. Police Bru-
tality: How GNS Conducted its Study, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 8, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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respect for law. Punishing police brutality appropriately will not com-
pletely stop this phenomenon-without abiding changes in both the
police culture and the culture at large, police violence will continue-
but sending a message that this behavior is a serious crime is a neces-
sary step in beginning to change these problems.
II. Treating Police Brutality as a Crime
The nature of, and harms caused by, police brutality compel a
meaningful and dedicated attempt to eradicate it. A broad range of
actions should be pursued within police departments and all govern-
ment branches. 30 But we must remember that above all else, police
130. Scholars and other experts have suggested a variety of measures that might be
taken to deter police brutality. Within police departments, training in violence reduction
and stress management are two obvious steps to be taken. See Travis, supra note 56, at
1763-67 (advocating for the adoption of these programs by law enforcement agencies).
Affirmative action to recruit, hire, and promote African Americans and other people of
color in order to integrate police forces reduces racially-motivated police brutality and
eases tensions in minority communities. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARD-
ING THE GUARDIANS? 5-13 (1981) (recommending broader recruitment to achieve more
representative police departments) [hereinafter WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?];
Rudovsky, Police Abuse, supra note 77, at 490 (supporting efforts to integrate law enforce-
ment and "assure minorities quality assignments and equal opportunities for promotions").
See also Terry M. Neal & Robert E. Pierre, P.G. Man Beaten by Police Wins Little Sympa-
thy, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at Al (describing positive changes in a police department
since the number of minority officers increased). Departments must establish clear rules
and policies on the use of force, including deadly force: effective procedures for receiving
and investigating citizen complaints; and strong and impartial disciplinary systems to hear
and punish cases of brutality. WHO is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?, supra, at 35-93. See
also Rochelle Sharpe, Unions, Service Boards Help Cops Evade Discipline and Brutal Cops
Still Police the Streets, Gannett News Service, Mar. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ARCNWS File (describing barriers to internal review and discipline that exist within
police departments). Most importantly, police culture must change. "Both the public and
the police suffer from the absence of a clear, unambiguous, and universally agreed-upon
statement of the police mandate in our society." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 242
(emphasis omitted). Skolnick and Fyfe argue that community policing will not only help
curb police brutality, but they also assert that it is the key to improving police effectiveness.
Id. at 250-55. Travis makes a similar point in urging that the police role be redefined from
crime fighting to problem solving. Travis, supra note 56, at 1767-69. Another suggestion
for reforming police culture urges departments to enact regulations which would punish
racist speech. Chow, supra note 77, at 898.
Federal, state and local governments must make it clear in words and action that po-
lice brutality will not be tolerated and resources to oppose it must be increased. Well-
staffed and funded prosecutorial units are necessary, as are independent civilian review
boards. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 220-31. See infra Part II.B. The federal
government should collect statistics on police brutality, including, inter alia: complaints
against the police; types of offenses; characteristics of victims; officers disciplined or prose-
cuted; convictions; civil actions; internal and external review systems; and judgments. Paul
Chevigny, Let's Make it a Federal Case, THE NATION, Mar. 23, 1993, at 370. The govern-
ment has been slow to respond to the mandate of § 210402 of the Violent Crime Control
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and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Section
210402 requires the Attorney General to collect and publish data on the use of excessive
force by law enforcement officers. Two projects are underway: a victimization study and
the creation of a comprehensive database on police use of force. But both are in their
preliminary stages only. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUS-
TICE, NATIONAL DATA COL.ECTION ON POLICE USE OF FORCE 75-81 (Apr. 1996). The
federal government should develop model guidelines foi" local police forces on the use of
force and management of brutality. Also, federal funding to local law enforcement agen-
cies should be conditioned on their compliance with laws against police brutality, terminat-
ing funding if a department has a pattern of violations. If federal program money is used
to supply departments with equipment or other resources (such as taser guns) and these
are used in connection with police brutality, the government should require the money to
be returned. Id. Political leaders can use their "bully pulpits" to educate people about the
nature and harms of police brutality.
On the legislative front, since the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), many have argued that Congress should amend section 242 to
eliminate the "willfulness" element. Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal
Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. Rv. 2113 (1993) (argu-
ing for the elimination of the wilfulness requirement in §§ 241 and 242 police brutality
cases). The Civil Rights Commission has also made this recommendation to Congress.
WHO is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?, supra, at 161; see also Hoffman, supra note 60, at
1522; Matthew V. Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police
Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 149, 183; Harry H. Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting
Civil Rights Actions, 48 CORNELL L. REv. 532 (1961). Subjecting local governments to
criminal prosecution for systematically encouraging or allowing criminal violations of civil
rights is another remedy Congress could consider. One scholar argues that existing law can
be construed to support prosecutions such as these. Stuart P. Green, The Criminal Prose-
cution of Local Governments, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1197, 1199 (1994).
In one positive development, on September 13, 1994, Congress gave the Attorney
General express authority to bring civil cases against localities in which the police deprive
people of their federal civil rights pursuant to a pattern or practice. The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). It was encouraged to do
so by many authorities. See generally Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 175-76,
185 (testimony of Drew S. Days III). "Pattern or practice" cases are authorized by Con-
gress under other civil rights statutes such as "Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1960... ;
Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... ; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 ... ; section 518(c)(3) of the Crime Control Act of 1973; and section 122(c) of the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972." Id. at 185-86 n.13. See also id. at 60 (testi-
mony of Paul L. Hoffman); Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J.
447, 450-51, 455-58 (1978) (arguing in favor of civil actions by the Justice Department
against localities in order to deter police brutality more effectively). It is now incumbent
upon the government to actively pursue these cases.
The judiciary bears heavy responsibility for ensuring that criminal and civil cases are
fairly tried. See discussion infra Part II.B.3 on obstacles to prosecuting police brutality.
An attitude that the behavior is serious can be conveyed in a myriad of ways, not just
through jury instruction. Bifurcation procedures in § 1983 actions that separate claims
against municipalities and individual officers are harmful to plaintiffs' cases. Douglas L.
Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality
Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.. 499,503-04 (1993). Venue selection must be carefully weighed to
produce a jury pool from representative communities. See supra note 73. Because prose-
cutors, especially at the state and local level, are often resistant to charging police officers
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brutality is a crime, and if we mean to take police brutality seriously, it
needs to be treated as seriously as we treat other crimes.
A. Significance of Criminal Prosecutions
Most incidents of police brutality never see the inside of any
hearing room, let alone a criminal court.131 Yet the criminal prosecu-
tions that are brought against police officers for excessive force are
critical, even though numerically insignificant.
By conveying a message of intolerance to police brutality, the
mere fact that criminal prosecutions are instigated mitigates the cul-
ture that currently engenders and sustains police brutality. A diminu-
tion in this culture is further bolstered by the sentencing of police
officers for their crimes, but only if sentencing is equal to the crime.
with brutality, it has even been suggested that judges afford citizens direct access to grand
juries to investigate and indict cases. Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminaliza-
tion of Police Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Reme-
dies for Victims of Police Brutality When the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L.
REV. 271, 356-57 (1994). Last, but not least, judges must sentence police brutality com-
mensurate with the serious crime that it is.
131. Because police brutality cases are notoriously among the hardest to prosecute suc-
cessfully, relatively few offenders are indicted. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. Victims
may still have recourse under federal civil rights statutes for damages via section 1983 and
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). See discussion supra note 124 and accompanying text. Section
1985(3) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons.., conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hinder-
ing the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws ... whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Id. The relief afforded by section 1985(3) is, however, limited. Plaintiffs may recover for
proscribed conspiracies among police or between police and civilians only when there is
evidence that the conspiracy is motivated by racial or other class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus, or to prevent the exercise of some fundamental right. Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
Plaintiffs may also bring civil suits under state tort law alleging assault, battery, exces-
sive use of force, false arrest and false imprisonment. Like criminal prosecutions, all of
these civil actions are brought infrequently in relation to the incidence of police brutality.
Besides civil suits, victims may seek recourse by filing a complaint with the police depart-
ment or an independent agency such as a civilian complaint review board.
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(1) Collective Condemnation
A criminal prosecution is the most powerful social mechanism we
have for expressing the judgment that a wrong has occurred. First, the
decision to prosecute elevates and accentuates the seriousness of the
behavior and the harms that such behavior causes. Second, unlike all
other actions that can be taken against police brutality, a criminal
prosecution is brought by the "people." A prosecution signifies a uni-
fied sentiment, expressing the conviction of a collective, not an indi-
vidual. A third reason why criminal prosecution of police brutality is
essential is that it evidences a wilingness by society to back up its
statement of condemnation by its use of collective power when the full
coercive power of the government is brought to bear on the wrong-
doer. Fourth, a criminal conviction against a person is more grave
than a civil judgment. The consequences of a criminal conviction can
be severe, including loss of employment; disqualification from a multi-
tude of situations (for instance, public office or professional licenses);
ineligibility for adoption, foster care, visitation or custody of children;
and disenfranchisement, to name just a few. Moreover, a severe social
stigma follows a conviction. And worst of all, in a criminal case that
results in a conviction, society may substantiate its judgment by im-
posing a prison sentence on the wrongdoer.
(2) Sentencing Sends a Message
Many theories seek to enunciate the purposes of sentencing. 132
While some of these purposes conflict, no matter which is accepted,
sentencing practices denote a societal judgment about the criminal
and the criminal behavior at issue. For example, white-collar
132. The diverse and sometimes contradictory goals of sentencing are: general deter-
rence (send a message to others); specific deterrence (discourage the individual from com-
mitting crime again); retribution ("just desserts"); incapacitation (prevent the individual
from committing crime by isolating him from society); and rehabilitation (reform, educate
and train). See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) (sup-
porting prison for specific or general deterrence); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME (1975) (advocating selective incapacitation); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUS-
TICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976) (arguing for "just deserts" as a ground for
punishment); NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991) (reviewing justifications for criminal
punishment, rejecting retribution); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code (1970) (favoring the rehabilitation
model); Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 465 (1961) (advocating utilitarian goals through rehabilitation).
The Sentencing Commission was unable to agree on a philosophy of punishment. In-
stead it begged the question by concluding that philosophy made little practical difference
and it did not need to choose. See 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 2-4 (dis-
cussing the interplay between various goals of sentencing).
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criminals are less likely to go to prison than common criminals.133 The
severe impact on African Americans of the differential treatment
under federal sentencing laws for crack and powder cocaine is like-
wise illuminating.134 In both of these instances, a value judgment is
133. White-collar criminals benefit from judicial empathy for them, based on the belief
that enduring the criminal process is punishment enough for them, the view that they are
especially suited for community service and the fact that most of them do not have criminal
records, among other rationales. STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SIT-rING IN JUDGMENT 144-
65 (1988) (discussing the judicial mind-set in determining sentences); Kenneth Mann et al.,
Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 479 (1980). Many of these
reasons are also used to justify low sentences for police offenders. See infra Part IV.B.
The United States Sentencing Commission made a deliberate policy decision to deviate
from the usual practice of giving white-collar economic criminals probation rather than
prison because, it said, these crimes are "serious." Now federal white-collar criminals re-
ceive at least a short prison sentence. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 7.
134. A possessor or distributor of crack cocaine is sentenced to the same prison time as
someone with 100 times that quantity of powder cocaine. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 14, at § 201.1(c). At a hearing held by the Sentencing Commission, many wit-
nesses testified that this penalty structure has a discriminatory effect on African Ameri-
cans. Because the vast majority of crack offenders are African American, they go to prison
for much longer periods than the predominantly white powder cocaine offenders for the
same drug quantity. United States Sentencing Commission Hearing on Proposed Guideline
Amendments, Mar. 14, 1995 (statements of Abe Clott, Federal Public and Community De-
fenders; Angela J. Davis, National Rainbow Coalition; and Nkechi Taifa, American Civil
Liberties Union, among others) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposed Guideline Amend-
ments]. There is no scientific justification for the different penalties between the two forms
of cocaine. United States Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 60 Fed. Reg. 90 (proposed May 10, 1995). Consequently, the Sentencing Commission
recommended that Congress amend the drug sentencing laws to equalize sentences for
crimes involving the same amount of crack and powder cocaine at the powder cocaine
level. Id. But Congress rejected the Commission's recommendation, and President Clin-
ton signed a law maintaining the harsh sentences for crack. He did acknowledge the racial
disparities that have resulted from the penalty structure, suggesting that one way around
the problem was to raise the penalty for powder cocaine. Ann Devroy, Clinton Retains
Tough Law on Crack Cocaine, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al.
Now the Supreme Court has entered the fray with its decision in United States v.
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), in which it held that statistics alone are insufficient to
support a defense allegation that the government has engaged in selective prosecution of
crack cocaine defendants because they are African-American. The defendants requested
discovery on the government's enforcement of crack and powder cocaine laws. The gov-
ernment resisted, arguing that its enforcement was not racially motivated, but based on
neutral criteria. The Supreme Court agreed, overturning the district and appellate court
rulings in favor of the defendants. It said that the defendants had not shown that similarly
situated "individuals who were not black, could have been prosecuted for the offenses for
which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at
1489.
The Armstrong case presents a slightly different factual claim than the one that was
before the Sentencing Commission. In Armstrong, the defendants sought to show that
whites used and dealt crack as much as non-whites, whereas advocates for the change in
the sentencing guidelines seemed to accept that there were different racial patterns be-
tween crack and powder cocaine crimes. But even if crack is more often the drug of choice
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made about the characteristics of the felons and the public's tolerance
for their crimes, which is communicated to them and to society
through their sentences. This expressive function of sentencing should
be a central consideration in determining how police brutality is to be
punished.
H. L. A. Hart asserts that making specific behavior a crime is
what communicates social reprobation, not the sentencing of that
crime.135 He distinguishes "between the primary objective of the law
in encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of behavior, and its
merely ancillary sanction or remedial steps.' 36 Hart is correct that
analytically the justification for the punishment is usually blurred with
the justification for the criminal law.137
The problem is that when a crime such as police brutality is none-
theless tolerated socially, there is an effective rejection of the very
message that was intended to be conveyed by its criminalization.
(Yes, the law says it is illegal, but we'll look the other way.) With
police brutality, both the laws and the sentences must communicate
that the action is forbidden. If most sentences for this crime are weak,
then the goal of criminalization will be eroded. 38 In other words,
while it is axiomatic that we need laws which prohibit police brutality,
we also need sentences that reinforce our condemnation of the behav-
for African Americans and other minorities than for whites, the selective prosecution claim
ought to have been considered. The defendants alleged that African Americans are prose-
cuted more often in federal court than other defendants for the same cocaine violations.
State courts have more lenient sentences than the federal government and generally do not
distinguish between crack and powder cocaine in their penalty schemes. In prosecuting
crack crimes in federal court, the government is making a deliberate decision to seek the
higher sentences for these offenders. If most of these defendants are African-American,
the government's charging practices may well be racially discriminatory.
135. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmILrrY 6-8 (1968).
136. Id. at 7.
137. A good example of this clouded thinking is the current attachment political lead-
ers exhibit to trying and sentencing juvenile offenders as adults. See, e.g., James Dao,
Pataki Proposes Legislative Plan to Curb Violent Crime by Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1995, at Al (Governor proposing tougher rules for prosecuting and sentencing juvenile
offenders); Fox Butterfield, States Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1996, at Al (44 states have changed or debated changes in their juvenile
laws in the past two years). Juvenile crimes can be rigorously denounced without relin-
quishing the best response for troubled youth which, according to juvenile justice experts,
is treatment, not adult-styled punishment. See JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE
WALL (1991); GRANT R. GRISSOM & WM. L. DUBNOV, WITHOUT LOCKS AND BARS
(1989).
138. Although prosecuting police brutality goes some distance in strengthening the
message that it is a crime, there are many obstacles to a successful prosecution. See discus-
sion infra Part II.B.3 and accompanying notes.
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ior. General deterrence provides the philosophical justification for
sentences intended as censure.13
9
As a practical matter, the only way to express condemnation of
police brutality through sentencing is to sentence it in proportion to
other crimes.140 Most of our politicians and other policymakers do
not recognize Hart's distinction between the crime and the sentence.
In our system, the sentence's severity is considered the primary, if not
the only, measure of a particular crime's standing in the lexicon of
crimes.141 For example, the importance that the federal government
attaches to sentencing is illustrated by its "Petite Policy," which pro-
hibits dual and successive prosecutions in the absence of a compelling
federal interest. One such express interest warranting a second prose-
cution arises when the sentence in the first trial is not appropriately
severe. 142
139. This precept maintains Hart's distinction. Often the purpose of legislating against
the behavior and the purpose of sentencing are different. But in police brutality cases the
two act in tandem because the purpose of sentencing is general deterrence.
Moreover, with police brutality, other sentencing purposes are either irrelevant or
simply less important. Specific deterrence and incapacitation are usually irrelevant be-
cause a police officer convicted of a crime committed under color of law is almost always
fired and therefore does not have the opportunity to be a repeat offender. Nor is rehabili-
tation a meaningful ground for sentencing a police officer who has already been afforded
education and training to become an officer. Moreover, rehabilitation does not reach po-
lice criminality to the extent that the behavior derives from the social context of their work
and identity as cops. Retribution is often important to the victim, but it is not a vital basis
for sentencing police brutality in a larger social sense. It is not as consequential as sentenc-
ing for the purpose of conveying a message that society condemns this behavior. The point
here is that the goal of general deterrence justifies the practice of imposing just sentences
for police brutality, even if other purposes for sentencing may sometimes be present in a
particular case. See discussion infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
140. See discussion supra Part I.D.1 on the importance of proportional sentencing from
a rule of law standpoint.
141. This conception of sentencing drives the sentencing reformers' goal to eliminate
disparity and achieve proportionality. See discussion of the history of sentencing reform
infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text. Moreover, the goal of achieving proportionality
in sentencing police brutality is entirely appropriate and not inconsistent with Hart's the-
ory. If the overall purpose of sentencing police brutality was not general deterrence, but
something else (say rehabilitation), arguing for proportionality would be incoherent and
indefensible, because each offender's needs would be different.
142. 7 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2.142(I), (IV)(B)(2)(a) (1995) [hereinafter
JUSTICE MANUAL]. The "Petite Policy" also considers cases coming within priority areas of
the Department to represent substantial federal interests, entailing a second prosecution.
Civil rights cases are among the Justice Department's priority areas. Id. at 9-
2.142(IV)(A)(2). Thus, an inadequate sentence in a civil rights case such as policy brutality
would certainly be reviewed for a second prosecution.
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B. Police Brutality is Not Treated as a Serious Crime
Prosecutions for police brutality may be brought under either
federal or state law.143 State law criminal charges typically are for as-
sault, battery, manslaughter or murder; whereas, federal criminal
charges are brought under civil rights statutes. 144 It is easier to convict
in state prosecutions in one sense: the law does not require proof that
the defendant specifically intended to deprive the victim of a constitu-
tional right.145 But both state and federal prosecutors must meet the
criminal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, making convic-
tion difficult to obtain under any circumstance. The reality is that too
often neither prosecutors, judges nor juries are willing to treat police
brutality as the serious crime that it is.
(1) State Neglect
The federal government normally defers to local authorities in
the prosecution of police brutality,146 but this policy generates
143. In some situations, both state and federal actions may be brought. Federal prose-
cutions may be initiated after either a failed or successful state prosecution ("dual prosecu-
tion"). Federal constitutional double jeopardy does not attach to successive prosecutions
by two sovereigns. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959) (upholding federal
prosecution following a state conviction for the same act).
144. Most federal police brutality prosecutions are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1994). This statute makes it an offense to interfere with an inhabitant's civil rights under
color of law. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, will-
fully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States .... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results ... shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results ...
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or
both, or may be sentenced to death.
Id. The second federal statute under which police brutality cases are brought is often
termed the "Ku Klux Klan Act." This statute outlaws conspiracy to interfere with a citi-
zen's civil rights and comes into play when law enforcement officials act in concert with
each other or with private persons. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994).
145. The Supreme Court read this requirement into section 20 of the Criminal Code,
the precursor to section 242, in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945). See dis-
cussion infra note 161 and accompanying text.
146. Federal policy dictates that federal prosecutors suspend their civil rights prosecu-
tions if local charges are filed. JusriCE MANUAL, supra note 142, at 9-2.142(c). The fed-
eral government sees itself as playing a "backstop" role. "We are not the front line troops
in combating instances of police abuse. That role properly lies with internal affairs bureaus
of law enforcement agencies and with State and local prosecutors. The Federal enforce-
ment program is more of a backstop, if you will, to these other resources." Police Brutality
Hearings, supra note 44, at 3 (recording testimony of John R. Dunne, then-Assistant Attor-
ney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice),
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problems. Indeed, the history of federal civil rights prosecutions of
police brutality emanates from the history of state indifference to
crimes against African Americans. The failure of state authorities in
the South to curb official lawlessness and to protect African Ameri-
cans from extreme violence perpetrated by white secret societies such
as the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of White Camellia led the post-
Civil War Congresses to provide a federal remedy.147 The antecedents
to current federal criminal civil rights statutes lie in these Reconstruc-
tion-era legislative initiatives.
148
147. See FONER, supra note 62; JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 227 (6th ed. 1988). See also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text (describing state officials' acquiescing to, and participating in, terrorism against Afri-
can Americans). See also Colbert, supra note 130, at 511-17 (reviewing history of post-
Civil War official lawlessness); W.E.B. DuBois, RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935)
(presenting economic and political analysis of Reconstruction).
148. Congress first attempted to protect the newly freed slaves from state violence by
including a provision in the Freedman's Bureau Bill of 1866 that made it a misdemeanor to
deny, under color of law, a person "on account of race or color, or any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, or for any other cause ... any civil right secured to
white persons . . . [or to subject that person] to any other or different punishment than
white persons are subject to for the commission of like acts or offenses." Freedman's Bu-
reau Bill of 1866, § 8, reprinted in EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74 (1871). Presi-
dent Johnson vetoed the bill, objecting on the ground that it subjected southern states to
federal military rule. Johnson seemed outraged that under section 8, white people could be
fined or imprisoned for denying freed slaves the same rights that they enjoyed. Id. at 69
(discussing veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, Feb. 19, 1866). Johnson specifically ob-
jected that the term "civil rights" was undefined. Id.
Congress returned to civil rights when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, shortly
after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified. Section 2 of the Act provided that "any
person who, under color of any law.., shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabit-
ant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act,
or to different punishment, pains, or penalties [because that person was once a slave] ... or
by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 79. Federal prosecutors and courts were au-
thorized to enforce the Act. Id. Johnson once again vetoed the legislation, protesting that
it interfered with states' rights, threatened state legislative and judicial immunity, discrimi-
nated against whites in favor of the former slaves, and was unnecessary. Id. at 74-78. This
time Congress overrode the President and the bill became law on April 9, 1866. Id. at 81.
Fearful that the Act might be overturned by the Supreme Court or by a later Congress,
Congress passed the 14th Amendment and submitted it for ratification two months later.
MILTON R. KONvrrz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 4-5 (1977).
Pursuant to the power granted it under the Fourteenth Amendment and the subse-
quently enacted Fifteenth Amendment, Congress passed a series of new civil rights acts
known as the Enforcement Acts. These acts were: the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (First
Enforcement Act), which largely concerned voting rights but included the first anti-Ku
Klux Klan criminal provision and reenacted the color of law provision from the 1866 Act,
MCPHERSON, supra, at 547; the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, which included the Second En-
forcement Act to protect voting rights, and the Third Enforcement Act known as the Ku
Klux Klan Act, the predecessor to section 1983, 2 FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
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Today, states are still reluctant to prosecute their own law en-
forcement officers. Local prosecutors who ordinarily work closely
with the police face an impossible conflict of interest between their
desire to maintain working relationships and their duty to investigate
and prosecute police brutality. District attorneys necessarily rely on
the police to provide the evidence needed to initiate and prosecute a
case, often as the principal (and most persuasive) witnesses. Inevita-
bly, this symbiotic relationship149 will be destroyed if a fellow officer is
charged. 150 In many instances, rather than pursue a victim's com-
plaint, local prosecutors will fall back on their discretion to decline.
151
Their unwillingness to prosecute police leaves the federal government
RECONSTRUCrION 112, 123 (1906); and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which ensured public
accommodations and jury service for African Americans. Id. at 295.
Few of these Reconstruction-era laws survived. The Supreme Court eviscerated them
in a series of cases, returning power to the states. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1882); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); and Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884). Congress later repealed forty two out of forty nine sections, 28 Stat.
36 (1894); 35 Stat. 1153 (1909), and codified the remainder into eight sections when it
adopted the Criminal Code of 1909.35 Stat. 1088 (1909). What is left from the Reconstruc-
tion enactments are five civil remedies (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988))
and three criminal actions (18 U.S.C. §§ 241-43 (1996)).
149. This perfectly descriptive term comes from Davis, supra note 50, at 289.
150. The problem exists between any district attorney and police officer, but is particu-
larly acute if the two are currently working together on a case. The officer could retaliate
and sabotage the case. Also, if the officer is convicted of brutality, other prosecutions on
which that officer worked could be jeopardized by the suspicion that brutality or perjury
played a role in them. Ricker, supra note 77, at 48.
151. James Fyfe, co-author of ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 41, and expert criminologist
on police brutality, is quoted as saying in a news series on police brutality that "[ijt's a very
rare event when police get prosecuted."' Rochelle Sharpe, King Verdict Underscores How
Few Cops Get Punished, Gannett News Service, Apr. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
library, ARCNWS file. Fyfe also described a study of 1500 police shootings in the western
United States in the 1970s which found that only three officers were ever prosecuted (and
none were convicted). Id. A 1970 study of police brutality complaints filed with the Phila-
delphia District Attorney's office concluded that it had not been and could not be "an
effective instrument for controlling police violence" because of the "hopeless conflict of
interest." Louis B. Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community
Rights Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1023,
1023-24 (1970).
The most current-and telling-statistics come from the Police Foundation study on
police use of force. See supra notes 45-50. In that study, weighted averages were derived
from the number of citizen complaints of police excessive force reported by law enforce-
ment agencies. Id. at 106. Statistics on the number of criminal charges that were brought
are unweighted. To compare the number of complaints to the number of cases charged,
both figures are unweighted: for every 1,000 sworn-in officers, state agencies reported 15.7
complaints and 0.14 criminal charges; sheriffs' departments 20.7 to 0.66; county police 39.4
to 0.49; and big city police 82.5 to 1.24. Id. at Table B-13.1 and Table B-38.1.
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the chief criminal enforcer of police brutality cases under the civil
rights laws.
(2) Inadequate Federal Response
Unfortunately, the federal government, too, encounters difficul-
ties in enforcing the laws against police brutality.152 In part, the prob-
lem stems from its historical legacy of not wanting to trample on
states' prerogatives. 153 As a result, it often refrains from actively in-
152. The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice is the federal office primarily responsible for prosecuting criminal civil
rights violations, including police brutality. The Civil Rights Division was originally called
the Civil Rights Unit when it was first established. Later, it became the Civil Rights Sec-
tion. Still later, it became a Division with many sections within it, including the Criminal
Section.
However, United States Attorneys can, and on occasion do, bring civil rights cases.
They are monitored by the Criminal Section and must notify the Criminal Section before
proceeding on sections 241 and 242 felonies. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 142, at 8-3.140.
Cases are also brought jointly.
153. From its first days, the United States Department of Justice, established shortly
after the First Enforcement Act was enacted, found itself with the challenging job of trying
to protect the lives and rights of the newly freed slaves. It was not very successful. Despite
the network of federal district attorneys, marshals, judges and troops that gave it a pres-
ence in every state, the Justice Department was incapable of overcoming enormous south-
ern resistance. First, it simply did not have adequate resources. Even when federal agents
were able to investigate complaints and obtain indictments, many of those indicted avoided
arrest because marshals were spread too thin. Often only the assistance of federal troops
made arrests possible, but the troops were soon withdrawn. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 234, 242, 244, 246 (1937). Judges and lawyers were in
short supply in relation to the caseload. Id. at 235, 239, 240. Simply put, expenses ex-
ceeded appropriations. Id. at 240. Second, the cases were difficult to win. Witnesses per-
jured themselves to cover up crimes. Id. at 235. Juries refused to convict because they
were either packed or intimidated. Id. at 236, 243, 245. See also Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 132 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (commenting on jurors' reluctance to
convict bad officers). The lives of people who cooperated were threatened. CUMMINGS &
MCFARLAND, supra, at 238. Also, then, as now, proof of the intent required for a criminal
conviction was hard to come by. Screws, 325 U.S. at 132. Finally, the Justice Department
did not have the support of the Supreme Court and eventually lost political support from
the North. See discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of Reconstruction era laws
supra note 148 and CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra, at 246, 248. In the end, the Justice
Department retreated, adopting a largely defensive posture of deference to the states.
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra, at 238, 239, 246; Screws, 325 U.S. at 131-32. This policy
of self-restraint, coupled with objective limitations, made the civil rights statutes a dead
letter.
It was not until the New Deal, when Attorney General Frank Murphy established a
"Civil Liberties Unit" within the Justice Department, that federal prosecution of state offi-
cials for civil rights crimes, and police brutality in particular, became a priority again. ROB-
ERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1, 29 (1947). Nevertheless, the
federal government still clung to its deference policy, as it has to this day. Police Brutality
Hearings, supra note 44, at 3 (testimony of John R. Dunne, discussed supra note 146). It is
hard to gauge how much of this philosophy comes from a feeling of being under siege on
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vestigating a viable case unless the state declines, by which time im-
portant evidence and witnesses may be lost.
A second reason for the reluctance of the federal government is
that from the beginning Congress has not committed adequate re-
sources to the task.154 Congressman Don Edwards raised this point in
hearings held on police brutality in 1991.155 Since their formation,
government commissions on civil rights have advocated increasing
funding and expanding staff. 56 Today, the Criminal Section employs
only approximately thirty attorneys whose caseload is divided among
all federal civil rights crimes, including police and other law enforce-
the part of those who oppose federal intervention, and how much of it is based on a genu-
ine commitment to federalism. When the Screws case was before the Supreme Court, the
Justice Department felt compelled to assure the Court that it would be moderate in its
prosecutorial approach. "'The Department of Justice has established a policy of strict self-
limitation with regard to prosecutions under the civil rights acts. When violations of such
statutes are reported, the Department requires that efforts be made to encourage state
officials to take appropriate action under state law."' Screws, 325 U.S. at 159 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (quoting from a Justice Department statement). This statement reverberates
with the same philosophy of restraint that is present in today's backstop policy. Police
Brutality Hearings, supra note 44. "Complaints of violations are often submitted to the
Department by local law enforcement officials who for one reason or another may feel
themselves powerless to take action under state law. It is primarily in this area, namely,
where the official position of the wrongdoers has apparently rendered the State unable or
unwilling to institute proceedings, that the statute has come into operation." Screws, 325
U.S. at 160.
154. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 153, at 240; supra notes 130, 148.
155. Congressman Edwards asked then-Assistant Attorney General John Dunne why
overall Department of Justice personnel had increased 55 percent from 1981 to 1990, while
the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division, the section that prosecutes police brutal-
ity, had not grown at all. Mr. Dunne could not answer the question, although he denied
that it was due to lack of interest by the government. He tried to bolster this claim by
pointing to greater involvement by U.S. Attorneys in prosecuting these cases, yet did not
provide statistics and could not explain the reduction in one U.S. Attorney's office, from
three lawyers to one in its civil rights division. Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at
31, 321.
156. By Executive Order, President Truman established a Committee on Civil Rights
in 1946. The Committee issued a report the following year that recommended, inter alia,
elevating what was then the Civil Rights Section to a Division and increasing its budget
and staff. MILTON R. KONVITZ & THEODORE LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 70
(1961). The United States Commission on Civil Rights was created by Congress in 1957,
replacing Truman's Committee. In hearings held in 1978 and again in 1981, the Commis-
sion heard testimony that the Civil Rights Division's resources were too limited. U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
173 (1978); WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?, supra note 130, at 115. In 1981, the
Commission included among its recommendations that "Congress should approve the hir-
ing of additional personnel for the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division ... to
investigate and prosecute police misconduct cases .... [and that it] should ensure adequate
staffing for civil rights enforcement in the U.S. Attorneys' offices." Id. at 161.
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ment brutality, racially-motivated violence, hate crimes, slavery and
abortion clinic violence.
A third source of the difficulty is that prosecuting police brutality
presents inordinate obstacles. Here, the fault lies not with the federal
government, but with the nature of the crime itself.
(3) Obstacles to Prosecution
When Attorney General Murphy created the Civil Liberties Unit
in 1939, he determined that after over a half a century of neglect by
the federal government, prosecuting police brutality should be one of
the unit's priorities.157 From the beginning, the unit encountered
many obstacles in this endeavor.158 Its first police brutality case was
tried twice, ending each time in a hung jury.'5 9 Hung juries and jury
nullifications were not unusual results in these cases. 160 Also, the
Supreme Court's decision in Screws, which upheld the constitutional-
ity of section 242 (then section 52), interpreted the statute's "willful-
ness" element to require proof of a defendant's specific intent to
deprive another of a federal right. 61 This requirement created a diffi-
cult evidentiary burden to meet.
Non-legal factors impeded the Division's work as well. In a 1945
speech to the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee, Victor W. Rotnem,
the head of the Civil Rights Division at the time, described some of
these factors:
Police brutality cases offer certain practical as well as legal difficul-
ties. If third degree practices are involved, there are seldom any
witnesses save the victim who may be dead or, if alive, certainly is
afraid, and the members of the police force who are usually expert
157. CARR, supra note 153, at 151. From the end of Reconstruction through the first
World War, lynchings of African Americans reached devastating proportions. Race riots,
too, by white mobs against African Americans destroyed lives, homes and businesses. This
period of intense intimidation saw little effort on the part of police to protect black citizens;
instead, many were involved in the violence. See generally FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note
147; NATIONAL ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP), THIRTY
YEARS OF LYNCHING (1919); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955); ZANGRANDO, supra note 62, at 22-51. Also, the Wickersham Commission had re-
cently issued its report on police third degree practices. See supra notes 65-69.
158. CARR, supra note 153, at 151.
159. The case was United States v. Sutherland. The Department of Justice does not
have a citation to this unreported case. Id. at 151-53.
160. Id. at 138.
161. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945). Justice Douglas, author of the
majority opinion, upheld the statute against a charge of vagueness by requiring not only
proof of specific intent to violate the law, but also proof of a deprivation of a federal right.
This right was "made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or by decisions interpreting them." Id.
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witnesses for the defense. Presumptions are in favor of a policeman
who often must act with some force in arresting a criminal and can-
not easily be proved to have voluntarily gone beyond the point of
necessary force.162
The problems encountered by the Department of Justice in sus-
taining police brutality prosecutions early on are still being exper-
ienced. The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division reports a
higher success rate for all its other prosecutions-including racial vio-
lence, housing interference and involuntary servitude-than its rate of
success in official misconduct cases, which include police brutality.
163
There are many reasons for the lower success rate. Victims may be
afraid to complain.164 Even if a victim does complain, few of the
Criminal Section's investigations result in a case being filed.165 Fre-
quently there are no witnesses other than the victim, or none who will
come forward,166 resulting in a "swearing match" between the police
162. CARR, supra note 153, at 162.
163. Department of Justice, Summary of Criminal Section Activities (1985-1994) (un-
published) (on file with author) [hereinafter Summary of Criminal Section Activities].
"Success rate" is defined as an outcome of guilt, whether by plea or conviction. The rate is
the percentage of convictions and pleas over the total number of cases filed. For the past
five years, the Criminal Section's overall success rate compared to its rate of success in law
enforcement cases has been 94.4% v. 77.8% (1990), 89.3% v. 80.6% (1991), 85% v. 62.2%
(1992), 73.6% v. 58.7% (1993) and 90.2% v. 78.7% (1994). Note that the statistics for 1994
are current as of October 24, 1994. Id.
164. Following the Rodney King beating, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People ("NAACP") held a series of hearings in cities across the country
on police misconduct and published a report on its findings. Among them was the finding
that people do not complain to the police because they expect that the police will be unre-
sponsive and that their credibility will be challenged. Many are also afraid of harassment
and retaliation. It is not uncommon for victims themselves to be criminally charged (or
threatened with a civil suit) to deter them from pursuing complaints against the police.
NAACP, BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY 52-59 (1995) [hereinafter BEYOND THE ROD-
NEY KINO STORY]. Similarly, after its extensive investigation into the Los Angeles Police
Department, the Christopher Commission concluded that the LAPD's handling of com-
plaints alleging police excessive force was "skewed" against complainants. REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT xix (July
9, 1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMM'N]. People told the Commission that they were
afraid of coming forward and in some cases were actively discouraged, intimidated and
even threatened from doing so. Id at 158-59.
165. For example, in Fiscal Year 1990, the Criminal Section received 7,960 complaints.
Of these, 3,050 were investigated, yet only sixty-five cases were filed. Summary of Crimi-
nal Section Activities, supra note 163.
166. Witnesses, like victims, are often fearful of reporting police misconduct. BEYOND
THE RODNEY KING STORY, supra note 164, at 52 (detailing citizens' fears of police retalia-
tion). Police expert James Fyfe testified before Congress that he was unaware that any
eyewitness reported the Rodney King beating other than the man who captured it on
videotape. He added that "it takes an enormous amount of guts to go into a police stations
and report that you've just seen an officer beating someone up." Police Brutality Hearings,
supra note 44, at 127 (testimony of James Fyfe, Professor of Criminal Justice, American
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officer and the victim and, consequently, a failure of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
167
Even so, the Criminal Section does pursue police brutality cases
whenever it determines that a federal interest requires vindication.1 68
As a result, many of the cases it undertakes are extraordinarily diffi-
cult to prove. The traits that make a person vulnerable to a police
beating are the same traits that create a lack of credibility with juries
(e.g., has a criminal history or was committing a crime when the police
brutality occurred;169 is the wrong race, age, class, sex or sexual orien-
tation;170 was drunk or high on drugs at the time or has a history of
University). In one extreme case, a police officer now faces the death penalty for arrang-
ing the murder of a woman who complained to authorities that the officer had beaten her
nephew. Michael Perlstein, Guilty: Rogue NOPD Officer, Triggerman May Face Execu-
tion for their Roles in 'Death Squad,' NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 1996, at
Al. Also, victims and witnesses may conclude that reporting to the police about the police
is futile. Rodney King's brother tried to report the beating but was turned away. CHRISTO-
PHER COMM'N, supra note 164, at 9-10.
167. According to the former Chief of the Criminal Section and the Supervisor of the
FBI's Civil Rights Unit, "prosecutorial decisions are necessarily guided by the evidentiary
strength of the case. The extent of independent corroboration significantly influences the
victim's claim. The department does not undertake to prosecute police officers on the
strength of the victim's statement alone." John Epke & Linda Davis, Civil Rights Cases
and Police Misconduct, F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., Aug. 1991, at 17.
168. Former Assistant Attorney General John Dunne elaborated the Justice Depart-
ment's policy as follows: "[W]e are careful in choosing cases for Federal prosecution, but
we will not shrink from pursuing a case where the facts require such action. Unquestiona-
bly, police misconduct cannot be left unaddressed by police and State officials, and should
that occur, it is a proper matter for Federal concern." Policy Brutality Hearings, supra note
44, at 6 (statement of John R. Dunne, then-Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice).
Another description of the policy provides that "the aggressive investigation and pros-
ecution of civil rights matters is absolutely necessary, regardless of cost. Residents of the
United States must have access to competent Federal investigative and prosecutive agen-
cies to redress U.S. Constitutional grievances when local mechanisms do not provide ade-
quate relief." Epke & Davis, supra note 167, at 18.
169. [W]e had to deal with the fact that most of the victims of police misconduct are
people who come from the wrong side of the tracks, if you will .... They are people who,
with criminal records, are not going to be believed when they get on the stand, even though
they have been subjected to quite brutal treatment by police officers.
Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 172 (testimony of Drew S. Days III, Professor
of Law, Yale Law School). See also id. at 5 (testimony of John Dunne); 120 (testimony of
James Fyfe).
170. "[M]any victims of police misconduct were people who, because of their race,
national origin, poverty, sexual orientation, or criminal records, often lacked credibility in
the eyes of predominantly white juries." Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 181-82
(prepared statement of Drew Days). See also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 19; and
BEYOND T-HE RODNEY KING STORY, supra note 164, at 70-72 (noting that minority citizens
report more violence at the hand of white officers).
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drug addiction or alcoholism; 171 or is mentally i1172). In contrast to
the victim, police officers have the advantage of inherent credibility
with juries simply by virtue of their position. 73 Also, fellow police
officers will not come forward due to the "code of silence."' 74 Some
police are willing to lie and claim necessary use of force to cover up
their crimes. 75
171. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 36-37.
172. "[Cjops often run into suspects who, emboldened by drugs, alcohol, mental illness,
or all three, fight back." Id. at 37.
173. Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 120 (testimony of James Fyfe). See
infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text on jury nullification.
174. The "code of silence" is well-documented in the literature. Skolnick and Fyfe
describe the code and why it is so powerful.
[T]he code ... typically is enforced by the threat of shunning, by fear that
informing will lead to exposure of one's own derelictions, and by fear that col-
leagues' assistance may be withheld in emergencies .... In the closed society of
police departments, especially in departments or units that see themselves and the
public in terms of 'us and them' and adopt the siege view of the world, the pres-
sure to remain loyal is enormous.
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 110-11. Another scholar calls it the "blue curtain" and
offers a similar analysis as to why it exists. Herman Goldstein, Controlling and Reviewing
Police-Citizen Complaints, in POLICING A FREE SOCIErY (1977), reprinted in Barker &
Carter, supra note 32, at 326-328. The Christopher Commission detailed its operation in
the LAPD. CHRISTOPHER COMM'N, supra note 164, at 168-71. Witnesses testified about it
in the NAACP hearings. BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY, supra note 164, at 74-76;
Barker & Carter, supra note 32; COULSON, supra note 92, at 18. See also Selwyn Raab, The
Unwritten Code that Stops Police from Speaking, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1985, at E6 (New
York City Police Commissioner acknowledges tradition that officers do not testify against
each other).
175. The Christopher Commission found that in the LAPD, officers lie but receive lax
punishment. CHRISTOPHER COMM'N, supra note 164, at 167. The NAACP report con-
cluded that an impediment to the investigation of police brutality is police perjury, citing
both a study done of routine police perjury in suppression hearings in Chicago courts by
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., and the testimony of several officers at its hearings. BEYOND THE
RODNEY KING STORY, supra note 164, at 57, 79; Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Per-
jury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U.
COLO. L. REv. 75 (1992). Perjury is difficult to prove, but as the NAACP points out,
lawyers and judges who work with police know that it happens. The "code of silence"
protects police officers from exposure. Sarah Terry, Experts Try to Pin Down Extent of
Police Misconduct, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1995, at A33 (describing relationship between
police perjury and the "code of silence" in report on Harvard Law School conference on
police misconduct). See also supra note 150. In police brutality cases, police perjury can
become apparent if, as part of their cover-up of wrongdoing, they bring charges against
their victims and testify for the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Rorke, 972 F.2d
1334 (3d Cir. 1992); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 763-64 nn.65-67
(1993) (presenting first-hand accounts by police of how the code of silence can lead to
perjury); see also infra Part IV.B.2 (case of United States v. Rorke describes police perjury
in their victims' trial).
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Finally, juries continue to refuse to convict despite convincing ev-
idence. "Jury nullification" is a common occupational hazard for
prosecutors trying these cases. 176 In part, jury nullification may be the
result of the "thin blue line," that is, that the police are all that stand
between the citizenry and anarchy.177 As a result of all of these fac-
tors, it may be said that police comprise the only class of criminal de-
fendants who are universally accorded the legally required
presumption of innocence.
Accordingly, convictions of police officers for brutality are rela-
tively infrequent. 178 Department of Justice statistics on Criminal Sec-
tion activities from 1985 to 1994 reflect a lower success rate in its civil
rights law enforcement cases than in its general civil rights docket.
179
176. "It appears that judges and juries simply refuse to consider the actions of a law
enforcement officer, acting as such, in the same light as those of an ordinary citizen."
MILTON ET AL., supra note 30, at 85. "By and large, juries are reluctant to find police
officers guilty of criminal misconduct. ... [P]rosecutors know this." PEREZ, supra note 50,
at 51. Drew Days was quite frank in his description of this problem. "But, even in those
cases where we had strong evidence, and where we had a right to actually obtain prosecu-
tion, we ran into jury nullification. Jurors simply would not convict police officers." Police
Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 172 (testimony of Drew Days); id. at 181 (prepared
statement of Drew Days).
177. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. "[I]n an era notable for its high fear of
crime, juries, who understand that cops routinely undertake risky and protective work, are
reluctant to convict police without compelling evidence." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note
41, at 19. Racism nourishes this phenomenon.
[P]olice may remain the 'thin blue line' between 'them'-the predominantly Afri-
can-American and Latino populations in the cores of our inner cities-and 'us,'
the largely white population migrating away from the central cities and into the
affluent suburban belts that surround our major urban centers.... The 'thin blue
line' theme was used aggressively and successfully by the lawyers representing the
officers charged with beating Rodney King in the 1992 state criminal proceedings,
and it may explain the verdicts that are otherwise difficult to comprehend. In the
urban war between 'them' and 'us,' the police are responsible for preventing ur-
ban warfare from spilling out of the inner city.
Hoffman, supra note 60, at 1486. See also Rudovsky, supra note 85, at 245.
178. All of these factors apply to state as well as federal police prosecutions. However,
convictions for federal civil rights violations are even more difficult to obtain. One reason
results from the federal policy ("backstop policy") of deferring to a state's prosecution
unless there are compelling reasons to go forward federally. See supra note 146. When
federal prosecutors seek a successive prosecution, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division must approve it under the "Petite Policy." JUSTICE MANUAL, supra
note 142, at 9-2.142(I)(C)(2). States tend to prosecute the stronger cases and, as a result,
federal prosecutors are confronted with the more difficult cases to prove.
179. Summary of Criminal Section Activities, supra note 163.
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(4) A Slap on the Wrist
In those cases that do result in a finding of guilt, the result is all
too often undermined by a token sentence. A judge's inordinately
low sentence subverts the message sent by a jury's verdict of guilt.
Federal prosecutors who tried police brutality cases prior to the
federal sentencing guidelines clearly regarded the sentencing practices
at that time to be too low and therefore problematic.180 These prose-
cutors believe that law enforcement excessive-force crimes are trivial-
ized when offenders received low sentences.' 8' Their perception was
that police and other law enforcement agents received a slap on the
wrist-often probation instead of prison-for violent crimes. Con-
duct that would be rigorously condemned if committed in the context
of another type of crime, for example, a civilian assaulting another
civilian, often went unpunished if committed by a police officer on the
job. The judicial system's failure to adequately punish police brutality
frustrated the purpose for enacting laws against it. It sent a message
to police and other official wrongdoers that they were above the law
and sent a message to their victims that there was no such thing as
equal justice under the law.182
In sum, while prosecutions are not the answer to police brutality,
they are an essential component of the effort to eliminate it. The
180. Department of Justice policy disallows public statements by prosecutors without
advance approval. These conversations do not represent official Department of Justice
policy. Nevertheless, the author of this Article spoke with a Justice Department lawyer on
October 29, 1993, another on July 7, 1994, another on July 15 and again on November 8,
1994, another on July 18, two others on September 16, 1994 and another on November 4,
1994. All are experienced civil rights prosecutors. Notes of these conversations are on file
with the author [hereinafter Prosecutors' Interviews].
181. See supra note 104.
182. Id. This problem is particularly acute when the victim is African-American or
Latino because of the long history of police brutality in minority communities. In those
comparatively few instances where a conviction is obtained, an inadequate sentence can
confirm public perceptions of racism in the criminal justice system.
An example from a context not involving police brutality illustrates this dynamic. In
an infamous Los Angeles case that occurred about two weeks after the Rodney King beat-
ing, a Korean shopkeeper, Soon Ja Du, shot and killed a 15-year-old African-American
girl, Latasha Harlins, after a fight erupted between them over the suspected shoplifting of a
container of orange juice. Ja Du was promptly tried and convicted, but given a sentence of
five years' probation by the state court. This result enraged African Americans. The name
"Latasha Harlins" was invoked as a symbol of racism for many people during the rioting
which followed the acquittals of the four police officers in the state trial for the beating of
Rodney King. Understanding the Riots, Part 1, The Path to Fury, L.A. TIMES, May 11,
1992, at T10; Patt Morrison & Greg Braxton, After the Riots: The Search for Answers, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 1992, at B3; Philip Hager, Justices Uphold Karlin's Ruling in Slaying of
Latasha Harlins, L.A. TIMEs, July 17, 1992, at B1, B8.
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question is who is in the best position to do this work? Unfortunately,
state prosecutors often are not, because of the inherent and substan-
tial conflict of interest that exists for them. 183 As a result, even though
the federal government has its own internal limitations and external
obstacles,184 it will continue to play a major role in the prosecution of
police brutality.
Sentencing is one area in the federal approach to police brutality
that has already seen positive reform. When the United States Sen-
tencing Commission promulgated sentencing guidelines for civil rights
crimes, 185 it dislodged a crucial stumbling block to the effective prose-
cution of police and other law enforcement officials. By stiffening the
sentences-requiring prison for all but the most minor violations-
and limiting judicial discretion to sentence outside the guidelines, the
Commission's work has resulted in more of these offenders going to
prison, and for longer periods of time, than before the guidelines were
in effect.' 86 Federal prosecutors by and large support this result, con-
tending that the minimal sentences imposed prior to the enactment of
guidelines diminished the perceived seriousness of these crimes. This
Article maintains that, because of the grave harms of police brutality
and the importance of criminal prosecutions and sentences, these
guidelines should be preserved.
III. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Police Brutality
Federal sentencing practices underwent a revolution a decade ago
when Congress replaced indeterminate sentencing with sentencing
guidelines. Congress undertook this radical reform because it found
that indeterminate sentencing caused great but unjustified variations
in the treatment of convicted criminals. 187 It believed that sentencing
183. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
184. Many of the internal constraints on federal prosecutions are government-imposed
and can be remedied if there is a will to do so. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3.
Some of the possible remedies are described supra note 130.
185. The sentencing guidelines first went into effect November 1, 1987. The civil rights
guidelines have been amended three times since then, most recently on Nov. 1, 1995. See
infra notes 202-06.
186. For a description of the relevant civil rights guidelines and their impact on
sentences in police brutality cases, see discussion infra Part IV.
187. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-50 (1983). In the last two decades, sen-
tencing reform has been concerned with achieving rationality and uniformity by eliminat-
ing disparity in the sentences imposed in similar cases. A critical moment in the history of
this reform dates back to the 1973 publication of U.S. District Court Judge Marvin Fran-
kel's incisive book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMI-
NAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). In his landmark book, Judge Frankel
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guidelines would eliminate unfair and irrational disparity in sentenc-
ing by creating uniform standards for classifying crimes, ranking these
crimes in proportion to their seriousness, and imposing set sentences
for each crime.'88
The federal system was overhauled with the passage of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984.189 The Act established the United States
Sentencing Commission whose mission is to promulgate guidelines
setting forth sentences for all federal crimes.190 To achieve its goal of
sentencing uniformity, the Act requires judges to select a sentence
from within the narrow guideline range enacted by the Sentencing
Commission.19' Congress also abolished the United States Parole
Commission in order to eliminate uncertainty about the amount of
time a sentenced prisoner would actually serve.192
The guidelines have been controversial. Many judges and schol-
ars challenge their effectiveness as well as their justness.193 These crit-
explained how he came to view the use of individualized sentencing determinations,
although widely employed at the time, as unjust, because they led to grossly disparate
sentences for the same crimes. Frankel argued that it was intolerable that our society had
given judges "unchecked and sweeping powers" in setting sentences in spite of our lofty
claim of being a government of laws, not of men. Id. at 5. He further noted that criminal
codes were illogical and incongruous, providing "crazy-quilt statutory patterns." Id at 9.
This nonsensical system had come about because sentencing laws were not written at the
same time, were not coordinated with each other, and were rarely subjected to thoughtful
study. IL Rather, they were the random product of politics. lad These qualities, Frankel
argued, created a system of "fundamental lawlessness." Id. at 49. Other studies also estab-
lished the substantial disparity and discrimination caused by indeterminate sentencing. See
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 124-28,132-44 (1971); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11-14 (1976); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 98-99, 101-04 (1976). Various
forms of structured sentencing were proposed and enacted in numerous jurisdictions, in-
cluding the federal system. The general idea was to create rational, uniform and fair sen-
tencing by requiring judges to sentence within prescribed guidelines for each crime. But
the limits on judicial discretion varied from system to system; in some, judges were left
largely free to depart from the guidelines, while in others, judges were afforded little
leeway.
188. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 50-53, 86-88 (1983).
189. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, ch. II, Pub. L. No. 98-473, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1987.
190. Ch. 11, 98 Stat. 2017.
191. Ch. II, § 3557, 98 Stat. 1988.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1988) (stating that a defendant may appeal an "otherwise
final sentence").
193. For a comprehensive look at problems with the guidelines, see Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). Freed also discusses the critical reactions of judges
and other scholars to the guidelines. Id at 1685-86 & n.10. See also Albert W. Alschuler,
The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901
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ics argue that the guidelines are too harsh and inflexible.194 Still, in
spite of the judiciary's distaste for guidelines and unhappiness over
the loss of its discretion, most courts comply with the guidelines.
195
A. What The Guidelines Are and How They Work
(1) Generally
The United States Sentencing Guidelines 196 are organized to cor-
respond to most of the major federal crimes. The guidelines establish
a "base offense level" for each of these crimes.197 The base level may,
however, be augmented by what the Sentencing Commission calls
"specific offense characteristics" that are listed under each guide-
line.1 98 The Sentencing Commission also decided that various factors
pertaining to the circumstances of the crime, the offender, and the
(1991); Theresa Walker Kare & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meet-
ing Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393,442-
43 (1991). See infra note 279.
194. See Freed, supra note 193, at 1685-86.
195. In 1994, 71.7% of sentences given within the federal court system were within the
guideline range. Downward departures accounted for nearly all of the cases sentenced
outside of the guidelines (27.1% of all cases were sentenced below the guidelines and only
1.2% were above). Most downward departures were granted on motion by the govern-
ment due to the defendant's "substantial assistance" to authorities pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) (1996) (a defendant who cooperates with authorities in the investigation or pros-
ecution of another offender). Only 7.6% of all cases sentenced in 1994 were below the
guideline range for reasons other than substantial assistance. Thus, judges stepped outside
the guidelines on their own in very few cases. In the years prior to 1994, compliance was
even greater. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 78-79 (1995) [herein-
after 1994 ANNUAL REPORT].
196. United States Sentencing Guidelines are published annually in the FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL by the Sentencing Commission. References to the guide-
lines in this Article are to the 1995 edition. See supra note 14.
197. In drafting the guidelines, the Commission referred to past practices as a point of
departure. It had two databases: nearly 100,000 dispositions from a two-year period pro-
vided by the Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System (FPSSIS),
and a sample of 10,500 convictions between October 1, 1984 and September 30, 1985 for
which the Probation Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
provided quantitative information along with the presentence investigations. The Proba-
tion Division's report on the 10,500 cases was supplemented by information provided by
the Bureau of Prisons on actual time (or its best projection of time) that these convicted
defendants would serve. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 7-8 & n.50 (1988); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 21-26 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. The
cases were organized according to the type of crime committed; the idea was to establish a
"heartland" or prototypical case and sentence for each crime.
198. For example, aggravated assault carries a base offense level of 15 points. 1995
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, § 2A2.2(a). But if a firearm was discharged in the
course of the assault, the level is increased by 5 additional points. Id. at § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A).
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victim, may be considered in determining the sentence. These are
called "adjustments."' 99 Another relevant factor in the calculus is the
offender's criminal history.20 0 To determine the sentence, the court
takes the final offense level after the adjustments have been made and
the criminal history category identified and selects the appropriate
sentence range from the sentencing table. The court may depart up-
ward or downward from the sentence within strict parameters. 20' It
has full discretion to select a sentence within the guideline range.
(2) Civil Rights Guidelines
Deeply concerned about the minimal sentences given to police in
brutality cases, the Department of Justice advocated two sentencing
reforms. First, it asked Congress to amend section 242 to include fel-
ony convictions for crimes resulting in bodily injury. The statute at
the time deemed only behavior resulting in death to be felonious.
Congress finally did so on November 18, 1988.202 Second, it worked
with the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the civil rights guide-
lines it drafted would communicate the seriousness of those crimes.20 3
Eventually, this second reform was also accomplished.20 4
199. A frequently used adjustment considers the offender's role in the offense. An
aggravating role adds points to the offense level while a mitigating role subtracts points.
IiL at §§ 3B1.1 & 3B1.2.
200. Id. at §§ 4A1.1-4B1.4.
201. Id. at § 5K1.1-5K2.16. The most common ground for departure is "substantial
assistance to authorities." Id at § 5K1.1. See supra note 195. Other specified grounds for
both upward and downward departures are: refusal to assist, death, physical injury, ex-
treme psychological injury, abduction or unlawful restraint, property damage or loss, weap-
ons and dangerous instrumentalities, disruption of governmental function, extreme
conduct, criminal purpose, victim's conduct, lesser harms, coercion and duress, diminished
capacity, public welfare, terrorism and voluntary disclosure of offense. Id. at §§ 5K1.2,
5K2.1-14, 5K2.16. In addition, if the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described," then it may sentence outside the guidelines. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1996). The Commission cautions, however, that "[iln the absence of a charac-
teristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as sufficiently atypical to warrant a sen-
tence different from that called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the guideline
range is not authorized." 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 5K.2.0 cmt. See
infra note 278.
202. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7019, 102 Stat. 4396 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242).
203. The guidelines first went into effect November 1, 1987, a year before the statutory
change. Subsequently, the guidelines were amended, effective November 1, 1989, to reflect
the increased penalty structure adopted by Congress.
204. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 2H1.1 to 2H1.5 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 GUIDELINES].
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The Sentencing Commission adopted five guidelines to cover civil
rights offenses. 20 5 A base level offense was assigned to each ranging
from 6 to 15. Section 2H1.4 ("Interference with Civil Rights Under
Color of Law"), the guideline most often applied to police brutality,
had a base level of 10. Under section 2H1.4, an offender was subject
to six months in prison at a minimum. 206
Even more consequential, the Commission decided to include the
underlying criminal behavior in the sentencing calculus. Instead of
punishing the civil rights crime in the abstract, distinct from the be-
havior accompanying the violation, the guidelines focus on the behav-
ior, or "underlying conduct." For example, in a police case involving
excessive force, the officer is sentenced for both the civil rights viola-
tion and the underlying assault. The sentence is calculated by first
referring to the guidelines for the underlying offense of assault and
adding on to it the civil rights base offense level.20 7
This approach dramatizes the gravity of civil rights crimes. Per-
sons convicted of civil rights crimes are punished for the underlying
conduct under the same guidelines that apply to this conduct no mat-
ter who the offender or what the circumstance is. The sentencing goal
205. The five guidelines were: § 2H1.1 ("Going in Disguise to Deprive of Rights");
§ 2H1.2 ("Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights"); § 2H1.3 ("Use of Force or Threat of
Force to Deny Benefits or Rights in Furtherance of Discrimination"); § 2H1.4 ("Interfer-
ence with Civil Rights Under Color or Law"); and § 2H1.5 ("Other Deprivations of Rights
or Benefits in Furtherance of Discrimination"). Id. Since their initial enactment, the
number of guidelines has changed twice. Effective November 1, 1990, guideline section
2H1.2 ("Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights") was consolidated with section 2HI.1
("Going in Disguise to Deprive of Rights"). 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at
607-08, app. C (discussing amendment 327 to the Sentencing Guidelines). Five years later,
effective November 1, 1995, the remaining four guidelines were collapsed into one, section
2H1.1 ("Offenses Involving Individual Rights") and an additional guideline was adopted to
sentence hate crimes, section 3A1.1 ("Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim"). Id.
at app. C at 824-26 (discussing amendment 54 to the Sentencing Guidelines).
206. The Commission raised the base level offense for police brutality and other civil
rights crimes committed under color of law to 12 when it amended the civil rights guide-
lines in May, 1995. This change went into effect November 1, 1995. 1995 GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 14, at 824-26, app. C; see discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
207. Id. at § 2H1.1(a). The guidelines adjust for the possibility that no underlying
criminal conduct has taken place by adopting relatively high base offense levels. It is hard
to imagine such a circumstance, but one possibility might be behavior that causes psycho-
logical anguish to the victim. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text. Where there is
underlying conduct, the base offense level is reduced somewhat. In most cases, the re-
duced base offense level combined with the underlying offense will exceed the
"unadorned" base offense level. The guidelines require that the greater of the two sums
shall be applied. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2H1.1(a).
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of achieving proportionality is met through the use of "add-ons.
' 208
At the same time, the seriousness of the civil rights deprivation is un-
derscored through the imposition of additional points.
B. Police Brutality Guidelines Result in Higher Sentences
Empirical research on sentences in police brutality cases is lim-
ited, but between the statutory change and the new guidelines, it ap-
pears that sentences in police brutality cases (and civil rights cases in
general) are longer than they were, supporting prosecutors' episodic
observations that the guidelines enacted by the Sentencing Commis-
sion result in stiffer sentences.209 This development is a positive one.
It is a forceful way of sending the message to all people in society that
the crime is serious.
(1) Department of Justice, Criminal Section Data
The most useful set of data comes from the Department of Jus-
tice's Civil Rights Division. The Criminal Section maintains a
database on the status of cases from its own docket and the civil rights
dockets of the United States Attorneys. Its database is the only
source of information on pre-guideline sentencing practices in law en-
forcement brutality cases. Unlike other compilations, these case re-
ports break down to include types of law enforcement civil rights
violations (brutality, sexual misconduct and false arrest), so that it is
possible to isolate and analyze sentences in law enforcement brutality
cases as a constant category.
208. "Add-ons" is a term used by some Commissioners to refer to additions to the base
offense level for underlying conduct.
209. There is little reliable statistical evidence on sentences imposed in civil rights cases
generally, whether before or after the guidelines. It is especially difficult to gain a picture
of pre-guideline sentencing because no agency was responsible for data collection. Pre-
guideline studies tended to be conducted for a particular purpose and on a one-time only
basis. A consequence of the different purposes of data collection is that the few studies
that were done cannot easily be compared; the methods used to gather and organize the
data vary too much.
Another problem in investigating sentencing practices in civil rights cases is that their
number is low. Relatively few civil rights prosecutions are brought compared to other
federal criminal prosecutions, the largest of which are drug offenses. In 1994, the Sentenc-
ing Commission determined that 41.8% of the 39,971 guideline cases that year were drug
cases (in 52 of the 39,971 cases the primary offense category could not be determined and
thus could not be included in the percentage calculation). 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 195, figure B, at 38 ("Distribution of Sentenced Guideline Defendants by Primary
Offense Category"). In contrast, that same year, only 0.3% of primary offenses were civil
rights cases. ILd. at 39, table 12.
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The Criminal Section data 210 indicate that since the guidelines
were enacted, more law enforcement brutality offenders are going to
prison and for a longer period of time than before. Of the seventy-six
law enforcement defendants indicted2 ' for crimes of brutality com-
mitted between September 30, 1985 and September 30, 1987, the
guidelines' effective date, forty-three were found guilty.212 Of the
forty-three defendants who were sentenced, only twenty-five of them,
or 62.5%, received any prison time, and most of these (68%) received
prison sentences of a year or less.213 In contrast, in 103 post-guideline
cases, seventy-seven offenders, or 74.8%, went to prison and less than
half (44.1%) received short sentences of a year or less. These post-
guideline statistics are derived from 150 indictments of law enforce-
ment officers for brutality committed between November 1, 1987 and
September 30, 1994. During this period, 107 defendants were found
guilty by plea or conviction and the Criminal Section has reported
sentences for 103 of them.
214
Another way of looking at the Criminal Section's data is to com-
pare average prison sentences. The average prison sentence for the
twenty-five offenders who went to prison before the guidelines was
18.7 months. After the guidelines, the average sentence for the sev-
enty-seven offenders who went to prison increased to 28.2 months.
215
As in the calculations above, these averages were computed after ex-
210. Computer printouts of case sentencing statistics were provided by Dianne Thomp-
son, then-Paralegal Supervisor, Criminal Section. The data cover all federal civil rights
indictments from September 30, 1985 to September 30, 1994.
211. The total 76 reflects cases brought to a determination of innocence or guilt. Other
cases were indicted during this period but were dismissed, diverted or not otherwise
pursued.
212. Three were acquitted, thirty pled guilty and thirteen were convicted after trial.
213. This analysis excludes the three brutality cases during this time in which a victim
died, because these much higher sentences distort the statistics.
214. Id. Again, as in the pre-guideline cases, these numbers do not include death cases.
Two observations need to be made here: First, proportionately fewer indictments occurred
in the post-guideline era than before (although in relation to the number of convictions,
the Criminal Section achieved a higher conviction rate after the guidelines, infra at note
216). It is not clear why fewer cases were indicted, but this result may be related to the
obstacles discussed earlier. See supra Part II.B. Perhaps, too, prosecutors are selecting
their cases more carefully. Second, the statistics are less dramatic in the higher sentencing
ranges and also perhaps less reliable because there are fewer cases. Twenty percent of pre-
guideline and 18.2% of post-guideline defendants sentenced to prison received between
one and two years. The remaining 12% of pre-guideline prison cases are three cases in
which very long sentences were imposed (72,72 and 108 months). The remaining 37.7% of
post-guideline prison cases are more evenly spread out. A substantial proportion (14 cases
or 18.2%) received sentences of over four years.
215. These are the average prison sentences, not average sentences, which would be
much lower because the latter would include probation.
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cluding the death cases. HoweiVer, among both pre and post-guideline
cases there were a number of extremely high sentences. The impact of
these extreme cases becomes clear when looking at the median
sentences. The median prison sentence before the guidelines was
twelve months. After the guidelines, the median prison sentence was
eighteen months.
A striking difference between cases sentenced before and after
the guidelines is the rate of judgments of guilt, meaning both pleas
and convictions. A judgment of guilt was obtained in slightly more
than one-half of the pre-guideline cases (57%), whereas it was ob-
tained in over two-thirds (71.3%) of the reported post-guideline cases.
Yet, surprisingly, this increased success in brutality prosecutions can-
not be explained by a rise in the number of pleas since the guidelines
took effect. Of the pre-guideline convictions, 70% were the result of
guilty pleas in contrast to 60.8% of post-guideline cases. Of course,
any number of factors unrelated to the sentencing guidelines could
account for the greater success rate in these cases in recent years.216
A possible explanation linking the guidelines with the greater success
rate, however, is that prosecutors are taking the cases more seriously
and working harder at prosecuting them than before because there is
more at stake. This theory needs to be tested. But the fact that the
rate of pleas is lower now than it was before the guidelines were en-
acted refutes a common perception that the guidelines are used as a
bludgeon to frighten defendants into accepting pleas on lesser of-
fenses to avoid longer sentences on the charged offense.
(2) Sentencing Commission Data
The Sentencing Commission did not specifically study sentences
for police brutality before it enacted the guidelines. 217 To the extent
216. For example, prosecutors in the Criminal Section and United States Attorney's
offices may be better trained than they were a decade ago, or they may be prosecuting
easier cases. It also could be that the two-year period of pre-guideline cases happened to
have a number of non-representative cases, or is not long enough to draw reliable statisti-
cal inferences.
217. See infra Part IV.A.1 discussing enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines. The
Commission reviewed approximately thirty civil rights cases that predated the guidelines in
which sentences were dispensed. See infra note 253. Its presentation of these cases, how-
ever, does not shed any meaningful light on pre-guideline sentences in law enforcement
excessive force cases. The offenses were organized into generic categories, called "baseline
offenses," that included what were considered to be the salient features of a crime. These
categories did not necessarily correspond to the guidelines subsequently drawn up by the
Commission. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 197, at 23. The five civil rights base-
line offenses were election laws, arson, victim injury, victim death, and "other." IAL at 33,
table 1(a).
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that it has studied this issue since the enactment of the guidelines, no
comprehensive findings have been published.218 However, some post-
guideline information is available.
The Commission provided unpublished data on guideline section
2H1.4 219 covering the 1991 through 1993 reporting periods.220 During
this period, fifty-two cases were sentenced under this guideline. When
Any of these baseline offenses could have been committed under color of law. Also,
the sentence levels were calculated by averaging the sentences given in the cases. An aver-
age sentence is not necessarily descriptive of actual practices because one extreme case can
throw the average off. This is of particular concern where, as here, the number of cases is
extremely small. Finally, a glaring weakness in the Commission's study is the failure to
include probation even though it is commonly perceived that many, if not most, civil rights
cases before the guidelines received only probation.
Because the civil rights data were useless for most purposes, the staff may not have
provided it to the Commissioners when they were drafting the guidelines. See infra note
253. Nevertheless, the Commission published the results in its Supplementary Report.
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 197, at 33, table 1(a).
218. Since the enactment of the guidelines, all sentences imposed in federal criminal
cases are required to be reported to the Sentencing Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)
(1994). The Commission, in turn, publishes an annual report that is transmitted to the
President, the Congress and the Judicial Conference, presenting and analyzing the data. 28
U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(14)-(16), 997 (1994). In 1994, the submission rates from the courts were
96.2% for Pre-sentence Reports, 99.3% for Judgment of Conviction Orders, and 93.6% for
the Report on the Sentencing Hearing (statement of reasons). 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 195, at 31.
The annual reports did not include civil rights among the primary offenses in its tables
until 1991. Since then, as with other offenses, civil rights guidelines are consolidated into
one primary offense for reporting purposes, so that it is impossible to determine sentences
under each guideline. Moreover, the tables do not report on the nature of the offense or
the offender. Thus, in the table providing average length of imprisonment by primary-
offense categories, the category of civil rights might include behavior ranging from verbal
abuse to first-degree murder, committed by a private citizen or a public official. With this
potential range, averages lose much of their meaning. At most, the averages show that at
least some civil rights defendants are doing serious time.
The tables show that during the 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 reporting periods (October
1 through September 30), 116, 126, 123 and 109 defendants, respectively, received their
primary sentences under the civil rights guidelines. In each year, roughly half of these
defendants received some imprisonment. The average length of imprisonment, measured
in months, was 26.1, 31.0 and 36.7, 40.1 respectively. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
195. Because these averages include cases where the victim died, one or two defendants
could be serving all of the imprisonment time, thereby skewing the results. These annual
reports are simply too superficial to bear close analysis.
219. While police and other law enforcement agents could be sentenced for civil rights
crimes under all four civil rights guidelines (before they were collapsed into one, see supra
note 205), their primary offense statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, was sentenced under guideline
section 2H1.4. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2H1.4 cont. (citing 18
U.S.C. § 242 as applicable statutory provision).
220. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Information on Guideline Cases Sentenced Under
§ 2H1.4 (October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1993) (unpublished) (on file with author).
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the sentence was imprisonment, the average sentence was twenty-four
months.221
These data support the conclusions of Commission staff who have
studied the civil rights guidelines.' They found that, as of July 7,
1994, sixty-seven defendants had been sentenced under guideline sec-
tion 2H1.4. Roughly half of them went to prison, averaging 36.4
months imprisonment. This number, however, is skewed by two cases
with unusual or extreme facts in which defendants were given severe
sentences.223 If the sentences in these two cases are not counted, the
average sentence would be 21.7 months.
(3) Federal Judicial Center Data
The Federal Judicial Center conducted a study in 1984 of pre-
Guideline practices, covering persons convicted of violating federal
criminal laws who were sentenced between January 1, 1984 and Febru-
ary 28, 1985.24 The database consisted of 39,304 offenders225 and was
prepared specifically to help the Sentencing Commission's work.
2 2 6
The authors stress that the study cannot support close statistical analy-
sis227 Nevertheless, they believe it is valuable for descriptive
purposes.
221. Id. All but one of the offenders were sentenced under Criminal History 1. There
is considerable variance in average prison time over the three years reported: 41.6 months
for 1991, 16.4 months for 1992 and 14.2 months for 1993. For those receiving probation,
the average sentences of probation were 24.0, 28.0 and 27.3 months respectively. The
Commission did not provide information on the number of section 2H1.4 offenders sen-
tenced to prison, probation or an alternative.
222. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Wroblewski, Staff Attorney, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Office of General Counsel (July 7, 1994) [hereinafter Wroblewski Interview].
223. Id.
224. 1 ANTHONY PARTRIDGE ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PUNISHMENTS IM-
POSED ON FEDERAL OFFENDERS 1-3 (1986) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CENTER DATA].
225. Id. at 1-9.
226. Id. at 1-3. The database was to provide the Commission with reference points to
determine whether its proposed guidelines radically departed from the current mainstream
practice. It is unclear whether the Commission used this study in drafting the guidelines.
There is no reference to it in the Commission's Supplementary Report describing its re-
search or in former Commissioner Stephen Breyer's article about the Commission's pro-
cess. See supra note 197.
227. The authors urge caution in relying on the data for statistical inferences. First, in
nearly half of the cases in which offenders were parole eligible, they had to estimate what
the decision would have been, based on the probation officer's prediction. Second, they
stress that extreme cases might be the product of faulty record-keeping. Third, while all of
the tables they constructed (organized by offense characteristics) show great ranges in pun-
ishments, they are unable to conclude one way or the other from the data that a disparity
in punishments exists. Fourth, because many of the tables contain few offenders, the statis-
tics may be skewed by chance. Finally, they note that their information about felonies is
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The Judicial Center study shows that, without breaking down the
offense according to the different civil rights statutes, out of seventy-
two cases,228 thirty-eight offenders were sentenced to prison and
twenty-nine put on probation.229 Excluding the one case in which
more than 10 years of imprisonment was imposed, the average prison
sentence was 1 year and 2.2 months. These offenders were not all first
timers: twenty-two had prior records, eight of whom had been incar-
cerated before.230 The inclusion of persons with prior records means
that at least twenty-two of these persons most likely could not have
been public officials. Once convicted, a public official usually does
not have the opportunity to act under color of law a second time.
Also, significantly, it must have raised the average prison sentence be-
cause repeat offenders typically receive longer sentences than first-
time offenders.
(4) Interpreting the Data
It is hard to draw firm conclusions from the data alone. There are
too few cases to obtain truly meaningful statistics. Moreover, and im-
portantly, except for studies run on the Criminal Section's database,
reports on pre and post-guideline practices are not comparable. In
addition to reliability problems of the earlier studies, none of the stud-
ies measures the same event.
The best source of data is the Criminal Section's database. It
maintains complete records of all its cases and the data can be
manipulated to give information specifically on police brutality. The
other sources provide, at best, an impression of trends in civil rights
sentencing. In some instances these impressions are consistent with
the Criminal Section data, but in others they are not.
With respect to pre-guideline sentencing, the Federal Judicial
Center's research can be interpreted to correspond to the Criminal
Section's. The Federal Judicial Center found that 52% of all civil
rights violators went to prison. Prison sentences averaged 1 year, 2.2
more complete than that about misdemeanors. JUDICIAL CENTER DATA, supra note 224, at
1-4 to 1-10.
228. The seventy-two offenders were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. sections 241,242
and 245. Fifteen of these also had secondary offenses, primarily assault. Id. at 8-19. Like
the Sentencing Commission's study, the lumping together of civil rights offenses here does
not distinguish between official and private misconduct, much less differentiate among
kinds of official misconduct, and therefore precludes analysis in brutality cases only.
229. Two were given fines only and three were excluded because the data were known
to be unreliable. Id. at 8-21.
230. Id. at 8-19.
[Vol. 47
months. Nearly one-third (30%) were repeat offenders, making it un-
likely that they were law enforcement officers. If their cases had been
subtracted from the total, creating more of an overlap with the Crimi-
nal Section's pool of law enforcement brutality offenders, it is likely
that the average prison time would have gone down, because repeat
offenders generally receive more time.231 This adjustment would
bring the Judicial Center's findings close to the Criminal Section's
data showing that nearly half of pre-guideline offenders received no
prison at all and most of those going to prison went for less than a
year.2 32
Post-guideline sentencing studies raise some interesting ques-
tions. Two Sentencing Commission sources, one measuring all civil
rights offenders and the other measuring section 2H1.4 offenders, 233
indicate that only half go to prison. Yet the Criminal Section's data
clearly indicate that since the guidelines were enacted, law enforce-
ment brutality offenders go to prison 74.8% of the time.23 4 Are the
guidelines causing law enforcement brutality offenders to go to prison
at a higher rate than before the enactment of the guidelines but leav-
ing other categories of civil rights offenders unaffected?
If law enforcement officers are going to prison more often under
the guidelines than before, they may be serving comparatively less
time than other civil rights offenders. Both Criminal Section and Sen-
tencing Commission sources show that civil rights offenders who go to
prison are serving more time under the guidelines. Yet the Sentencing
Commission's averages for all civil rights cases are higher than its
averages for section 2H1.4 cases.2 35 This dichotomy suggests that pri-
vate citizens are raising the civil rights prison average sentence, or are,
at least, disproportionately impacted by the guidelines' stringent
levels. If this is the case, research needs to be undertaken to deter-
mine the source of the disparity.2 36 The disparity does not result from
231. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 87 (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1983) (studies consistently show that prior record affects sentence).
232. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
233. These are the Commission's annual reports and staff findings. See supra notes
219-23.
234. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part III.B.2. Even the average prison sentences computed from the
Criminal Section's data shows that law enforcement brutality offenders are serving some-
what less time on average in prison than the Commission's data for civil rights offenders
overall. See supra Part III.B.1.
236. Of all the interpretations presented here, this one is the most tentative. There is
no way of knowing what cases the Commission included in its computations. The addition
or subtraction of one or two cases can shift the results, giving rise to an entirely different
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the guidelines. Indeed, law enforcement offenders should be serving
more time for the same behavior under the guidelines.
237
Regarding underlying conduct, Sentencing Commission data
show that half of the public-official offenders sentenced under section
2H1.4 go to prison for roughly two years. It is fair to assume that, as
previously noted, these were first-time offenders because public offi-
cials who are convicted of a civil rights crime are normally fired from
their jobs.2 38 Thus, the average offense levels for prison-bound of-
fenders would fall in the range of fifteen to seventeen months.
239
Given that the base-offense level under section 2H1.4 is only 10 (6 to
12 months), it is apparent that it is the underlying conduct that boosts
the amount of time an offender spends in prison.
Finally, given the strong implication from the data that the aver-
age prison sentence of two years for offenders sentenced under sec-
tion 2H1.4 results from the addition of underlying conduct, it seems
clear that this system of computing sentences has had a significant ef-
fect in sentencing outcomes. This finding is important because it
shows that the application of underlying conduct has rationalized the
sentencing process by bringing civil rights sentencing in line with other
noncivil rights crimes involving the same behavior. Thus, an impor-
tant goal of sentencing reform-achieving proportionality-is being
met. More importantly, the police and the public are being sent a
message: police brutality is an egregious crime and will be punished
accordingly.
C. Prosecutors' Views
Prosecutors who specialize in bringing civil rights cases are ex-
perts in the operation of the guidelines. Their insights must be seri-
ously considered in evaluating how the guidelines are working. In
interviews with a number of current and former prosecutors, 240 one
interpretation. An example of the impact of extreme cases can be seen in the discrepancy
between the average and median sentences drawn from the Criminal Section's data. See
supra note 215 and accompanying text.
237. The explanation may lie in the courts' use of downward departures. See infra Part
IV.
238. Sentencing Commission staff did not specify what the criminal histories were in
the sixty-seven official misconduct cases, Wroblewski Interview, supra note 222, but the
information provided by the Commission for cases between 1991 and 1993 confirms this
assumption that most public officials are first time offenders. Of the fifty-two cases, forty-
seven fell in Criminal History Category I and one in Category II (information is missing on
four of the cases). See supra note 221.
239. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 272; see also id. (Sentencing Table).
240. Prosecutors' Interviews, supra note 180.
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phenomenon they all emphasized was the strictness of the guidelines,
particularly in police-brutality cases. Their sense is that they are send-
ing more police to prison.
Prosecutors also perceive that these police violators are being
given longer sentences. A former employee whose responsibilities in-
cluded data collection for the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Di-
vision of the Department of Justice said her impression was that police
were receiving as much as 50% more time. But, several prosecutors
noted, it was impossible to tell whether the change was due to the
1988 amendment to the statute or the guidelines. 241
What is clear to prosecutors is that they have been given great
leverage due to the increased penalties under the guidelines and the
elimination of judicial discretion. The power of sentencing rests
largely with the prosecution in deciding what to charge. Also, many
think that the guidelines are encouraging more defendants to cooper-
ate and plea.to a lesser offense so that the offense level is reduced and
points are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility.242 The prosecu-
tor may also ask the court to depart downward on grounds of substan-
tial assistance.
Most prosecutors appear to support the guidelines. They are val-
ued by prosecutors for the message they send. This message is partic-
ularly important in the Criminal Section where, because so few police
prosecutions are successfully brought, a major goal of its work is gen-
eral deterrence. 243 This deterrent effect is undermined by minimal
sentences. Prosecutors believe that these cases are taken more seri-
ously when offenders are subject to lengthy sentences.
Thus, most of the prosecutors interviewed think that the elimina-
tion of judicial discretion in these cases is a change for the better be-
cause courts tended to sympathize with police and excuse their
criminal behavior. Several singled out the role of underlying conduct
in the penalty structure as key to lessening sentencing disparity. Po-
lice are not considered special under the guidelines, but are to be
treated like any other offender who commits the same conduct.
As an empirical matter, several prosecutors mentioned that it was
impossible to evaluate the effect of the guidelines. One prosecutor
asked whether what was to be measured was a change (presumably a
241. Id.
242. But, interestingly, their own data do not support this belief. See supra note 216
and accompanying text.
243. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 on the difficulty of winning convictions in police
brutality cases.
March 1996]
reduction) in the number of complaints about police.244 Even such an
obvious question as whether stiffer sentences are being given due to
the guidelines is difficult to answer because the statutory change oc-
curred within one year of the enactment of the guidelines. Also, with
so few cases, it is hard to identify a statistically significant trend. Vari-
ations may simply be due to the kinds of cases brought in a given year.
Another prosecutor noted that the guidelines could bring about
disparate results among like cases. For example, one prosecutor was
troubled by the role of chance in sentencing. In cases in which police
behave in a similar fashion, it is often pure fortuity whether the victim
is seriously injured or not, yet the presence and degree of injury
makes a big difference in the sentence. Similarly, the guidelines do
not account for a police officer having a "bad night." An isolated in-
stance of criminal behavior involving split-second decisions and a
carefully premeditated crime might result in similar sentences.
Concerns about anomalous cases aside, several prosecutors were
troubled by the severity of the civil rights guidelines. Nevertheless,
because police should not be singled out for special consideration,
they do not regard the use of downward departures in police brutality
cases to be appropriate given their belief that the privileged treatment
of police by the criminal justice system is a fundamental obstacle to
achieving justice in brutality cases. These comments suggest that lib-
eralizing the grounds for departure will not be a satisfactory means of
moderating severe penalties in brutality cases. What is likely to occur
with such an approach is a reappearance of the old patterns. Instead,
if the sentences are too severe (a point on which prosecutors disa-
gree), they think that the sentencing structure as a whole should be
revisited. If done in this manner, the fundamental concept of punish-
ing everyone equally for the same underlying conduct, with add-ons
for civil rights crimes, could be preserved.
IV. Sentencing Guidelines on Trial
In police brutality cases, the fundamental purpose to be accom-
plished by guideline sentencing is recognition and enforcement of the
principle that law enforcement agents who violate the law should not
be given special consideration by the criminal justice system. This
244. She emphasized that the number of complaints is not a measure of how good or
bad a police department is. A good police department, she stressed, will make it easy for
citizens to make complaints. It would be a disservice to those departments to assume they
have a significant problem with brutality when they are doing the right thing by encourag-
ing people to come forward. Prosecutors' Interviews, supra note 180.
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principle should seem self-evident. But it is precisely this principle
that the Supreme Court has rejected in its consideration of Koon v.
United States.
In Koon and United States v. Rorke,245 the trial courts departed
downward from the guidelines in sentencing police officers convicted
under section 242. In both cases, departure was justified on the.
grounds that are intrinsic to the crime of police brutality, namely, the
victims' misconduct and the defendants' status as police officers.246 In
essence, these courts sought to excuse the defendants' behavior be-
cause they were police officers, rather than punish it because they
were police officers.
The history of the enactment of the civil rights sentencing guide-
lines is highly instructive. Twice the Sentencing Commission came
close to adopting guidelines that would have effectively rejected the
principle of treating police brutality like other serious crimes.247 But
in each instance, the Sentencing Commission instead adopted strin-
gent standards for police and other civil rights violators acting under
color of law. The Commission's actions can be interpreted in two op-
posing ways. It could be argued that the history casts doubt on the
Commission's long-term commitment to send a convincing message to
police departments and other law enforcement agencies that brutality
will not be tolerated or that, at the least, its internal struggle reveals
an uneasy consensus about the guidelines that were ultimately en-
acted. The better argument is that the Commission's view changed in
the course of its deliberations. 248 The Commission came to see that
police brutality is routinely dismissed as inconsequential and to recog-
nize the connection between that common attitude and the frequent
"slap on the wrist" sentences officers received before the guidelines
were enacted. The Commission decided that the public deserved bet-
245. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11932, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1991), aff'd 972 F.2d 1334
(3d Cir. 1994).
246. When the Sentencing Commission drafted the guidelines, it employed the concept
of a "heartland" case to distinguish among crimes and degrees of criminal culpability.
Each crime that is punished under the guidelines has its prototype. The prototypical cases
are called 'heartland" cases. They are the quintessential crimes of burglary, assault, car
theft, police brutality, etc. Each is assigned a base offense level for sentencing. When
cases vary from the "heartland," points are either added to, or subtracted from, the base
offense level. In both Koon and Rorke, the trial judges found that the crimes were not in
the "heartland" of police brutality. They did so by denying the very nature of these crimes
and the criminals: police brutality is a crime committed by police officers. These cases are
discussed fully infra Part IV.B.
247. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
248. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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ter. Once set, the Sentencing Commission has not swerved from its
decision to maintain strong police brutality guidelines. However, un-
less the Commission acts decisively again, the result of its steadfast
commitment will be undone by the Supreme Court's failure to recog-
nize the critical role of these guidelines in criminal civil rights
enforcement.
249
A. The Sentencing Commission
(1) History of Enactment
Police brutality has had an ambivalent place in the history of sen-
tencing reform. Some, perhaps most, members of the Commission ini-
tially resisted increasing civil rights sentences. 250 The enactment
history of civil rights guidelines that follows is drawn from extensive
interviews and correspondence with the Commissioner most responsi-
ble for their adoption, as well as interviews with other key players, a
review of the proceedings, including minutes of Commission meetings,
hearing testimony, outside submissions and draft proposals, and arti-
cles and reports issued since then. It shows that until one Commis-
sioner assumed responsibility for educating the other Commissioners,
the Commission was tending towards a position that would cater to
the sorts of attitudes about civil rights and police brutality described
earlier in this Article that prevail in our society.251
The relative insignificance of police brutality and other civil rights
crimes in the minds of the Sentencing Commission members was
demonstrated in the first instance by their failure to follow the proce-
dures used to produce guidelines for all other crimes. 252 There was no
249. Koon v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996). See discussion infra
Part IV.B.1.
250. The first members of the Sentencing Commission, appointed by President Rea-
gan, consisted of three federal judges, three academics and one criminal justice profes-
sional. The three judges were the Chairman, William W. Wilkins, Jr., J., District of South
Carolina (now a 4th Circuit Judge); Stephen G. Breyer, J., 1st Circuit (now an Associate
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court); and George E. MacKinnon, a Senior Judge on the
D.C. Circuit. The three academics were Michael K. Block, Professor of Law, Policy &
Economics, University of Arizona; Ilene H. Nagel, Professor, Indiana University School of
Law; and Paul H. Robinson, Professor, Rutgers School of Law. The criminal justice pro-
fessional was Helen G. Corrothers, a one-time prison warden and U.S. Parole Commis-
sioner. The Commission was generally regarded as a philosophically conservative body.
Of the many criticisms of the guidelines, they cannot be said to be the product of a group
that was "soft on crime."
251. The Commissioner who spearheaded the civil rights reform effort was Helen
Corrothers.
252. Typically, Commissioners used data sets of existing sentences as a point of depar-
ture for developing their new sentencing system. These data are described supra note 197.
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useful data set to analyze the adjudication of past civil rights crimes,
which may have allowed preconceived notions that police brutality is
not a real crime to influence the proposals. 253 Second, other than the
Criminal Section at the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division,
there is no evidence of any involvement by a government agency.254
Finally, civil rights crimes were not on the agenda of Commission ad-
visory or working groups. It was not a topic at any of the hearings
held by the Commission. Nor, apparently, was there any citizen com-
ment on the issue.255 While this empirical vacuum may not have been
entirely the Commission's fault, it nonetheless appears to have had a
negative impact on the proposals the Commission initially drafted.
Two main controversies characterized the Commissions's enact-
ment of guidelines for civil rights offenses. First, the Commissioners
disagreed about the number of necessary guidelines, both in terms of
Commissioners examined and then accepted, rejected or modified these past sentencing
practices and the distinctions upon which they relied. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra
note 197, at 16. Many other sources also influenced the formation of the guidelines, includ-
ing, most importantly, Congress' intent in passing the legislation and its specific instruc-
tions to the Commission to consider various factors. Title 28, the Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure Code, lists twelve statutory considerations the Commission was to apply in writ-
ing the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(n) (1996) In addition, the Commission consulted
advisory and working groups it had established; solicited information from various federal
agencies; held both topical and public hearings; and relied on its own research staff for
ideas. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 197, at 9-11.
Normally, Commissioners submitted guideline proposals to the Staff Director for ini-
tial drafting. Staff on the Guideline Production Unit put draft guidelines in the proper
format, reviewed proposed guidelines for consistency with previous efforts and then
presented them for discussion at Commission meetings. Numerous competing drafts re-
sulted from this process; all proposals were placed on the agenda for Commission consider-
ation. Interview with Helen Corrothers (see supra notes 250-51) and Charles Betsey,
former Senior Research Associate for the Commission, Sept. 2, 1994 [hereinafter Cor-
rothers & Betsey Interview].
253. William Rhodes, Research Director for the Commission during the guideline for-
mation, estimates that there were roughly thirty civil rights cases in the entire data base.
Telephone interview with William Rhodes, Research Director for the Commission (Oct.
25, 1993). Because of the small number of cases, the empirical study done for other crimes
was not conducted for civil rights crimes. Telephone Interview with Phyllis Newton, cur-
rent Staff Director and former researcher for the Commission (Nov. 1, 1994). Neither
Helen Corrothers, nor Charles Betsey, the staff researcher who assisted Corrothers, has
any memory of a data set for civil rights crimes. Corrothers & Betsey Interview, supra
note 252.
254. Department of Justice officials Roger Pauley and Vicki Portney recall the process
as informal and managed through the Criminal Section. Telephone interviews with Roger
Pauley, Policy Director, Office of Legislation, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
(Sept. 16, 1994) and Vicki Portney, Attorney, Office of Legislation, Criminal Division, De-
partment of Justice (Nov. 2 & 22, 1994).
255. A review of all the files at the Sentencing Commission containing comments on
the guidelines uncovered no reference to civil rights crimes.
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what kinds of conduct to include and in terms of whether to issue
separate guidelines for each offense.256 Second, Commissioners could
not agree on the severity of the sentences to be imposed.
257
The initial draft section of guidelines for civil rights violations
demonstrated clear disregard for the seriousness of civil rights of-
fenses.258 Issued by the Guideline Production Unit, it consisted of
only one guideline, called "Interfering with Civil Rights. ' 259 All civil
rights offenses were to be encompassed under this one guideline, cov-
ering behavior ranging from verbal harassment of victims to homicide.
This created a lowest common denominator problem-by grouping all
the offenses together, the least harmful and the most egregious carried
the same punishment. That punishment level was extremely low. The
base level first proposed for civil rights offenses was 6, putting it in the
lowest ranked range; it brought zero to six months imprisonment.
260
To correct this flaw, Helen Corrothers, the criminal justice profes-
sional on the Sentencing Commission, proposed expanding the guide-
lines to include a broader range of behavior than that encompassed by
the original proposal. Other Commissioners objected on the ground
that additional guidelines were unnecessary because so few cases were
being brought. They interpreted the relatively small number of civil
rights prosecutions to mean that the statutes simply were no longer
being violated.261 A lawyer from the Criminal Section provided ex-
amples of recent cases that represented these kinds of behavior,
262
and also attended a Commission meeting to convey that civil rights
violations are not a thing of the past, but unfortunately still a para-
mount concern today.263 After this meeting, apparently persuaded by
his arguments, the Commission voted to adopt Corrothers' proposal.
This proposal established five civil rights sentencing guidelines.
264
256. Telephone interview with Helen Corrothers (Dec. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Corrothers
Interview] and Memorandum from Helen Corrothers to Alexa Freeman (Aug. 24, 1994)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Corrothers Memorandum].
257. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
258. Id.
259. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 84
(Sept. 1986).
260. Id. at 84, 140.
261. Corrothers Memorandum, supra note 256.
262. Id. The lawyer was Daniel L. Bell II, then Deputy Chief, Criminal Section, Civil
Rights Division.
263. Corrothers & Betsey Interview, supra note 252. The Commission meeting was on
April 1, 1987, immediately prior to the adoption of the first set of guidelines.
264. Minutes of U.S. Sentencing Commission (Apr. 1, 1987). See supra note 205 for a
description of the five guidelines.
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The decision to adopt stricter sentencing parameters than initially
proposed underwent a similar process. Commissioners resisted adopt-
ing sentences with meaningful prison time, even though they had in-
creased sentences for most other crimes.265 Had the original proposal
been adopted, police who used excessive force would have received
less time than anyone else for the same behavior but without the civil
rights component, i.e. not under color of law. Such a result would
have been incongruous.
266
265. Commissioners did not acknowledge their hostility to punishing civil rights crimes,
but their behavior clearly shows that they did not view civil rights crimes as serious threats
like other crimes. Just as in the effort to expand the number of guidelines, the grounds of
opposition for increasing the sanctions were veiled. Corrothers cannot recall ever hearing
a concise rationale for objecting to these increases. Yet there continued to be consistent
resistance to her efforts up until the moment of their adoption. Corrothers & Betsey Inter-
view, supra note 252.
Corrothers' drafts were not presented for discussion by the Guideline Production Unit
and the drafts that were offered continued to provide weak and ineffectual sanctions. Un-
like the usual identifiable work products from other Commissioners, these drafts were un-
signed. The anonymity of the opposition'prevented open discussion of the issues. This
silence sharply contrasted with the normally hot debates that took place when sanctions for
other crimes were discussed. Corrothers Interview, supra note 256.
In discussing this history with Judge Wilkins, former Chairman of the Commission, his
first recollection was that there was no resistance to these guidelines simply because they
addressed civil rights. He speculated instead that civil rights were given a low priority
because there were so few cases and the Commission was buried by its work with high-
frequency crimes such as drugs and fraud. This explanation, however, only goes to the
scheduling of topics. It does not explain why in this area there was an effort to reverse the
usual course that applied for other crimes of giving serious time. Acknowledging that this
effort may have taken place, Judge Wilkins then noted that reasonable people can disagree
and that these issues were difficult ones. Telephone Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
former Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Nov. 9, 1994).
266. Ultimately, the Sentencing Commission increased the sanctions for the civil rights
guidelines. The base offense level for four of the five guidelines was raised from level 6 to
10 (§§ 2H1.3, 2H1.4), 13 (§ 2H1.2) (deleted by consolidation with § 2H1.1 effective Nov. 1,
1990) or 15 (§ 2H1.1). 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 113-15. For an of-
fender with no criminal history, level 6 would mean zero to six months of imprisonment.
Levels 10, 13 and 15 would mean six to twelve, twelve to eighteen and eighteen to twenty-
four months, respectively. Id. at 242.
The Commissioners also agreed to a 4-level increase as a "Special Offense Character-
istic" when the defendant was a public official at the time of the offense. The number of
additional months a four-level increase could bring varies widely depending on the starting
point. It could mean as few as nine more months if it raised the offense from level 10 to
level 14, or it could mean life imprisonment if it raised the offense from level 39 to 43. Id
This increase did not apply to section 2H1.4 ("Interference with Civil Rights Under Color
of Law"), because it was inherent in the offense. The most significant reform, however,
was the inclusion of "add-ons" to the base offense level. The idea was the brainchild of
Daniel L. Bell II, the lawyer from the Criminal Section who worked with Corrothers. See
supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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Three factors might explain the Commission's hesitancy to
toughen the guidelines. First, civil rights crimes were not a high prior-
ity for the Commission. Second, Commissioners had no background
in civil rights to give them a special sensitivity to the issues. Finally,
some Commissioners resisted stiff penalties for civil rights crimes be-
cause they sympathized with the defendants in official misconduct
cases. Their initial opposition to the civil rights guidelines, in contrast
to their support for often severe penalties for other crimes, must be
read against a background of public attitudes towards crime in gen-
eral. People are terrified by increases in crime and will grasp at any
talisman that they believe might reduce it, even if it is irrational.2 67
But this attitude towards crime is not applied equally to all crimes. As
we have seen, police brutality is an acceptable trade-off for many peo-
ple in the fight against "real" crime, particularly given the color of
many of the police victims. The Commissioners, lacking background
in civil rights and not conversant on the issues, probably looked at the
small number of cases they were provided in the data set and agreed
that the trade-off was reasonable. It is to their credit that they ulti-
mately recognized this inconsistency.
(2) Guidelines Strengthened in Face of Attack
The Sentencing Commission always has the option of reducing
the guidelines by amendment, yet it has made only minor technical
changes to the civil rights guidelines since their original enactment.
Moreover, in 1995, by rejecting its own staff proposal to retreat from
its strong stance on police brutality, the Commission reaffirmed its
earlier decision to treat these crimes seriously. This action is convinc-
ing evidence that the Commission (and Congress, which approves
these guidelines) is determined to send a strong message condemning
police brutality. This interpretation of the Commission's action is par-
ticularly compelling in light of the fact that it not only rejected the
staff proposal to dilute these guidelines, but it actually increased the
267. Public support for the death penalty is one such irrational choice when research
fails to show any benefit to the crime rate. See, e.g., William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson,
Murder, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence and an Examina-
tion of Police Killings, J. SOCIAL IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 53 (reviewing and assessing
empirical research on death penalty and finding consistent pattern of nondeterrence);
Richard L. Worsnop, Death Penalty Debate: Will Support for Executions Continue to
Grow?, CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, Mar. 10, 1995, at 195 (observing that the death penalty
growing in popularity as public fears increase in crime, but most law enforcement people
admit it does not deter crime); John Horgan, The Death Penalty; Most Americans Favor It,
But What Purpose does it Serve?, SCL AMER., July 1990, at 17 (arguing that the death
penalty is popular but does not deter crime).
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base level offense for police brutality and other civil rights crimes
under color of law from ten to twelve. Also, perhaps significantly, it
acted just after the Koon defendants petitioned for certiorari seeking
to weaken the guidelines.
On January 9, 1995, the Sentencing Commission published a no-
tice of proposed amendments to the sentencing guidelines that in-
cluded, inter alia, an alteration to the civil rights guidelines.268 The
notice presented a staff proposal to collapse the four guidelines into
one.269 While there were several variations proposed, the net effect
for crimes committed under color of law was to reduce the offense
level. Rather than adding six to the level applicable to the underlying
offense, the proposal set an enhancement of two, three or four levels.
If the resulting offense level was less than ten, it was to be raised to
that level. The problem with the proposal was that it lowered the base
offense level for police brutality from the originally enacted
guidelines. 270
The Commission published several reasons for the proposed
changes. 271 First, it said that its action was prompted by Congress'
mandate to apply at least a three-level enhancement to hate crimes.
Second, the consolidation of the four current civil rights guidelines
into one would simplify their operation. Third, it reasoned that reduc-
ing the enhancement for public officials would bring the civil rights
guideline in line with section 3B1.3. 272 However, the primary reason
for the proposal was not published in the Notice. According to the
staff member responsible for its drafting, the proposal to downgrade
268. 60 Fed. Reg. 2430, 2435-36 (1995).
269. For the base offense level, the Commission staff proposed applying the greatest of
the following: 1) the base offense level for the underlying offense; 2) level 10 for offenses
involving the use or threatened use of force or the actual or threatened destruction of
property; or 3) level 6. If the crime was a conspiracy, one option set a default level of 12
while the other set it at 10. Id. at 2436.
270. At the time of the proposed amendment, the default level for section 2H1.4 was
10 where there was no underlying offense. With this proposed default level of 10 in place,
there appeared to be no change at the low end. However, in police brutality cases, there
are no prosecutions without an underlying offense. Thus, under the existing guideline, the
default level of 10 was never applied, but under the staff proposal it could have. For exam-
ple, if the underlying offense was minor assault, the base offense level under section 2A2.3
could be 6 and possibly as low as 3. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 34,
§ 2A2.3 ("Minor Assault"). In that case, even if the Commission opted for the highest
enhancement of 4 levels, the base offense level would have ended up being the default
level of 10.
271. 60 Fed. Reg. at 2435-36.
272. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 207, § 3B1.3 ("Abuse of Position of
Special Trust or Use of Special Skill").
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the offense levels for color of law crimes was motivated by a concern
that these guidelines were too strict.
2 73
Without knowing the process by which Commission staff and
Commissioners arrived at the proposed amendment or, for that mat-
ter, the empirical basis for their decision,2 74 it nevertheless appears
that the staff member was correct in singling out guideline stringency
as the chief issue in contention. The changes behind the first two pub-
lished reasons for the proposed amendment were accomplished by the
amendment that was ultimately adopted.2 75 The latter two reasons,
both concerning the minimum length of incarceration to which police
officers and others acting under color of law would be subjected,
clearly were contested. Between the period of the published notice
and the Commission's submission of the guidelines to Congress, the
proposed sentence reduction was eliminated. Not only did the Com-
mission reverse its course, but it added to the base offense level. The
Commission has not made its reasoning public, but the statement its
action makes is unequivocal: the judicial system must vigorously con-
demn police brutality.2 76 But the judiciary has not heard the Commis-
sion's message.
273. Wroblewski Interview, supra note 222.
274. See Hearing on Proposed Guideline Amendments, supra note 134 (statement of
Alexa Freeman) (claiming there was insufficient communication of grounds for proposed
amendments).
275. In accord with Congress' intent, the amendment provided that if the crime was a
hate crime under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, then a 3
level enhancement would apply to all offenders. 60 Fed. Reg. at 2436. It also consolidated
four civil rights guidelines into one.
276. Perhaps, too, the Commission realized that altering the civil rights guidelines in
isolation from the rest of the guidelines would undermine the purpose of sentencing re-
form: achieving rationality, uniformity and proportionality. If the offense levels for color-
of-law crimes are strict, they are no more so than the guidelines as a whole. Had the
proposal been accepted by the Commission, some crimes would have continued to be sen-
tenced harshly while police-brutality offenders would have, once again, received the token
"slap on the wrist."
Many of the criticisms about the guidelines' overall harshness are valid, the federal
prison system is overcrowded and severely overburdened. Perhaps it is time, nearly a dec-
ade after the guidelines' enactment, to reconsider their approach in a comprehensive man-
ner. However, even if the Sentencing Commission should decide to do so, it should
exercise great caution in altering the civil rights guidelines. It must be remembered that, in
every key respect, all the ordinary advantages and presumptions that flow to the prosecu-
tion are reversed, making these cases the inverse of the usual criminal case. Police brutal-
ity is unique among crimes.
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B. Guidelines Departures by the Courts
Police brutality is a peculiar crime in the sense that society's prin-
cipal law enforcers become "law-breakers," but the crime itself often
follows predictable patterns, as evidenced by the cases discussed be-
low.277 This distinction is lost in the guidelines departure cases. For
courts in guidelines departure cases, the issue is whether they may
take into consideration the special nature and circumstances of police
work. Focusing on the issue in this manner causes courts to overlook
factors generally common to these cases. The real issue is whether
these "heartland" factors are already encompassed in the crime of po-
lice brutality and the guidelines for sentencing it.
Unfortunately, the Sentencing Commission did not create a clear
record of its intent, leaving the door open for the courts to decide this
question.278 Not surprisingly, some courts have taken advantage of
this opportunity to enlarge their discretion. 279 That these courts are
277. Its causes, too, are often knowable. See supra Part I.C.
278. Downward departures occur through several mechanisms. The guidelines specifi-
cally allow downward departure for offenders who provide "substantial assistance" to gov-
ernment investigators or prosecutors. See supra note 201. The intent of the sentencing
guidelines also can be bypassed through mechanisms such as charging decisions and plea
bargains. There is no language in the guidelines forbidding these from being used to ma-
nipulate sentencing outcomes (although arguably this violates the spirit of the guidelines).
Normally, however, the statute requires that a court sentence within the guidelines
unless it finds that the Commission did not take a particular factor into adequate consider-
ation. Id. The Sentencing Commission attempted to guide courts in distinguishing be-
tween permissible and impermissible departures by publishing a non-exclusive list of
factors that it had not considered adequately for courts to apply in their discretion. Id.
These and other unspecified potential factors may only be applied, however, when they are
not normally present in the crime. Id. Otherwise, "departure from the applicable guide-
line range is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of
that which ordinarily is involved in the offense." 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
14, at 310, § 5K2.0 ("Grounds for Departure").
279. All guideline departures by the courts raise complex questions. At core has been
the dichotomy of opinion relative to the propriety of the Sentencing Commission. Numer-
ous courts invalidated the guidelines on separation of powers and excessive delegation
grounds before they were upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mistretta, 488
U.S. 361 (1989). See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1989). Despite
this decision, there lurks in departure jurisprudence the view that the guidelines threaten
federal judicial independence. One of the most outspoken critics is Judge Jack Weinstein
who has written articles against them and issued several lengthy opinions in cases rejecting
their application. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First Impression of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REv. 1 (1987); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 357 (1992); Jack B.
Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 6 (1992).
Many courts question the wisdom of sentencing according to guidelines rather than
case-by-case determinations. The suggestion is that the Sentencing Commission may be
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granting downward departures to police is also not surprising given
the bias they usually display in favor of the police-a bias shared by
the majority of society to such an extent that is scarcely seen as such.
By sanctioning factors common to police brutality cases as proper
grounds for downward departure, the Supreme Court encourages
more downward departures in these cases.
280
motivated by different concerns than those weighed by the courts, caring less about achiev-
ing justice than with achieving consistency. Guideline sentencing circumscribes the tradi-
tional role of courts in interpreting and applying norms and values. In particular, the
guidelines do not expressly allow courts to intervene to prevent grave injustice from being
done. Other concerns are institutional. With the advent of guideline sentencing, courts
have seen their prerogatives restricted. Thus, the narrowed arena within which courts must
operate undoubtedly has generated resentment and resistance. A survey of 270 witnesses
on the guidelines by the Federal Courts Study Committee found all 266 judges in opposi-
tion for the reasons discussed here. (in favor of the guidelines were three Commissioners
and the Attorney General). FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 142 (1990).
These concerns about the role of sentencing guidelines are intricately connected to the
debate on the substance of the guidelines. Many judges and scholars believe that the
guidelines are inordinately rigid and harsh. See supra note 193. But whether the benefits
of guideline sentencing as a whole outweigh the disadvantages is beyond the scope of this
Article.
280. It is unclear how many courts have departed downward in police brutality cases.
The Criminal Section data do not include notations of departures, and the way statistics are
normally compiled by the Sentencing Commission would not reveal a departure unless the
average sentences were below the baseline offense of six months for section 2H1.4. They
are not. See discussion supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
However, the Sentencing Commission offered to assist in the research for this Article
by specially compiling departure information for section 242 cases. See supra notes 210,
220. It reported that between October 1, 1991 and September 30, 1993, there were thirteen
downward departures, eight for substantial assistance and five for other reasons, out of
fifty-two. Id.
But the Commission's data are contradicted by other sources. While constrained from
providing case names and citations (by an agreement it has with the Judicial Conference
Committee on Criminal Law and Probation Administration and the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts), the Commission was able to name the five districts in which courts
departed downward for reasons other than substantial assistance. Two of these cases were
said to be from the Southern District of West Virginia. However, according to Charles
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney in Charleston, who has taken the lead in prose-
cuting all police misconduct cases in that District since his employment there 12 years ago,
the only two cases in which the guidelines were not followed were United States v. Adkins,
No. 91-5702, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12107 (4th Cir. May 24, 1993) and United States v.
Steele, No. 3:91-00233 (S.D.W. Va. 1991). Neither case was, technically speaking, a down-
ward departure. They were both misdemeanors, limited by statute to a sentence of one
year's imprisonment. The calculation under the guidelines would have netted the defend-
ants sentences beyond the one year statutory limit. A statutory constraint requiring a sen-
tence below the guidelines is not considered a downward departure. Telephone Interview
with Charles Miller, Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.W.Va. (Nov. 18, 1994).
Two other cases from the Commission's list remain unidentified, one from the Eastern
District of Tennessee and the other from the Northern District of Ohio. The fifth case is
Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir.
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(1) United States v. Koon.28
The Rodney King beating brought for the first time to many in
this country an awareness of the problem of police brutality and its
role in fomenting enormous racial tension 282 The massive rebellion in
the streets of Los Angeles against the not-guilty verdicts in the state
trial court not only forced the Justice Department to try the defend-
ants a second time, but also eradicated once and for all the public's
seeming indifference to the outcomes of trials involving police brutal-
ity. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that this case also triggered in-
tense debate on the application of the sentencing guidelines. Even
though the Supreme Court has weighed in on the side of the convicted
police officers, bringing to an end the sentencing dispute in Koon, the
issues raised by this case should not be closed, but revisited by the
Sentencing Commission as soon as practicable.
(a) Procedural background
On April 17, 1993, the jury returned its verdicts in the federal
trial of the four police officers charged with violating Rodney King's
civil rights under section 242. Two defendants, Officers Tmothy Wind
and Theodore Briseno, were acquitted. Sergeant Stacey Koon and
Officer Laurence Powell were found guilty. The trial court sentenced
Koon and Powell to thirty months in prison, departing downward
from the guidelines' sentence range which it calculated to be seventy
to eighty-seven months.283 The court's reasons for departing were
fully described in a published sentencing memorandum.
284
The government appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed,
the sentences. A year after the sentencing, on August 19, 1994, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in
1994), rev'd and remanded, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996). The absence from the
Sentencing Commission's data of United States v. Rorke, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d. Cir. 1994), an
important police brutality case sentenced November 25, 1991, in which the trial court's
downward departure was upheld on appeal, raises a question about the comprehensiveness
of the Commission's data. The Commission is at the mercy of the courts in this regard.
One knowledgeable observer believes that most courts are departing-and only
downward-in police brutality cases. Wroblewski Interview, supra note 222. According to
Mr. Wroblewski, these departures often go unnoticed because many, perhaps most, are not
appealed. Id.
281. 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996).
282. Obviously, this awareness was not new for everyone. For many in minority com-
munities, police brutality is a fact of life and the Rodney King beating was nothing more
than a reaffirmation of a bitter reality. See discussion Part I.
283. Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
284. Id. at 791-92.
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part, and remanded the case for resentencing.285 The defendants
asked the full Ninth Circuit to rehear the appeal. 286 A divided court
refused to do SO. 2 8 7 However, nine judges disagreed and issued a dis-
senting opinion setting forth the reasons why they believed the panel
"seriously erred. '288 The defendants then filed a petition for certio-
rari which the Supreme Court granted.289 The Supreme Court issued
its decision on June 13, 1996, reversing the Ninth Circuit panel on
most of the issues, and ordering the Appeals Court to remand the case
to the District Court.2 90
(b) Victim's conduct
The trial court began its opinion by referring to the standard for
departure under the sentencing statute.2 91 It then set forth the rea-
sons why it regarded the case as atypical, and therefore meriting
downward departures for the two convicted officers. Foremost among
these reasons was King's behavior in attempting to escape from the
officers and resisting arrest. The court viewed King as at fault for hav-
ing caused the incident and prompting the officers to cross the line
into illegal conduct.292 According to the court, King's conduct
brought the case outside the "heartland" of an aggravated assault civil
rights offense2 93 because, unlike an officer's assault on a person al-
ready in custody, the officers here were initially "incited to use
force. '294 Thus, the court's analysis turned on the distinction between
a police officer who intends from the beginning to assault the victim
with excessive force and an officer who is provoked and whose use of
initial force is reasonable. The court clearly regarded unprovoked
custodial assaults as the sort of case contemplated by the guidelines,
not arrests of a belligerent, drunk, struggling and potentially danger-
ous suspects.2 95
285. United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994).
286. Defendants' Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was
filed Sept. 16, 1994. The government's opposition was filed Nov. 7, 1994.
287. United States v. Koon, 45 F.3d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, C.J.,
dissenting).
288. Id.
289. Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (granting certiorari).
290. 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996).
291. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 785. For the text of the departure standard, see supra note
278.
292. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 785.
293. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 32-34, § 2A2.2 ("Aggravated
Assault").
294. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 787.
295. Id. at 787-88.
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The Ninth Circuit panel on appeal disagreed and reversed the
trial court for departing on the basis of King's behavior.296 It began
by scrutinizing the lower court's argument that King's wrongdoing
brought the case outside the guidelines.297 Referring to the analysis in
Graham v. Connor in which the Supreme Court set forth its test for
evaluating excessive force claims,298 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the very volatility of the incident that the trial court determined to be
a basis for departure is recognized by the Supreme Court to be often
present in these situations. 299 "The incorporation of this considera-
tion into the basic fabric of the law in this area strongly suggests that
provocation by the victim in a situation where an officer must act in-
stantly is typical-not unusual. '
300
The Ninth Circuit then noted that because Graham usually ap-
plies in civil cases, the proof in Koon was much more compelling be-
cause it showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officers
intended to deprive King of his rights? 01 "Thus the feature which the
district court found unusual, and exculpatory, is built into the most
fundamental structure of excessive force jurisprudence, and in crimi-
nal cases is built in twice." 302
The appellate court concluded this portion of its analysis by find-
ing that the difference between the volatile Graham type of case, like
Koon in which the illegal force is used some time after the encounter,
and the case in which the force is illegal from the beginning, does not
justify applying the guidelines differently. 303 Instead, it said, the idea
296. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1460-61.
297. Id. at 1457-59.
298. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-97 (1989). In Graham, the Supreme Court
held that in excessive force cases, the prosecutor must identify a specific right that has been
infringed, and how the courts define "excessive" will depend on what that right is. Most
commonly; police cases are analyzed under a Fourth Amendment standard which inquires
into the reasonableness of the police action. "Reasonableness" is judged by an objective
rather than subjective standard. "As in other Fourth Amendment contexts.., the 'reason-
ableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the
officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances con-
fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397 (cita-
tions omitted). See also discussion supra note 41.
299. In Koon, the Ninth Circuit quoted from Graham: "'[t]he calculus of reasonable-
ness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."' Koon, 34 F.3d at
1459 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).
300. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1459.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1460.
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is to protect victims because they are particularly vulnerable in these
explosive instances.30 4 In other words, the Ninth Circuit panel under-
scored that it is precisely when a victim angers police officers that of-
ficers need to be especially careful not to cross the line. 305
In dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing, Judge
Reinhardt focused on the timing of the victim's provocation in rela-
tion to the defendants' unlawful conduct, observing that departures
under section 5K2.10(e) do not require a tight nexus.30 6 He also re-
jected the panel's finding that volatility is not a ground for departure
in these cases, citing the absence of any guideline language that would
support the panel's position.307
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Ninth Circuit's
holding regarding victim misconduct but adopted neither the reason-
ing of the en banc dissenters nor that of the trial court. Instead, it
embraced a test developed by then-Chief Judge Breyer of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for determining when departure is appropri-
ate. This test distinguishes among "forbidden," "encouraged" and
"discouraged" grounds for departure.308 According to this scheme, a
sentencing court may depart unless an "encouraged" factor was al-
ready taken into consideration by the relevant guideline (in which
case a court should depart only if the circumstances are excep-
tional).309 The Court then went on to find that victim misconduct is
an "encouraged" ground because it is listed under section 5K2.10.
304. Id.
305. The Ninth Circuit panel determined that the district court justified its departure
on an "implicit" basis other than section 5K2.10. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1458. Section 5K2.10
states in pertinent part, "if the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to pro-
voking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range
to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense." 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 14, at 285-86. Because the district court found that the illegal conduct occurred after
King stopped being provocative, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it could not have intended
to apply section 5K2.10. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1458. Instead, according to the Ninth Circuit,
the district court viewed King's misconduct as the cause of the escalating incident and in
this "but for" sense, King was responsible. The court found that the district court "implic-
itly recognized" that section 5K2.10 was inapplicable because "but for" causation is a
"much less demanding standard" than victim provocation. Id.
306. Koon, 45 F.3d at 1307. Section 5K2.10(e) states that "relevant conduct by the
victim that substantially contributed to the danger presented" may be considered by the
court in deciding how much to depart. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 285-
86, § 5K2.10 ("Victim's Conduct").
307. Koon, 45 F.3d at 1307.
308. 64 U.S.L.W. 4512, 4516 (U.S. June 13, 1996) (citing United States v. Rivera, 994
F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
309. Id. See supra note 278 on the standards for departure.
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The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion310 in
departing on this basis because the heartland of police brutality is un-
provoked aggravated assault, and the defendants' crimes were pro-
voked by King's misconduct.3t ' Furthermore, given that the same
civil rights guideline punishes unprovoked as well as provoked gov-
310. The Koon case also presented the issue of the standard of review to be applied in
departure cases. The Court rejected the Government's argument that de novo review was
necessary to preserve the guideline scheme from unjustified disparities, ruling in favor of
an abuse-of-discretion standard. It reasoned that trial courts are in a superior position to
assess whether the facts of a case bring it outside a guideline's heartland because they can
compare it to the many other cases they see. Koon, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4517. "Whether a
given factor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commission, or
whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure because it is present in some
unusual or exceptional way, are matters determined in large part by comparison with the
facts of other Guidelines cases." Id. The Court also cited the statute, legislative history
and its own precedent in determining that, even though Congress departed from past prac-
tice in allowing appellate review of sentencing decisions, it did not intend to deprive trial
courts of their discretion entirely. Id. at 4516-17.
What practical difference this aspect of the decision will make remains to be seen. On
one hand, very few police brutality sentences have been appealed. See supra note 270
(most sentencing departures in police brutality cases are not appealed); infra text following
note 396. On the other hand, Koon renders the chances of successful sentencing appeals
remote. Now that the Supreme Court has approved the use of departures on grounds that
are routinely present in police brutality cases, many more trial courts will undoubtedly take
advantage of them. Without the effective oversight by appellate courts, it is likely that the
cases will begin to diverge.
311. The Court took pains to interpret the district court's decision as basing departure
on the provocative conduct of King, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, which found
that the district court based departure on the volatility of the incident and Kings's "but
for" responsibility. By finding that the district court did not depart because the situation
was volatile, but because King provoked the officers, the Supreme Court was able to side-
step the application of Graham to police brutality guidelines departure cases. Koon, 64
U.S.L.W. at 4518.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the district court's use of section 5K2.10 created a di-
lemma for the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit was clearly wrong to find that the district
court did not rely on section 5K2.10 in support of departure. See supra note 305. The
district court cited section 5K2.10 when it stated, "[o]f these four factors [warranting depar-
ture], only Mr. King's wrongful conduct independently warrants a sentence reduction. See
Guideline § 5K2.10." Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 786. The problem for the Supreme Court was
that the district court incorporated "but for" causation into section 5K2.10. Throughout its
analysis of King's behavior, the district court subtly returned to this "but for" analysis.
There is little doubt that the district court blamed King for the fate of the officers in the
sense that, if King had not broken the law by speeding, none of the subsequent events
would have happened.
The Supreme Court did not want to embrace the district court's interpretation of sec-
tion 5K2.10. Under the district court's interpretation, departures based on victim miscon-
duct meant that any attenuated "but for" causation by the victim discounts a sentence.
Therefore, the Court corrected the district court by finding that in addition to the fact that
King's behavior caused the incident to happen in the first place, King's behavior was pro-
vocative. In other words, the Court seemed to recognize that the Ninth Circuit was correct
in finding the district court's "but for" analysis could not justify departure. In order to
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ernment official assault, the district court was correct to differentiate
between the two crimes.
312
The Court does not adequately explain how it came to define the
heartland of police brutality as unprovoked aggravated assault-it
simply repeats this claim as though repetition makes it true.313 It as-
sumes that civilian aggravated assault is unprovoked and that, by ex-
tension, the heartland of police aggravated assault (defined by the
simple mechanical annexation of the civil rights guideline to section
2A2.2, the aggravated assault guideline) is unprovoked, too.314 For
the Court, no meaningful distinction exists between civilian and police
aggravated assault: "That petitioners' aggravated assaults were com-
mitted under color of law does not change the analysis. ' 315 But the
Court's reasoning is wrong. The two crimes are critically different.
Aggravated assaults under color of law present particular sorts of pat-
terns not shared with civilian aggravated assault. Foremost among the
characteristics of police brutality cases is the presence of a victim who
is misbehaving in some way. This is logical, when one realizes that the
officer approaches the victim because the victim is doing, or perceived
as doing, something wrong.
Prosecutors who bring police-brutality cases describe Koon as a
quintessential heartland case: the police officer has reason to believe
the victim has broken the law; the officer confronts the victim; the
victim fails to comply promptly-it may be by verbally abusing the
officer, physically resisting arrest or fleeing; the officer gets angry and,
after subduing the victim, retaliates with a beating.31 6 A common ver-
sion of this scenario is known as the "post pursuit syndrome," in which
a suspect triggers a chase and when caught, is summarily punished by
the very angry and adrenalin-flooded officer.317 Often, too, in a po-
uphold the district court, the Supreme Court interpreted provocation to be something
more than pure causation. Koon, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4518.
312. Leaving aside the question of whether provoked or unprovoked aggravated as-
sault constitutes the heartland in police brutality, it is clear that a court should distinguish
between the two in sentencing. But it does not follow that the Sentencing Commission
intended departure to be a permissible means of doing so. The guidelines provide a pun-
ishment range that would allow a court to select relatively more strict or lenient punish-
ments from within that range.
313. Id. at 4518, 4519.
314. Id. at 4518.
315. Id. at 4519.
316. Prosecutors' Interviews, supra note 180.
317. Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 44, at 26 (testimony of William Baker, Assis-
tant Director, Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)). The connection
between the emotion and the adrenaline-charged, high-speed chase and subsequent pun-
ishment of the motorist by the police is described in GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G.
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lice-brutality case, the victim is judged to be an undesirable person by
the officer, as in Koon. Perhaps the victim is intoxicated by drugs or
alcohol, is obviously poor, or is a person of color.318 There are numer-
ous reported police civil rights cases involving similar facts.319 Thus,
the victim's character and misconduct are core elements of "heart-
land" police-brutality cases. If the King case deviated from the usual,
it was not in the basic scenario, but in the serendipitous fact that a
videotape provided evidence sufficient to prove the allegations be-
yond a reasonable doubt.320
DUNHAM, POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING 31,70 (1990); TOM OWENS, LYING EYES 49-50 (1994);
PEREZ, supra note 50, at 31; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 11. Former Los Angeles
Police Department Chief Daryl Gates initially tried to explain away the King beating as a
result of the post pursuit syndrome.
318. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 874-80 (9th Cir. 1993) (detailing in-
stances of disproportionate use of police force for offenses such as loitering and minor drug
possession); United States v. Boyland, 979 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1992) (after leading officers
on car chase, victim then ran from officers and resisted arrest when caught); United States
v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1569-71 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1813 (1993) (officer
subdued initially unruly victims with repeated shots from stun gun); United States v. Mes-
serlian, 832 F.2d 778, 781-84 (3d Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988) (intoxicated
victim in minor car accident kicked at window of police car while being detained and sub-
sequently beaten with flashlight); United States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244, 245 (5th Cir.
1987) (victim initially refused to obey command to cross intersection; when victim began
moving, officer hung onto mirror and fired weapon into truck, causing severe brain dam-
age); United States v. Walker, 785 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1986) (after being stopped
for speeding victim and officer had heated exchange and exchanged blows); United States
v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1985) (after man who committed hit and run was
released, officers beat him); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983) (officer beat victim after altercation at a dance hall);
United States v. Harrison, 671 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 847 (1982)
(victim leaped at officer); United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975) (officer
beat obstreperous and verbally abusive drunk); United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156,
157-58 (3rd Cir. 1972) (officer beat victim with nightstick after high-speed chase); United
States v. Barnes, CN 8948526 (M.D. Fla., plea 1993) (officer kicked victim who fled on foot
after car chase); United States v. White, CR 3-91-175-T (N.D. Tex., filed June 19, 1991)
(drunk driver chased and beaten when stopped); Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings,
United States v. Kachadurian, No. 89-251-Cr-T-10(A) (M.D. Fla., Dec. 13, 1989) (victim
beaten after high-speed chase); United States v. Plaud, CN 88-386 (GG) (D.P.R., sen-
tenced Feb. 23, 1989) (victim stopped for expired car registration sticker and beaten).
Civil rights prosecutors affirm that Koon is a standard, "garden-variety" case, prose-
cuted far more often than even the reported decisions show. Prosecutors' Interviews,
supra note 180.
320. Another case out of Southern California is virtually identical to Koon and was
also videotaped by a witness. In this case, two deputies from the Riverside County Sher-
iff's Department chased a pickup truck that evaded a border checkpoint for 80 miles. At
the end of the chase, the deputies repeatedly beat two of the passengers, a man and a
woman, with batons. Nineteen others ran for cover. Civil rights groups characterized the
beatings as charged by anti-immigrant and racist attitudes. The Mexican government is-
sued a statement that "'[t]he obvious abuse of authority demonstrated in this case confirms
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The Supreme Court completely missed the factual reality of Koon
and other police brutality cases. As a result, it could not see that the
officers' behavior should not be excused or discounted simply because
King's behavior was "provocative" to the officers, which obviously it
was. 321 The Court stated that "a finding that King's misconduct pro-
voked lawful force but not the unlawful force that followed without
interruption would be a startling interpretation and contrary to ordi-
nary understandings of provocation. '322 However, just the reverse is
true: this "startling" interpretation is the only possible one. Other-
wise, there would have been no basis for condemning any of the con-
victed officers' behavior. Their use of force became illegal because it
was no longer justified once King was under control. For the Court to
regard a victim under control as still provocative sets a dangerous pre-
cedent. It was not external reality, but what was going on inside the
police officers' minds that brought their actions over the line from le-
gality to illegality. They were furious at King and wanted to punish
him; their adrenaline was pumping after the high-speed chase; their
racism fueled their disdain for him; and while they appeared to know
that they were breaking the law,32 3 while police culture taught them
that they were above the law.
the urgent need to take firm action to eradicate discriminatory attitudes that lead to insti-
tutional violence."' Abigail Goldman et al., Beatings Spur U.S. Investigation and a Na-
tional Debate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al. See also Mandalit DelBarco, California
Beating Incident Draws Sharp Public Protest, NPR Radio Broadcast, Apr. 2, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library, NPR file.
321. Of course in Koon, the conviction of two of the four officers means that their
behavior was not entirely excused. However, in many other police brutality cases the vic-
tim's misconduct does contribute to acquittal, as it did in the state criminal trial of the four
officers. It should also be acknowledged that a failed defense may nevertheless provide a
sound basis for a sentence reduction. The Sentencing Commission was alert to this possi-
bility in allowing departure under the guidelines for coercion, blackmail, duress and dimin-
ished capacity. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 314, §§ 5K2.12 ("Coercion
and Duress") & 5K2.13 ("Diminished Capacity"). The inclusion of section 5K2.10 ("Vic-
tim's Conduct") certainly represents another such circumstance. But this exception must
be read against the general requirement that departures be permitted only in atypical
cases. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 5 ("Departures"). There is nothing
atypical about Koon regarding this factor. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
If victim misconduct was uncommon in police brutality cases, the Court's endorsement of
this departure ground would be understandable, but it is almost always present.
322. Id. at 4518-19.
323. Police radio transmissions immediately after the beating strongly suggest that the
officers involved knew that they had crossed the line. Their first report of the beating
referred to "a big time use of force .... " They subsequently transmitted the word "oops,"
followed by "I haven't beaten anyone this bad in a long time." CHRISTOPHER COMM'N,
supra note 164, at 14-15.
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(c) A "mix" of departure grounds
In addition to King's misconduct, which reduced the defendants'
offense level by 5 points, the sentencing court found further grounds
for departure. These other grounds, it said, unlike the 'victim's con-
duct, did not independently warrant reductions, but, in combination,
they formed unique circumstances that made sentencing outside the
guidelines appropriate.3 24
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court's approach, caution-
ing, however, that in the mix of factors that may combine to justify a
departure, only factors permitted under the guidelines may be consid-
ered.325 On appeal, it reviewed each of the grounds the district court
employed.
(i) Defendants' vulnerability in prison
The trial court specified the defendants' "extreme vulnerability to
abuse in prison" and their exposure to additional adversarial proceed-
ings as two categories of additional punishment that justified down-
ward departure.3
26
Regarding the first of these, the court found that because of the
notoriety of the case, the outrage surrounding it, and the defendants'
status as police officers, they were susceptible to abuse in prison, a
form of punishment exceeding the guidelines. 327 The district court
recognized that, unlike other cases in which extreme vulnerability to
prison abuse may warrant downward departure, in this case the de-
fendants' vulnerability was not due to their physical characteristics.
For this reason, it said that in order to support departure, this factor
must be considered together with others.328
While open to the possibility of downward departure on this
ground in cases where a defendant is vulnerable because of an ex-
traordinary physical impairment, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district
court's interpretation of extreme vulnerability to abuse in prison as
including police officer status.329 It said that departure because of a
person's notoriety or occupation would be inconsistent with the
guidelines. Such determinations would be subjective and open-ended,
inviting great disparities and thus subverting the guidelines' pur-
324. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 786.
325. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1452.
326. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 788-89.
327. Id. at 788.
328. Id.
329. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1455.
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pose.330 Also, the appeals court noted that the public outrage was due
to the defendants' criminal acts and that it would be "incongruous and
inappropriate to reduce appellants' sentences specifically because in-
dividuals in society have condemned their acts as criminal and an
abuse of the trust that society placed in them. '331
(ii) Additional adversarial proceedings
The other form of additional punishment to which the district
court found the defendants would be unduly subjected was the multi-
plicity of adversarial proceedings they faced. 332 These proceedings,
which would strip them of their jobs and tenure and disqualify them
from the field of law enforcement, causing anguish and disgrace,
amounted to additional punishment according to the district court.
This additional punishment stemmed from that fact that the defend-
ants were police officers.333
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on this finding as
well. It held that these sorts of personal and professional conse-
quences of a conviction are not lawful grounds for departing under the
guidelines.334 In its review of the law, the appeals court found that the
factors which constitute aggravating or mitigating circumstances
favoring a departure must relate to a "congressionally-authorized le-
gitimate sentencing concern," such as, for example, the culpability of
the defendant or the severity of the offense.335 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that there are "virtually unlimited" consequences stemming
from a criminal conviction besides the guideline sentences.336 Al-
lowing courts to consider these, as the district court suggested, would
cause huge disparities, contrary to the guidelines' purpose.
The Ninth Circuit concluded its discussion of this factor by mak-
ing two further points. First, it remarked that allowing "additional
punishment" to justify departures could easily entail consideration of
the defendants' socio-economic status which is impermissible under
the guidelines. 337 It also reiterated that the guidelines intend to pun-
ish public officials who have abused their positions of trust more se-
verely than private individuals engaged in the same conduct. In this
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1456.
332. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 789.
333. Id.
334. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1454.
335. Id. at 1453 (citing United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1992)).
336. Id. at 1454.
337. Id.
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case, the very "additional punishments" experienced by the defend-
ants that troubled the district court stemmed from their positions as
police officers. The appeals court held that it would be inconsistent
with this policy of punishing public officials more harshly than others
to allow departure for hardships particular to police officers.338
(iii) Need to protect the public
Another factor that the district court identified as part of the mix
supporting departure was the absence of a need to protect the public
because the defendants were not violent, dangerous, or likely to be
repeat offenders. 339 It said that the guidelines did not adequately dis-
tinguish between first-time offenders who were dangerous and poten-
tial recidivists and those who were not.340 Thus, the court reasoned,
while their crimes were serious breaches of the public trust, this factor
should be weighed along with the others in fashioning a fair and ap-
propriate sentence.341
Again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It found that the Sentencing
Commission had already accounted for dangerous offenders in draft-
ing the guidelines and "expressly disapproved" of departures below
the range of the lowest risk category.342 What the Ninth Circuit did
not point out as additional support for its holding is the fact that this
factor will almost always exist in a law enforcement brutality case.
Law enforcement officers do not normally have a second chance in
their jobs once they have been convicted of a crime. The district
court's "absence of need to protect the public" factor would be con-
trary to the intent of the guidelines not to grant law enforcement of-
ficers special treatment but, rather, to deal with their criminal
breaches seriously.
(iv) Specter of unfairness
The final factor that the district court found to constitute a miti-
gating circumstance not adequately considered by the Commission
was the "specter of unfairness" in the successive state and federal
prosecutions.343 While conceding the constitutionality of repetitive
prosecutions under the dual sovereignty doctrine, the district court
338. Id.
339. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 789-90.
340. Id. at 790 n.20.
341. Id. at 789-90.
342. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1456-57.
343. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 790.
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nevertheless found that the sequence of the federal convictions fol-
lowing state acquittals created "an unusual circumstance" and signifi-
cantly burdened the defendants.3 44
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that reducing a sentence on this
ground directly conflicted with the guidelines and therefore could not
be used as a basis for departure.345 Such a reduction does not speak
to "the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the offense, [or] to
some other legitimate sentencing concern." 346 The appeals court con-
cluded that the sentencing statute requires sentences to reflect the
crime's seriousness and that, in cases such as these where the United
States Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division has
authorized a federal prosecution in order to vindicate a citizen's con-
stitutional rights, that criterion is met.347
A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on
two of the four "combined" grounds, the defendants' vulnerability in
prison and the specter of unfairness in the successive prosecutions.348
The Court ruled that unless the Sentencing Commission has already
declared that a factor is prohibited, the judiciary exceeds its authority
under the sentencing statute if it determines that the factor may never
be a departure ground.349 When the Sentencing Commission is si-
lent-that is, has not specifically prohibited the factor-the sentenc-
ing court must decide if the factor removes the case from the
heartland. 350 Under this test, the Court's majority concluded that vul-
nerability in prison and successive prosecutions are not within the
heartland of police brutality and therefore are permissible grounds for
departure. 35' However, the Court found the other two grounds on
which the trial court departed, collateral employment consequences
and the low likelihood of recidivism, to be within the heartland. 352
Accordingly, the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit on these grounds.353
What is remarkable about this part of the opinion is that the
Court was just as casual in determining that collateral employment
344. Id.
345. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1457.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Koon, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4521.
349. Id. at 4519-20.
350. Id. at 4520.
351. Id. at 4521.
352. The Supreme Court's characterization of these two factors is narrower than the
trial court's, which included them under the broader rubric of "additional adversarial pro-
ceedings" and "need to protect the public," respectively.
353. Koon, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4520.
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consequences are inside of the heartland as it was in concluding that
victim misconduct is outside of the heartland. Without any evidence
about the Sentencing Commission's deliberations or intentions, the
Court made an assessment that loss of employment is to be expected
when a public official is convicted of a crime. That the assessment is
reasonable is undeniable. But the Court's method was unreasonable
in that it imposed its judgment here just as superficially as it did with
the victim misconduct factor. The only difference was in the result.
The Court employed the same process when it found that the two
other factors, vulnerability in prison and successive prosecutions,
brought the case outside of the heartland. It reiterated the trial
court's recital of the harms the defendants potentially would suffer in
prison and had already suffered in the successive prosecutions. Nota-
bly absent from this part of the Court's analysis is any reference what-
soever to the heartland.
354
The only factor for which there is any clear evidence of the Sen-
tencing Commission's intention is the recidivism issue. There, the
Court properly found that the Commission explicitly rejected down-
ward departure for a first offender with a low risk of recidivism.
355
However, with each of the other factors where the Court thought that
the Commission's intention was unclear, the Court should have re-
manded the case, requiring the trial court to make explicit findings as
to whether the factors were within the heartland, referencing other
police brutality cases.356 A reliable assessment of a factor's relation-
ship to the heartland logically must be based on a cross-section of po-
lice brutality cases, yet neither the Supreme Court nor the trial court
cited a single police brutality case when determining which Koon facts
were inside or outside of the heartland. It is particularly ironic that
the Court proceeded in this fashion, given its holding that the stan-
dard of review for departures should be abuse of discretion because
the trial courts' familiarity with other guidelines cases gives them an
"institutional advantage over appellate courts" in deciding whether a
case falls within the heartland. 357
354. Id. at 4521.
355. Id. at 4520.
356. The Court did remand the case but only for "further proceedings consistent with
this opinion," or a recalculation of the sentences.
357. Id. at 4517. See supra note 310.
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(2) United States v. Rorke358
The Supreme Court's admonition to appeals courts to defer to
the superior ability of trial courts to resolve the question of whether
or not a case is in the heartland means little if trial courts refuse to
educate themselves about what constitutes heartland police brutality.
United States v. Rorke is an example of a heartland police brutality
case in which the trial court departed downward, with the appeals
court summarily affirming. 359 As in Koon, not a single police brutality
case was cited to show how the Rorke factors were atypical.
(a) The facts
The defendants, Peter Rorke, Gary Vinnacombe, Dennis Keegan,
Richard Smythe and Paul Kelly, were police officers in Upper Darby,
Pennsylvania. They were convicted of conspiracy and substantive vio-
lations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 on May 28, 1991. In its sentencing
opinion, the trial court described the facts of the case as follows. An
altercation took place between Diane McArdle, Rorke's pregnant
daughter, and a neighbor, Edward Smith, Jr., on September 26, 1990.
Smith hit her, splitting her lip. After learning of the assault, Vin-
nacombe, on duty, and Rorke, off duty, went to the Smith residence in
plainclothes equipped with a blackjack. They had no warrant. Upon
arriving, Vinnacombe called for back-up officers. Vinnacombe and
Rorke pounded on the door until Smith, Jr.'s father, Edward Smith,
Sr., half-dressed, opened it. He refused to let them in without a war-
rant. A struggle ensued and Smith, Sr. was pulled from his house and
handcuffed. After he was handcuffed, Rorke struck him in the shoul-
der with his blackjack. Meanwhile, back-up officers had arrived, in-
cluding Keegan, Smythe and Kelly. The officers carried Smith, Jr. out
of the house, in the course of which he fell on the patio. The officers
handcuffed him. After Smith, Jr. was handcuffed, Rorke began beat-
ing him with the blackjack, with the other officers joining in kicking
and punching him. As Rorke continued to hit him, Smith, Jr. was
taken to a police car. Not even alleging any reason, Rorke also or-
dered the arrest of another son, seventeen-year-old Bobby Smith.3
60
The government's presentation of the facts paints a more lurid
scene. Of particular relevance, there were numerous eyewitnesses
from the neighborhood who were awakened by the commotion. They
358. 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1992).
359. The trial court issued a written sentencing decision, but it is unpublished. Id.
360. Sentencing Opinion at 1-3, United States v. Rorke, No. 90-485-01 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
25, 1991).
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testified that Smith, Jr. did not resist the officers. There was also testi-
mony from an officer, a neighbor and Smith, Sr. that while beating
Smith, Jr., Rorke yelled, "This is what you get when you fuck with my
daughter." None of the officers on the scene tried to protect Smith,
Jr. as he was beaten, with his hands handcuffed behind his back. Wit-
nesses testified that a neighbor from across the street yelled to the
police to "stop beating that boy." In response, one of the officers
shined a light in her face and told her "shut up or you're next."
Bobby Smith, the seventeen year old son who was arrested, was taken
out in his underwear, his pleas to be allowed to put on pants
rejected.361
Smith, Sr. and Smith, Jr. were falsely prosecuted for assaulting
police officers.3 62 Throughout the six months between the Smiths' ar-
rests and criminal trial the defendants kept silent about what had hap-
pened.363 The coverup continued through the trial.364 The Smiths
were acquitted despite the false testimony of Rorke, Vinnacombe and
Keegan. Thereafter, the federal investigation started, leading to the
convictions of the officers in this case.365
(b) The sentencing
After making some adjustments, the court determined the guide-
line ranges to be 168-210 months for Rorke, 108-135 months for Vin-
nacombe, 87-108 months for Keegan, 70-87 months for Smythe, and
57-71 months for Kelly.366 In sentencing the five defendants, the court
departed dramatically downward from these guideline ranges. Rorke
received sixty months, Vinnacombe thirty months, and Keegan,
Smythe and Kelly twenty-four months each.367
(i) Victim's conduct
The court first expressed its disapproval of the guideline sentence
for Rorke.368 It found that the victim, Smith, Jr., significantly contrib-
361. Brief for the United States at 12-17, United States v. Rorke, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.
1994) (No. 91-19960).
362. Sentencing Opinion at 4, Rorke (No. 90-485-01).
363. Brief for the United States at 21, Rorke, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1994) (No. 91-
19960).
364. Id. at 21-22.
365. Sentencing Opinion at 4, Rorke (No. 90-485-01).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. "I have to tell you that I can't believe that any federal district court judge sitting
today under the facts of this case would sentence this defendant to jail for 14 years without
the possibility of parole. I just can't believe it. That does not mean that he does not de-
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uted to provoking the crime, justifying departure under section
5K2.10. The court rejected the government's argument that, to sup-
port departure, the provocative conduct must have been proximate in
time to the crime, the conduct must have been directed at the defend-
ant, not his daughter, and the defendant's response must have been
proportional to the provocation.
369
The court's reasoning was not developed. It simply found that
the cases cited by the government did not support this standard.370 As
for the impact of the provocative conduct, the court was satisfied that
an assault of Rorke's daughter was tantamount to an assault on Rorke
himself. 371 Like the trial court's sentencing in Koon, the court here
embraced a "but-for" analysis, stating that but for the original assault,
nothing would have happened that evening. 372 In adopting this causa-
tion theory, the court gave no indication where it would draw the line.
Under its reasoning, even the false police reports and perjury at the
victims' trials could be defensible responses to the provocation under
a "but-for" theory.373
In the end, the court justified its departure on an emotional argu-
ment. It said departure was justified because "[i]n this case, Defend-
ant Rorke, though acting under color of law, responded as a father to
the news of the beating of his daughter .... As the Sentencing Com-
mission did not adequately take these facts into consideration, the
serve a significant sentence." Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 49-59, United States v.
Rorke, No. 90-495-01 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Rorke Sentencing Transcript].
369. Id.
370. It relied on, among other cases, United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650
(8th Cir. 1989), a case with no relevance to police brutality. In Yellow Earrings, the female
defendant stabbed the victim immediately after he assaulted, verbally humiliated and con-
fronted her-nude-demanding that she have sex with him. He was six to eight inches
taller, and appeared much stronger, than she was; he was drunk and unpredictable, and
some of his friends were present from whom he sought support. Id. at 651. In the Rorke
court's discussion of Yellow Earrings, in which downward departure was upheld where the
provocation to an assault was attempted rape, the court suggested that it was satisfied that
Rorke's response to the provocation was proportionate to the defendant's response in that
case. Sentencing Opinion at 6, Rorke (No. 90-485-01). In applying Yellow Earrings, the
court did not distinguish between a private citizen's response to provocation and a trained
police officer's. Id.
371. Sentencing Opinion at 7, Rorke (No. 90-485-01). The court's reasoning is reminis-
cent of antiquated laws rendering women the property of men.
372. Rorke Sentencing Transcript, supra note 368, at 61. In its opinion, the court again
employed a "but for" theory of the case. "There is no question that Smith, Jr.'s conduct
precipitated this incident and that absent this, Defendant Rorke, let alone the other de-
fendants, would not have been at the Smith residence that evening." Sentencing Opinion
at 7, Rorke (No. 90-485-01).
373. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Koon, perhaps such attenuated causation
would not be allowable. See supra note 311.
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Court departed below the range as calculated under the
guidelines. '374
(ii) Aberrant behavior
The trial court also cited aberrational behavior as a reason for
departing for all of the defendants. 375 It found that their conduct was
out of character, spontaneous and thoughtless, 376 and that the guide-
lines did not account for single acts of aberrant behavior.3 77
There are patent flaws with the court's analysis. First, the court
relied on commentary in the guidelines to show that the Commission
failed to address single acts of aberrant behavior.378 This commentary
refers only to those offense levels where probation may be appropri-
ate.379 Second, first-offender status is expressly prohibited as a basis
for downward departure under the guidelines.380 Third, the conduct
of the defendants did not consist of a single act but rather of sustained
criminal behavior over a period of time encompassing the coverup.381
Finally, the spontaneity of the defendants' initial actions should not
justify departure because this "heat of action" conduct is within the
"heartland" of police-brutality cases.38
What is most troubling about the court's approach is the underly-
ing attitude it revealed. The character evidence that the officers
presented the court was impressive. 383 But, like white-collar offend-
ers, police officers usually have good reputations and upstanding life
styles. They do not have criminal records or they could not be em-
ployed in law enforcement. To allow downward departure on this
ground would undermine Congress' goal of uniformity in sentencing
374. Sentencing Opinion at 6-7, Rorke (No. 90-485-01).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 7, 10, 12-13, 15.
377. Id. at 7.
378. "The Commission ... has not dealt with single acts of aberrant behavior that still
may justify probation at higher offense levels through departures." 1995 GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 14, at 7 ("Probation and Split Sentences").
379. Id.
380. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 235-36, § 4A1.3 ("Adequacy of
Criminal History Category").
381. See Sentencing Opinion, Rorke (No. 90-495-01).
382. Id.
383. Transcripts of Sentencing Hearings in Government's Appendix to Brief in United
States v. Rorke (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 1992) (No. 91-1997).
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and the Sentencing Commission's goal of fairness and accountability
in the civil rights guidelines.
384
A third basis for departure that the court applied illustrates this
point. The court cited Smythe and Kelly's youthfulness, lack of so-
phistication and inexperience to support departures in their cases,
385
but these factors are almost never allowed consideration in other sen-
tencing contexts. 386 Smythe and Kelly were middle-class defendants
with college educations and police academy training, advantages other
drug or blue-collar defendants of a similar age lack.387 The routine
rejection of similar claims by those far less privileged-for example,
many courts have reversed downward departures for young drug de-
fendants388-makes the court's application of them here seem unfairly
biased. As in Koon, the trial court's sympathies with the defendants
unduly influenced its decision-making.
(c) An unexceptional case
It is evident that the court's analysis ignores the concept of the
"heartland crime." Obviously the sentencing guidelines cannot pre-
dict all the myriad of ways and circumstances in which human beings
commit crimes. Their failure to anticipate the precise facts present in
a particular case should not, alone, invalidate a sentence. That is why
Congress set a generic boundary: only cases which present aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately considered by the Sentencing Commission, may be sentenced
outside the guidelines.38 9
The Rorke case does not fit this exception. Police must often deal
with rude, obnoxious, assaultive, even evil, people. They are trained
384. Similarly, the Sentencing Commission has criticized pre-guideline sentencing prac-
tices of giving probation to an "inappropriately high percentage" of white-collar or "eco-
nomic" criminals. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 7.
385. Sentencing Opinion at 12-15, Rorke (No. 90-485-01).
386. The guidelines state that age, education and mental and emotional conditions are
not ordinarily relevant to sentencing determinations. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 14, at 275-76 § 5H1.1 ("Age"); § 5H1.2 ("Education and Vocational Skills"); and
§ 5H1.3. ("Mental and Emotional Conditions").
387. Brief for the United States at 88, United States v. Rorke, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.
1994) (No. 91-19960).
388. See, e.g., United States v. White, 945 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversing de-
parture from 151 to 120 months for 18 year old drug defendant); United States v. Shoupe,
929 F.2d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing departure from 168 to 84 months for 18 year
old drug defendant); United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 69 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing
departure from 352 to 242 months for 23 year old drug defendant).
389. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1996).
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to withstand provocation.390 The fact that the provocation here was
personal should not remove the case from the "heartland." Granting
the anger that Rorke clearly and understandably felt upon learning of
the assault of his daughter, nevertheless as a police officer he should
not act outside the law. "The very essence of the civil rights statutes is
that trained police officers cannot take the law into their own hands
for real or perceived slights and exact summary punishment... "391
When police cross this line by summarily punishing people who anger
them, they should be penalized under laws enacted to censure exactly
this sort of behavior.
39
390. It is in the nature of their work that police can expect to encounter people who
are "unstable, ill-dressed, pugnacious, and threatening." SKOLNiCK & FYFE, supra note 41,
at 95. Police officers are taught to deal with difficult people and to de-escalate tense and
potentially dangerous situations if possible. "[T]he parameters of the police license to use
force generally are conceptualized in training and policy as a scale from which officers
should pick the least severe degree of force likely to accomplish the job at hand." Id. at 38.
The court in United States v. Steele, No. 3:91-11233-01 (S.D.W.Va. 1992), spoke to this
point when it rejected downward departure on grounds of victim provocation in sentencing
a deputy sheriff for beating and striking a drunk and abusive prisoner in his custody:
The defendant here was ... a well-trained police officer. He had been through
the State Police Academy, which trains policemen to be state policemen or mem-
bers of the Department of Public Safety of West Virginia. He had considerable
experience thereafter as a police officer .... People in law enforcement may not
permit passion to control their actions. They must with total disinterest and with-
out bias or passion do what they have to do .... I sometimes read in a newspaper
of heinous crimes that people have committed and it makes me so indignant that I
feel like going out and trying to hunt them up myself and choke them to
death ... but that's not our system of justice. When you get on the bench or when
you're a police officer or a United States Attorney or prosecuting attorney or a
lawyer, it is your duty to do what the law says, not what your personal feelings tell
you to do.
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 10-11, Steele (No. 3:91-11233-01).
391. Sentencing Memorandum of the United States at 15, United States v. Rorke, No.
90-485 (E.D. Pa.) (undated).
392. Moreover, the court did not review the circumstances spelled out in section
5K2.10 when victim conduct may support departure. If it had, it could not have justified
departing under it. For example, even if Smith, Jr.'s behavior can be said to have contrib-
uted significantly to provoking the beating, it cannot be said to have done so in the subse-
quent false prosecutions. Likewise, the subsequent events were not proximate in time to
the victim's conduct. According to a government brief, the beating itself occurred close to
two hours after Smith, Jr. assaulted McArdle. Sentencing Memorandum of the United
States at 14, United States v. Rorke, No. 90-485 (E.D. Pa.) (undated). This sequence is far
less proximate than the victim's conduct was to the police beatings in the Koon case.
Rorke's repeated beating of Smith, Jr., not to mention the beating of Smith's father and
false arrest of his father, brother and him, was not proportional to the provocation of
Smith, Jr.'s one punch to his daughter. Finally, the court did not discuss the physical char-
acteristics of the victim, the persistence of his conduct, the danger perceived by the defend-
ant or the danger presented to the defendant as required under section 5K2.10,
undoubtedly because they were irrelevant. But their very irrelevance goes to the issue of
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The Rorke case squarely raises the question of even-handed ap-
plication of the guidelines. Many of the sentencing court's concerns
and grounds for departure are compelling, yet the guidelines normally
reject them. Along with Koon, this case may be used as precedent for
treating police officers and other law enforcement personnel in a priv-
ileged way. Such an outcome would vitiate enforcement mechanisms
for criminal civil rights violations, send an unwarranted message to the
police, and undermine the public's confidence in the justice system.
(3) United States v. Couch
393
A third police brutality case, United States v. Couch, comes out of
the Sixth Circuit. The defendant sought, but was denied, Supreme
Court review of, inter alia, the circuit court's affirmance of the trial
court's failure to depart downward from the guideline sentence he re-
ceived.394 The Sixth Circuit held that as long as the sentence was
within the properly calculated guideline range, it would not review a
trial court's denial of a downward departure motion.395 That outcome
was not surprising. Even prior to the Supreme Court's holding in
Koon that abuse of discretion is the standard of review in sentencing
departure cases, appeals courts normally upheld sentencing court's re-
fusals to depart.396 Couch is discussed here because, along with Koon
and Rorke, it is one of the few examples of a police brutality sentenc-
ing appeal, thus making its facts readily ascertainable.
(a) The facts
On August 12, 1989, Officer Robert Couch, a police officer in
Covington, Kentucky, took part in a chase of Larry Overbey, a civilian
who was driving at a high speed on Interstate 75.397 When Overbey
finally gave up and pulled over, Officer Donald Andrews was already
whether section 5K2.10 applies at all. 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 285-86,
§ 5K2.10 ("Victim's Conduct").
393. 59 F.3d 171 (table), 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617 (6th Cir. June 20, 1995)
(unpublished opinion).
394. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, United States v. Couch (No. 95-662, filed
Oct. 23, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996).
395. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617, at *25.
396. See discussion supra note 310.
397. The district court did not issue a sentencing memorandum. Accordingly, these
facts are drawn from both Couch's petition for, and the government's opposition to, the
writ of certiorari, as well as the short factual synopsis from the unpublished Sixth Circuit
opinion. Where there are differences, the relevant brief is cited. Otherwise, only the Sixth
Circuit unpublished opinion is cited. The government's characterization should be given
more weight because the jury found Couch guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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on the scene. By the time Couch arrived, Andrews had his gun
drawn.398 Couch testified that he saw Overbey make a move toward
Andrews and that Andrews shouted at Couch to grab Overbey. 399
However, the government asserted that Overbey was not attempting
to flee, resist or threaten Andrews.400
The two sides also dispute how Overbey ended up on the ground.
Couch claims that Overbey and he fell together to the ground when
Overbey hit him in the chest.40 1 The government maintains that
Overbey was on the ground under Officer Andrew's control from the
moment Couch arrived on the scene.402 While Overbey was on the
ground, Couch struck him with his metal flashlight-one time some-
where on his body according to Couch, several times on the head ac-
cording to the government.403 Other officers on the scene, including
Andrews, also beat Overbey.404 The incident lasted a few seconds.405
When it was over, Overbey was lying in a pool of blood.406 One of-
ficer who was there said that there was more blood than he had seen
in his six and a half years on the force and that it looked like "road
kill. '407 Overbey received over fifty stitches for multiple lacerations
to his head. He was also bruised and had welts on his shoulders and
back.4 08
Couch was convicted of two counts of violating section 242.409
He was sentenced to prison for sixty-three months (based on an of-
fense level of 26) on the first count, out of a guideline range of sixty-
three to seventy-eight months.410
398. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617, at *3.
399. Id.
400. Respondent's Opposition at 2-3, United States v. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
15617 (6th Cir. June 20, 1995) (No. 94-3292).
401. Petitioner's Petition at 7, Couch (No. 94-3292).
402. Respondent's Opposition at 3, Couch (No. 94-3292).
403. Petitioner's Petition at 7; Respondent's Opposition at 3, Couch (No. 94-3292).
404. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617, at *3.
405. ld. at *3-4.
406. Respondent's Opposition at 4, Couch (No. 94-3292).
407. Id.
408. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617, at *3; Respondent's Opposition at 4, Couch
(No. 94-3292).
409. Count One charged him with using unreasonable force against Overbey during his
arrest after a high-speed chase, causing him bodily injury. The second count charged him
with falsely arresting Overbey for assault and resisting arrest. Indictment, United States v.
Couch, No. CR-1-93-0033 (S.D. Ohio, filed Mar. 3, 1993). A second officer, Michael Kraft,
was acquitted of these same charges. Couch, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15617, at *2 n.1.
Couch's conviction for the second count was reversed and remanded for a new trial by the
6th Circuit. Id. at *25-*26.
410. Appellant's Brief at 2, Couch (No. 94-3292).
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(b) The sentencing appeal
In his appeal to the Sixth Circuit and petition for a writ of certio-
rari, Couch made the same arguments for departure that the trial
courts in Koon and Rorke found credible and on which the Ninth and
Third Circuits split. Although the Supreme Court denied his petition,
he would stand a better chance before a sentencing court since the
Court's decision in Koon.
Couch claimed that his case was atypical, thus warranting depar-
ture.411 In support of this claim, he referred to the same sort of cir-
cumstances that existed in Koon. He argued that the victim's
"reckless and criminal behavior" played a substantial role in bring
about the incident; that he lost his job and benefits; that as a police
officer he was a more likely target of physical abuse in prison than
other prisoners; and that there was a reduced need to protect the pub-
lic because he was not violent, dangerous, or likely to engage in future
criminal conduct. 412 Two of these circumstances, victim misconduct
411. He cited guideline commentary that allows departure in cases where '"a particular
guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm."'
Appellant's Brief at 41, Couch (No. 94-3292) (citing 1995 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 14, at 5-6, pt. A, § 4(b) ("Departures"); id. at 282-83, § 5K2.0 ("Grounds for Depar-
ture"), which reiterates this principle).
412. Id. at 41-42. Couch also argued that the trial court erred in: (1) determining that
his underlying offense was an aggravated assault as defined by section 2A2.2 of the guide-
lines, giving him a base offense level of 17 (15 for aggravated assault plus 2 for the civil
rights violation under section 2H1.4); (2) "double-counting" by enhancing his sentence by
4 levels because he used a dangerous weapon; and (3) enhancing his sentence by 3 levels
because Overbey sustained serious bodily injury. Appellant's Brief at 35, 38-39, Couch
(No. 94-3292). Because many police brutality cases entail this sort of underlying conduct,
these claims are commonly raised. There is ample jurisprudence that has developed for
aggravated assault, use of a dangerous weapon, and serious bodily injury to which the
courts can turn for help in determining whether they apply. See, e.g., United States v.
Reese, 2 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 928 (1994) (affirming officers'
conviction for use of excessive force); United States v. Park, 988 F.2d 107 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 226 (1993) (affirming aggravated assault conviction of defendant who
rushed at I.R.S. agents removing his tractor with an iron pipe); United States v. Newman,
982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 59 (1993) (affirming Newman's convic-
tion for interfering with victim's civil rights under color of law); United States v. Corbin,
972 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming defendant's sentencing increase because blows to
the head requiring over 25 sutures constituted serious bodily injury); United States v. Wil-
liams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992) (vacating the district court sentence and applying the
increased 4-level adjustment for aggravated assault).
Finally, Couch maintained that the district court failed to base his sentence on injuries to
Overbey that only he caused. Appellant's Brief at 41, Couch (No. 94-3292). This argu-
ment was not developed and more properly pertained to his claims that the aggravated
assault guideline was improperly applied.
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and vulnerability in prison, were upheld by the Supreme Court as ap-
propriate departure grounds in Koon.
413
Ironically, the parallels cited by Couch between his case and
Koon undermine the rationale applied by the Supreme Court in Koon
that would have bolstered Couch's claim. Both Couch and Rorke
demonstrate that the very factors cited by the Court to be atypical in
Koon are, to the contrary, quite common. Had the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Couch, perhaps the outcome in Koon would have
been different. At the least, an awareness of the facts in Couch might
have given the court pause in its "rush to judgment" that Koon was
outside of the heartland.
Conclusion
When a court applies heartland factors to depart downward from
a typical police brutality case, it is refusing to apply the guideline sen-
tence on grounds that represent the essence of the crime. The effect
of such departures is to diminish the fundamental purposes of the
guidelines: to treat police officers like all other people who break the
law and punish them for their crimes in proportion to the punishment
prescribed for all other crimes. Departures trivialize the principle of
fairness and equality for all and send the wrong message to police
officers and their victims alike. Such a message is particularly perni-
cious given the frequent racial dimension to the crime.
Koon, Rorke and Couch are representative of countless other
brutality crimes committed by police. Yet departures have been
sought and granted on the basis of findings that the crimes and cir-
cumstances surrounding them are not what the Sentencing Commis-
sion envisioned when it enacted the guidelines. Given the frequency
with which these same factual circumstances appear in police brutality
cases (and of which the courts are in the best position to be cogni-
zant), however haphazard the Commission's early process may have
been, this challenge to the guidelines seems disingenuous. Further-
more, under any interpretation, the Commission made its intent clear
when it reaffirmed and strengthened the police brutality guidelines in
1995.4 14 Viewed realiftically, what is really going on is disagreement
between departing courts and the Sentencing Commission on the use
and substance of these guidelines. With Koon, the Supreme Court has
now openly sided with these departing courts, fully sanctioning depar-
413. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
414. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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ture practice in police brutality cases under the guise of respecting the
Commission's intent.
Admittedly, the Sentencing Commission could have made a bet-
ter record. The Koon decision invites it to do so. The Commission
should take this opportunity to thoroughly study police brutality sen-
tencing, both before and after the guidelines. By doing so, it will be
able to clearly define the heartland crime. It will need to decide
whether the factors that the Supreme Court said are outside of the
heartland really are. The issue of victim misconduct is perhaps the
most urgent, both because it is so prevalent and because the Court
unanimously found that it is not. Specifically, the Commission needs
to clarify whether it considers volatile police-citizen encounters of the
sort contemplated by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor to be
unusual.415 The Commission should also determine whether it en-
dorses the test for departure that the Court adopted from Rivera in
which factors are categorized as "encouraged," "discouraged," and
"forbidden.1 416 If it does approve of this test, then the Commission
415. See supra note 299 (describing how in Koon, the Ninth Circuit cited Graham v.
Connor to support its holding that because police-citizen encounters are often "tense, un-
certain, and rapidly evolving," the district court should not have found Koon to be an
unusual case); see also supra notes 41,298-99 (discussing Graham). In Couch, the defend-
ant argued precisely the opposite. In seeking downward departure, he asserted that his
conduct should be viewed in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest
and that police "must respond to rapidly evolving situations and in these exigent circum-
stances are called upon to make split-second decisions." Appellant's Brief at 42, Couch
(No. 94-3292). Without indicating so, Couch was quoting directly from Graham. 490 U.S.
at 397. The Supreme Court did not directly answer this question. It simply rejected the
circuit court's characterization that the district court focused on volatility rather than prov-
ocation. See supra note 311.
The Sentencing Commission must recognize that Couch's statement is indeed an accu-
rate account of what police work entails. Police officers work under great pressure, often
having to make instantaneous decisions. CouLsoN, supra note 92, at 15. As in Couch, the
use of rapid response systems in which police are alerted through their car radios of a
situation requiring intervention has intensified this dynamic. Police "must size up the peo-
ple involved and make raw assumptions about the facts. Snap judgments are the name of
the game. Responding officers are under pressure to act quickly. They are expected to be
back on patrol as soon as possible and be ready for another assignment. Respond quickly,
size up the situation, fix the immediate problem, then exit the scene: This is typical of
modern police work." Id. at 110. See also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. One
of the things that makes police work so volatile is that it entails subjecting unwilling people
to their authority. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 94. Added to this dynamic is the
fact that often the people with whom police must contend are unstable. See supra notes
171-72 and accompanying text.
However, the Sentencing Commission should then make clear that the fact that these
circumstances arise in police work is exactly the point. It brings cases such as Koon, Rorke
and Couch squarely within the heartland.
416. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
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will need to designate potential departure grounds accordingly. Fi-
nally, the Commission should measure the civil rights guideline's im-
pact on police brutality sentences. As discussed at length in this
Article, existing data provide an incomplete picture. 417 The evidence
that such a study is likely to produce-that pre-guideline sentences
were unconscionably low-will fortify the Commission's commitment
to the existing punishment scale. By undertaking this project, the
Commission can curb unwarranted departures by setting forth more
precisely permissible departure grounds and reinforcing the sentenc-
ing courts' resolve to comply.
Even if the Sentencing Commission fails to act, however, courts
should resist departures in police brutality cases, despite the Supreme
Court's virtual grant of unlimited power to them. As long as police
brutality is a crime, to justify downward departure for reasons that are
inherent in, and go to the heart of, these crimes is to suggest that the
courts are not serious about addressing the problem. While mandated
sentencing is surely not the only means of fighting police brutality, any
dilution of effort in that aspect of the cause diminishes the trust placed
in the judiciary by affected communities. Unless the citizenry believes
that the courts can be counted on to try and punish police brutality to
the extent willed by Congress, the deep societal chasm that currently
exists will not abate.
417. See supra Part III.B.
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